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ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 3.5.10)
The incomes and employment policies of the Thatcher government are embodied in its privatisation strategy,
which unequivocally advocates the application of 'market principles' in public service provision and wage
determination. This study is concerned with the issue of wage determination for public sector service
employees, a large proportion of whom are women working part-time; and engages in current social
stratification debates concerning the structuring of inequality, which largely focus on the efficacy of labour
market processes and explanations. Through a critical analysis of the processes structuring women's
'economic position', the study contributes to the social stratification literature by advancing arguments
regarding 'non-market' conceptualisations of the processes structuring the distribution of social resources.
The marked growth in public sector employment during the post-war period in Britain has been associated
with significant increases in women's labour force participation. Given the importance of the public service
sector as a source of women's expanding employment opportunities, women in particular are susceptible
to the consequences of reductions in public spending and in the scope and content of social welfare
services. The government's privatisation policies are thus a significant cause for concern in reference to
women's employment in Britain.
The privatisation programme, which incorporates policies to contract-out public services, de-nationalise
public industries, and 'liberalise' legislative controls, and is designed to 're-establish' the primacy of 'market'
principles in the distribution of resources, is closely allied to assumptions underlying orthodox economic
theory. Privatisation policies have been marshalled, however, in relation to circumstances where market
distinctions are most problematic. Market-based explanations fail to coherently account for public service
sector employment and the growth of 'social wages'; they are also unable to adequately explain gender
differences in earnings and the general pattern of low pay. Women's employment in the public sector
juxtaposes the artificial division of domestic and paid labour, and 'public welfare' and 'private market' forms
of resource distribution, underlining the contrived nature of the separation of 'economic' (productive) and
'social' (non-productive or reproductive) processes. Conventional 'malestream' analyses focusing on
'economic man' have been criticised for their treatment of women, and there are clear parallels to the
manner in which public welfare services are analytically treated: as 'social' categories both are construed
to be peripheral and are therefore marginalised.
Conservative policies to 'roll back' welfare state activities have been widely criticised as turning the tide
against the 'welfare state.' It is argued here, however, that privatisation policies represent one end of a
continuum in a series of attempts to locate the explanation for wage determination in terms of market
efficiency and productivity, and more specifically, low pay with inefficiency and low productivity. While it is
recognised that the government's initiative to curtail certain public sector activities is deleterious, in order
to successfully counter the mobilization of privatisation policies designed to effect such a curtailment, it is
important to understand the manner in which legitimacy for these policies has been appropriated. While
the 'crisis in welfare' is generally perceived to reflect the collapse of consensus regarding the 'mixed-
economy of market' and 'state' welfare assumed by pioneers of the welfare state, it is argued here that the
'welfare crisis' is rooted not in the collapse of consensus, but in the consensus rationale that state activities
constitute intervention in 'market' operations. Both free-market theorists and leftists share similar analytical
understandings of the relations between politics and the 'market economy'; both positions assume that
improvements in social welfare through government action constitute 'interference' with the 'logic of the
market.' It is this pervasive assumption which has hitherto constrained welfare state developments and
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Introduction
The incomes and employment policies of the Conservative government in Britain are
embodied in its privatisation strategy. Privatisation policies have been pursued on the
premise that processes of wage determination are to be explained in terms of market
efficiency and productivity, and more specifically, low pay with inefficiency and low
productivity. The present research focuses on the perceived problem of wage determination
for public sector service employees, a large proportion of whom are women working on a
part-time basis. Criticisms and developments within social stratification debates concerning
the structuring of inequality focus on the efficacy of labour market processes and
explanations. The aim of this research is to contribute to debates which critically examine
the dualism in stratification theory as reflected in the division of 'economic' and 'social'
relations in explanations of resource allocation, wage determination and the structuring of
inequality1. The economic/social divide is variously expressed in the dichotomies of:
man/woman; capitalism/patriarchy; class/status; paid labour/domestic labour;
production/consumption; market/welfare state. The underlying principles and
consequences of the analytic separation of 'the market' and 'the welfare state' as systems of
resource allocation and wage determination provide the primary focus in this analysis.
In considering the impact that privatisation policies have had on women's employment in
Britain, the research presented here attempts to demonstrate the conceptual and evidential
problems in theoretical analyses which assume the separation of 'economic' and 'social'
aspects in the structuring of social life. The study of gender and employment, in particular
women's employment in the public sector, is instructive in challenging the way in which
economic explanations assume social processes and issues to be peripheral, thus
restricting the relevance of the field of social inquiry to a limited set of circumstances.
1 Cf. Stewart et al., 1980, 1985; Goldthorpe 1978, 1980, 1985; Holmwood and Stewart 1983;
Siltanen and Stanworth 1984; Prandy 1986; Acker 1989
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Conceptualisations of the autonomy of the 'economic', however, do not simply underpin
normative economic theory but also conventional approaches in stratification research. This
limits and distorts our understandings of social experiences. This also has important
consequences for social policy practice, as reflected in the advancement of neo-
conservative agendas throughout many western industrialised countries.
The distinction between market and non-market (ie. welfare state) systems of resource
distribution necessarily involves a consideration of explanations of the structuring of
employment and the relationship between employment (paid labour) and the family
(domestic labour). The dichotomy between the spheres of production and reproduction,
between paid and unpaid labour, has been extensively debated and challenged within the
feminist literature. The need for a reconceptualisation of the relationship between women's
position in the 'private sphere' of the family and in the 'public sphere' of employment has
been spurred, in particular, by substantial increases in the participation of married women
with young children. Issues of gender and gender inequality are thus central to the analysis;
the question of the relationship between these apparent separate spheres has not,
however, been resolved.
As Stacey (1981) argues in 'The Division of Labour Revisited...', while feminist scholarship
has ensured that the analysis of reproduction is addressed, the deficiencies of theories of
production and reproduction stem not from the fact that one process is analysed and the
other is not, but from the fact that they are not analysed as parts of a single process.
Similarly, Acker suggests that a conceptual transformation is required: 'Instead of positing
analytically independent structures and then looking for linkages between them, it starts
from the assumption that social relations are constituted through processes in which the
linkages are inbuilt' (1989: 239). The need for a transformation of social theory, such that it
might account fully for the range of social relations, is acknowledged within much feminist
work but holds less potency elsewhere. Despite the fact that feminist research has
considered the problem of dualist conceptualisations in explaining structures of inequality,
<
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the issue of the division of 'social' and 'economic' relations has not been explicitly
addressed but remains largely embedded within debates about the adequacy of the
distinction between systems of production and reproduction, or capitalism and patriarchy.
As I have indicated above, however, the distinction between production and reproduction is
one expression of an underlying conceptual dualism; that is, the separation of 'social' and
'economic' processes. Thus, the research presented here will specifically address the issue
of the separation of 'economic' processes from apparently additional 'social' influences in
explanations of the structuring of inequality. As Stewart et al argue (1985: 243), the
contradiction between 'economic' and 'social' influences constitutes 'an increasingly acute
explanatory crisis' that cannot be ignored.
Privatisation policies, pursued by a government whose self-declared intent is to 'roll back
the frontiers of the welfare state', have been widely criticised as turning the tide against the
'welfare state'. In exploring themes and concepts running through policy statements and
documents relating to employment and wage policies over the post-war period, the main
argument presented in Chapter 1 is that there are important lines of continuity in social
policies pursued by successive governments - Conservative and Labour alike - which calls
into question the perceived novelty of the neo-conservative agenda. In arguing that the
privatisation strategy represents the culmination of, rather than digression from, post-war
public sector wage policies, it is suggested that privatisation denotes the most categorical
statement and extension of successive policy developments promoting the salience of so-
called 'market' principles in the structuring and distribution of employment and wages.
While recognising the deleterious consequences of the Thatcher government's attempt to
reduce the scope and content of certain public sector activities, it is important to understand
the way in which legitimacy for these policies has been appropriated. This is important,
above all, in order to successfully counter their mobilization. In Chapter 2, it is argued that
the presumed validity of 'market' criteria, such as efficiency and productivity objectives
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pursued through privatisation policies, has been cultivated as a result of the power given to
'economic', as against 'social' explanations, rather than emanating from any intrinsic
'economic logic'. In critiquing conventional economic and social theory, it is suggested that
the residual conceptualisation of social categories and prevailing obeisance to 'economic
laws' is deeply flawed. This fundamental weakness is evidenced in the failure of market
explanations to coherently account for the structure of employment and wages, in particular,
employment and pay in the public sector. It is, nevertheless, on the basis of erroneous
assumptions about the relationship between economic and socio-political forces which has
informed and seriously constrained social policy and welfare state developments.
Gender divisions in employment and earnings further highlights the failure of market
explanations. Chapter 3 provides an overview of trends in women's labour force
participation examining, in particular, patterns of employment and pay in the public and
private sectors over the post-war period. The growth in public sector employment over this
period has been very closely associated with the increased participation of women,
especially married women, in the labour force. The growing numbers of women in public
service employment brings into focus, in a very powerful way, the fundamental significance
of 'non-market' influences. Though labour market segmentation theory has evolved out of
the recognition that market 'imperfections' exist and feminist analyses have employed its
basic concepts in an attempt to explain gender inequalities, the primary question addressed
in this chapter is whether segmentation theories adequately contend with the centrality of
social processes.
One of the principal aims of Privatisation and Women's Employment is to explore the
relationship of the workers' social circumstances and their employment situations, in order
to further our understanding of the social nature of stratification arrangements. Given the
economic axioms explicitly marshalled toward justification of the privatisation strategy,
assessing the impact of privatisation policies on women's employment in the public sector
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provides a unique opportunity to explore the commensurability of 'economic' and 'social'
explanations.
The National Health Service (NHS) has served as a precedent in the Thatcher
government's privatisation drive, with clear directives emerging in 1983 instructing health
authorities to contract-out certain ancillary services. For this reason, the present research
focuses on developments within NHS ancillary - specifically domestic ancillary -
employment and service provision. The contracting-out of ancillary health services,
however, has not proceeded as smoothly in the direction intended and implied by the term
'privatisation'. Chapter 4 traces the form and progress of the privatisation strategy affecting
NHS ancillary service provision in England and Scotland. The analysis developed in the
current work is primarily based on information relating to domestic ancillary service
provision and employment in two NHS general hospitals in a Scottish health board. In
reponse to pressures to privatise their services, this health board has pursued the
introduction of 'efficiency initiatives', primarily in the form of incentive bonus payment
schemes. The research examines the impact of efficiency initiatives on domestic ancillary
working conditions, service provision and working patterns generally, and provides an
analysis of the relationship of the workers' social circumstances (including domestic
responsibilities) and their employment situations.
As a consequence of the government's privatisation policies, the analysis suggests that
domestic employment is being restructured. The employment restructuring is manifested by
the increased reliance on part-time work and is also reflected in radical changes in the
profile of the workforce. The repercussions of the process, in which employment
opportunities are significantly altered, on the profile of the workforce itself rather than simply
on job conditions, is one which has not been adequately addressed in other studies. In
providing a focus which captures changes in the profile of the workforce, as well as
employment opportunities and conditions, the research attempts to demonstrate the
centrality of social processes in employment and wage structuring. The research presented
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in Chapters 5 and 6 undermines conventional conceptions of the relationship between
wages and employment, which generally assume that wages are 'economically' determined
and largely, if not exclusively, reflect 'job-market' criteria. Further, while gender appears to
be a salient factor in the distribution of jobs at the aggregate level - domestic ancillary
workers are almost entirely female - the female workforce itself is highly differentiated.
There are, then, important variations in the social circumstances of female workers which
structure their employment experiences. The research thus provides an occasion to
investigate divisions within, and not just across, the category 'gender'.
Low pay, measured in terms of an individual's position within a national earnings league, is
concentrated among particular groups within the general population. Women, young
people, older manual workers and ethnic minorities are all more heavily represented at the
bottom of the earnings hierarchy. Chapter 6 examines the nature and extent of low pay
among domestic ancillary workers, and considers the likely impact of a national minimum
wage in improving their low paid position and providing a socially acceptable living
standard. It is suggested that minimum wage debates highlight the problematic nature of
the separation of 'economic' and 'social' factors in explanations of resource distribution and
processes maitaining inequalities.
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1. The Policy Continuum: From Public Provision to
Privatisation
Introduction
The privatisation programme heralded by the present Conservative government is premised
explicitly upon neoclassical economic theory, and ascribes paramount importance to the
belief in 'market forces' distributing resources, that is, wages, jobs, goods and services. It is
argued that by introducing 'market competition', privatisation will make public industries and
services more efficient, providing better 'value for money' by removing wasteful employment
practices (cf. Kay et al 1986; Beesley and Littlechild 1986; Moore M.P. 1986; Minford 1987;
Barry 1987; Ascher 1987). Privatisation is an umbrella term encompassing an array of
polices designed, in the government's view, to 're-establish' the primacy of so-called
'market' principles in the provision of public services. These policies are at the heart of
controversies concerning the distribution of resources.
The policy to privatise public industries and services is, in effect, both an employment and
wage policy; the intention is to govern not simply the general type of service provision but
also the method of wage determination itself. In this chapter, I will be arguing that the
privatisation strategy is the culmination of, rather than a digression from, post-war policies
in the public sector concerning wage determination. In arguing that privatisation represents
the culmination of public sector wage policies in the post-war period, I am suggesting that
privatisation denotes the most categorical statement and extension of successive policy
developments promoting the salience of so-called 'market' principles in the determination of
wages. It is my contention, furthermore, that the legitimacy of and increasing emphasis
given to 'market' criteria such as efficiency and productivity, in the name of 'economic
necessity', has been cultivated as a result of the power given to economic, as against
social, explanations, rather than emanating from any intrinsic 'economic' logic.
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Throughout the post-war period, the question of public sector pay has been central to the
growing concern about the increasing size and, more importantly, the growing cost of
maintaining the public sector. The prevailing presumption is that public expenditure,
affording essentially 'unproductive' services, is a drain on the national economy, threatening
economic growth. Wages are regarded as the largest element in escalating public
expenditure costs. There are, however, problems in measuring government activity and
public expenditure. Measures of public sector size are relatively arbitrary in two ways - in
relation to public sector accounting practices and in relation to welfare costs specifically.
Criticisms of public service provision in fact mobilise a stereotypical conception of 'the
welfare state' which conveniently disregards the broad range of welfare benefits provided
and the equally diverse recipients of these benefits.
The nature of the social divisions of welfare (Titmuss 1958; Sinfield 1986) and the interplay
between fiscal, economic and social policies reflect these entrenched and, in my view,
incorrect assumptions about the relation between 'socio-political' and 'economic'
processes. The attempted subsumption of social processes under the centrality of market-
commodity production stems from the separation of 'economic' processes from apparently
additional 'social' influences. This conceptual framework has important implications for
understandings of the distribution and allocation of resources. In the next chapter, I will
develop my critique of the underlying conceptually contrived economic/social divide. I turn
now, however, to consider the privatisation strategy and its relationship to post-war public
sector wage policies generally.
Public Sector Wage Policy Developments
The debate about public sector pay has invariably been set in relation to private sector pay.
The controversy centres on the relative rates of growth of average earnings in the two
sectors and the apparent divergence of average pay levels. The controversy, though
arguably heightened since the early 1970's, has always been a pressing issue. There has
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been a dual concern underlying the endeavour to clarify the principles determining pay in
the public sector : firstly, to specify the ostensibly economic relationship between the so-
called 'productive' and 'non-productive' or 'market' and 'non-market' areas of employment,
in order to aid the formulation of government employment policy; and secondly, to ensure
that public sector employees are not poorly paid in relation to other workers, apparently a
socio-political objective, deriving in part from the former problem.
Public expenditure, defined generally as the 'dispensation by the state on non-market
criteria of economic resources which it has acquired from firms and households' (Heald
1983:10), is used to measure the size of the public sector, usually by comparison with the
national income aggregate, Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is not the purpose here to
discuss in detail the various public expenditure/national income ratios which, by all
accounts, record an expanding share of national income involving the state. Nonetheless, it
is important to restate the standard cautionary warnings, typically ignored, that there are
problems in measuring government activity and public expenditure and therefore, the fact
that measures of public sector size are relatively arbitrary. In the protracted political debate
about the size of the public sector, such measures have, nevertheless, been extensively
employed, and have themselves contributed to an escalation of concern over what appears
to be the steady encroachment of the public sector on the rest of the economy.
Government policies regarding public sector wages have taken various forms over the post¬
war period. Essentially, there have been five institutional approaches: incomes policies,
fiscal policies, arbitration and enquiry, cash limits on public expenditure, and privatisation.
Successive enquiries concerning the pay and conditions of employment for public service
workers in the civil service, local government and the NHS, beginning with the Tomlin
Commission in 1929 and ending with the Clegg Commission in 1980, have accorded
priority to the principle of pay comparability. The principle that 'fair market rates' should be
paid to public service workers stemmed from two rather conflicting concerns. One major
concern was the need to recruit and retain sufficient staff in the public sector. The other
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concern, from the point of view of the Treasury, was that a broad comparison of wages
provided by the generality of outside employers established, as near as could be, a
surrogate commercial 'market' basis for wage determination in the public sector. A 'market
price' was argued to be necessary in order to provide some defence against criticisms (from
both employees and 'taxpayers'/private sector employers) about public sector wage levels
and public expenditure costs in general.
I would argue that the development of incomes policies, cash limits and privatisation has
demonstrated a progression toward tighter controls designed to constrain public
expenditure with particular pressure on wages. Incomes policies designed to control the
rate of growth in wages are the most obvious and familiar form of government wage
intervention and were widely used in the years 1948-1979. The operation of pay
comparability exercises as the basis of remunerating public service workers was often
modified or deferred on the grounds of national incomes policies. From the mid-1970's,
incomes polices were accompanied by the use of cash limits on public expenditure which,
since 1981, have been employed more extensively and stringently. Cash limits, intended to
restrict the cash requirements for the public sector as a whole, do so to a large extent by
limiting wage costs. The assumptions underlying cash limits include provisions for
projected pay movements and thus reflect an implicit government policy on pay. The
privatisation programme in the 1980's, which incorporates policies to contract-out public
services, denationalise public industries and 'liberalise' legislative controls, is both a wage
and employment policy, intended to introduce to the public sector a 'market allocation' of
wages and services, thereby restricting wages.
In the remaining sections of this chapter I shall focus on issues of pay comparability,
primarily in the context of NHS ancillary pay bargaining developments, and the general
progression of government policies regarding public sector wages.
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Public Sector Pay and the Comparison Principle
The notion that public sector pay should be settled by means of comparison with pay for
similar jobs 'outside' can be traced back to the nineteenth century. The suggestion
emanated from Parliament for use as a guiding principle for its administrators in the
payment of government employees. However, it was through the action of trade unions that
the principle became firmly established (Clegg Report No.9:1980).
Trade unions took their lead from the original 'fair wages' resolution passed by the House of
Commons in 1891. This resolution brought into the legislature protection for workers hired
on government contracts : that their wages should be not less than the 'going rate for the
job'. Government manual workers pressed for similar wage protection, which was granted
in 1919. In 1924 the Prime Minister made a statement to the effect that the Government
should 'pay rates of wages and observe hours of labour not less favourable than those
commonly recognised by employers and trade societies (or in the absence of such
recognised wages and hours, those which in practice prevail among good employers) in the
trade in the district where the work is carried out' (Hansard: May 1924:col.1570).
The Treasury has had a general policy on wages and salaries in government employment
since the Tomlin Royal Commission on the Civil Service (1929-31). The adopted 'Tomlin
Formula' rests on the observation that:
'Where the employer is a private individual the terms of employment can be
settled directly between the two parties to the contract. In substance the
position is the same in large commercial companies...Moreover in many
cases the test of profit or loss gives some guidance to the staff costs which
can be afforded.
In the case of public employment not only is the test of profit or loss
normally absent, but as between the Crown as employer and the individual
civil servant the chain of responsibility is longer...'(Paragraph 298).
The essence of the 'Tomlin Formula' is expressed in the following quote taken from the
Minutes of Evidence given by the Joint Consultative Committee to the Commission:
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'...the basis of remuneration in the Civil Service should be such as is
sufficient to recruit men appropriate to the particular duties and retain them
in the Service without losing their keeness or efficiency' (1931:729).
The concern, to protect 'public' (taxpayers/private employers) and market interests in wage
bargains, is explicitly acknowledged in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's budget statement
in 1941 andthe White Paper on Price Stabilisation and Industrial Policy :
'...the maintenance of wages and employees' remuneration at a reasonable
level should be achieved as far as possible by improvement in the
efficiency of production by the joint efforts of employers and work people'
(Ministry of Labour Gazette August 1941:154).
This paper remained the governing document on the subject throughout the war. Grounds
for the upward adjustment of wages were permitted only where there was improved
efficiency and production, or in cases of comparatively low paid grades of workers.
In 1948, the Labour government published its Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs and
Prices (cmnd. 7321). This placed an even greater emphasis on economic criteria,
suggesting that the only acceptable occasions for increases in wages were cases where the
distribution of labour would otherwise be adversely affected; i.e., in 'undermanned'
industries. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) accepted this policy in full, on the condition
that other exceptions, such as the needs of those 'below a reasonable standard of
subsistence' and of safeguarding differentials, were allowed.
This resulted in a wage freeze and roughly coincided with the nationalisation of the health
service. Nonetheless, Clegg and Chester (1957)suggest that a qualified Tomlin formula
was the conscious policy used in the NHS because although the government's policy acted
as a brake on pay awards, many increases were granted. In particular, the frequent
recourse to the use of arbitration to settle pay awards in the first six years of the health
service's existence is noted; (arbitrators tended to apply the Tomlin formula in settling
claims.). As Clegg and Chester indicate, it takes two sides to make a case for arbitration
and yet, management (government) continued to permit arbitration when the results more
frequently supported staff claims.
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'By following the decisions made on remuneration in 'comparable
employments', they (the government) can avoid the charge that tney are
embarrassing the private employer by taking the lead at the expense of
increased taxation... Thus by renouncing a good deal of their control over
what they pay, governments can erect a political defence...This was the
accepted doctrine of those who became responsible for dealing with
wages and salaries in the Health Service' (1957:97).
Moreover, prior to nationalisation, the 'Hetherington Committee', appointed during the war
to recommend minimum rates of wages and conditions of employment for domestic workers
in hospitals, explicitly considered rates of wages settled by agreement in comparable
employments as a basis for their recommendations.
The use of comparisons with outside employment for pay determination was also
recommended by the Priestley Commission in 1955. This Commission on the Civil Service
was appointed, among other things, to consider whether any changes were desirable in the
principles governing pay. The view of the commission was that the ultimate objective was
'an efficient civil service, fairly remunerated' (1955:15). The commission, however, voiced
its disagreement with several major principles held by the Tomlin commission.
'We believe the State is under a categorical obligation to remunerate its
employees fairly, and that any statement of end which does not explicitly
recognise this is not adequate : It may be held that if rates of pay are such
as to recruit and retain an efficient staff they must be fair or even that this is
what is meant by fair. We do not agree...We believe that it is true in a
general way that if rates of pay for the Civil Service are what we should call
fair they will probably, over a period of time and in most cases, enable the
service to recruit and retain an efficient staff...The converse of this cannot,
however, be logically inferred. The proposition that the Civil Service is
recruiting and retaining an efficient staff does not necessarily prove the
proposition that the rates of pay are fair. That the analysis of 'fairness' in
terms solely of recruitment and retention is not supported by the facts
seems to us clear...' (1955:paragragh 90).
The Priestley commission supported its contention that the fairness of the wage determined
has little to do with the distribution of labour, on the grounds that:
1. Financial considerations are not always the principal incentive attracting recruits;
2. Wastage is not a good indicator of the fairness or unfairness of rates of pay;
3. It is dangerous to assume that because civil servants appear to be carrying out their
duties 'efficiently', they are being paid 'fairly';
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4. The 'law of the market' plays an ever decreasing role in the conduct of wage and salary
negotiations.
Though strongly arguing for increased government intervention and responsibility the
commission did not, however, believe it to be the duty of governments to take a lead on
matters relating to principles of pay determination.
'...narrowing or widening of variations in living standards must raise social
and, as we think in the last analysis, political considerations. The question
of salary 'differentials', so very much before the public eye, is an example,
since it is directly bound up with the pattern of income distribution, which is
essentially a political question. We are satisfied that it is right and proper,
and it is implicit in the principle of fair comparison, that the civil service pay
structure should reflect such changes as take place in the outside world. If,
however, changes were proposed in the Civil Service with the intention of
giving a lead on such matters to the country as a whole in order to further a
political or social objective, civil service pay negotiations would become
involved with political issues and the non-political character of the Service
might well be impaired' (1955:26).
Consequently, the commission abdicated responsibility (of itself and of governments) from
the task of protecting wages where the pay and conditions of service of outside comparators
were themselves poor. In essence the Commission reiterated the received wisdom that
government involvement in pay negotiations to establish a higher floor to wages constitues
interference.
'How far wage and salary rates in the country at large are 'right' absolutely
and relatively, and how far trade union organisation should be improved or
modified, are issues that are beyond our terms of reference. But we are
satisfied that to pay the civil servant more than his outside counterpart on
the ground that the latter is paid inadequately would be unfair to the outside
counterpart who as a taxpayer has to bear a proportion of the cost of the
civil servant's salary' (1955:27).
The Treasury reaffirmed its belief in this principle before the Royal Commission on the Civil
Service ('Priestley') in 1954.
'...if a civil servant can be seen to be getting, as near as may be, what
citizens of similar attainments are getting for doing similar work in the
country at large, that is a situation which will surely be commended as fair
by the civil servant himself, by his outside analogue, and by the taxpayer
who foots the bill...Finally, there is the essential point that the Service must
be able to recruit its fair share of the available talent in all classes. From
this point of view, the rates currently offered for similar work by outside
employers are of paramount importance' (Memoranda of Evidence
submitted by the Treasury: November 1954).
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In according priority to the Tomlin principle, the Treasury further stipulated that 'fair market
rates' should be paid, which in practice meant that comparison was with the current rates
paid by the generality of outside employers.
The Priestley Commission, nevertheless, encourages the government to be a 'good
employer' in the sense that it should be among those who offer the highest rates of
remuneration (above the median, but below the highest quartile of average earnings).
Moreover, a 'good employer' is argued to provide stability and continuity of employment with
structures for consultation between staff and employers (1955:39-45). Thus, for a period of
twenty-five years, the conscious policy on wages and salaries in government employment
was that of using the principle of broad general comparisons with outside analogues in
order to 'recruit and retain' staff. From the point of view of the Treasury, this established, as
near as could be, a surrogate commercial 'market' basis to the procedure, which in turn
provided a sound defence against any possible criticisms from its employees or from private
employers as 'taxpayers'.
Expenditure Constraints
The appointment of the Guillebaud Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the NHS, which
was given the task of finding measures to effect the 'most effective control and efficient use
of such Exchequer funds as may be made available' (1956:1), arose because the
expansion of the NHS in the 1950's fuelled heightened concern about the public cost of the
service.
Given that approximately 70% of NHS expenditure has been in respect of wage and salary
payments, and other public services involve similar amounts, governments have focused on
these 'costs' and have relied on the use of various wage policies tQ try and curb their
growth. The development of incomes policies, cash limits and privatisation over the post¬
war period has demonstrated a progression toward tighter controls designed to constrain
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public expenditure. The common rationale for incomes policies, cash limits and privatisation
alike is the prevailing presumption that public expenditure, affording essentially
'unproductive' services, is a drain on the national economy, threatening economic growth. It
is the nature of public services in particular which is argued to create the problem of
allocating resources (which includes wages, jobs and services) because demands are not
restrained by a 'market price'. This has been most explicitly addressed and politicised by
the Thatcher government, but has in fact informed and constrained government employment
and wage policies throughout the post-war period.
From 1948 to 1980, incomes policies (and latterly, cash limits) observed through the
collective bargaining structure, through direct determination of pay settlements, or by
restricting health authority budgets, punctuated the operation of pay comparability systems.
During this period, certain exceptional increases above the ceilings set by incomes policies
and cash limits were allowed. In particular, the following 'special cases' were not always
subject to the ceilings laid down: certain 'essential differentials' (comparator occupations
and internal relativities); labour shortages; low paid categories of workers ; and increased
productivity. Current privatisation initiatives, intended to dramatically reduce public sector
wage costs and public expenditure on public services generally, has accompanied the
stricter application of cash limits and the abandonment of formalised systems of pay
comparability exercises such as existed for the civil service.
Throughout this period, then, an incomes policy, whether implicitly or explicitly employed,
has been in operation. The issue, therfore, is not whether there is a policy; rather, the task
is one of understanding what informs the policy adopted. A continuity in thought has
informed concerns regarding the cost of 'non-market' employment and the apparent
consequent need for expenditure constraint, especially given the growth of the public sector,
throughout the post-war period.
'The nation's economic welfare depends largely upon our ability to make
and sell the exports necessary to buy the imports we need to feed our
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people and keep our industry going. Our costs of production are of vital
importance and they depend to a considerable extent on the amount which
industry has to pay in profits, salaries and wages' (1948:para 1;emphasis
added).
Thus began the first incomes policy of the post-war period. Warning of the ever-present
dangers of inflation, the policy declared that there should be no further general increase in
levels of individual money incomes without a corresponding increase in the volume of
production. A year previously, the Interim Report of the Cost of Living Advisory Committee
(1947) suspended the existing cost-of-living index, proposing in its stead a retail price index.
The adoption of an interim index and the subsequent retail price index stemmed in part from
the out-dated basis of the official cost-of-living index figure. However, as the Interim Report
indicates, the desired revision was not simply a result of the fact that the index was out of
date, but the fact the whole conception of a 'cost-of-living' index had come to be perceived
as inappropriate and misleading. The adoption of the index based on retail prices rather
than costs or standards of living facilitated the desired distancing of the index from an
explicit wage index, a policy clearly in line with the anti-wage inflation concerns of the
government at that time.
In the 1956 White Paper, The Economic Implications of Full Employment, the government
underlined the 'obvious social evil' of continually rising prices, the most important factor
being productivity concerns - that is, wages and productivity levels. The 'social unfairness'
of the 'spiral of rising incomes and prices' was ardently criticised. The objective, to achieve
full employment without inflation was, nonetheless, bound by the view that levels of income
depend on the balance of supply and demand.
'The Government of this country does not attempt to tell the people what
income each one of them ought to be receiving at any given moment.
Wages are fixed by free negotiation...But the satisfactory operation of this
whole system depends upon everyone involved being fully aware of the
issues at stake, and upon their acceptance of the full duties of citizenship
which this realisation places upon them' (1956:para 31).
The ordained solution was that of self-restraint and increased productivity.
In 1958, the government took steps to distance itself (and conciliation and arbitration bodies
appointed to operate on its behalf) even further from directly determining wages and
conditions of employment. The dissolution of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal in 1959
followed the breakdown of tripartite discussions between the Trades Union Congress, the
Employers Confederation and the Government regarding the future of compulsory
arbitration. For almost 20 years, compulsory arbitration had been in force, embodied in
various Statutory Rules and Orders under the auspices of general defence regulations.
Compulsory arbitration entailed legislative machinery to settle disputes regarding fresh
applications for improved terms and conditions of employment in addition to settling issues
about whether or not an 'agreed' principle was being applied. Though compulsory
arbitration was abandoned, section 8 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959
provided legislation which, on the basis of voluntary agreements between both sides of
industry, gave statutory rights to representatives of employees and employers to invoke the
'agreed' or established terms and conditions of employment, adjudicated by the Industrial
Court. Thus, even though the vast majority of cases previously presided over by the
National Arbitration and National Industrial Tribunals related to fundamental disagreements
about the actual substance of the terms and conditions of employment (Ministry of Labour
1961:144), remaining legislation only pertained to the less contentious task of settling
issues about whether a particular employer (or employee) was falling short of 'agreed' terms
and conditions.
The Economic Survey of 1962 indicates that one of the main factors contributing to poor
national productivity performance at that time was the
'...growth in employment during the past two years...of workers (for example
immigrants, school workers and women, including many working part-time)
who have gone largely into the service industries, where output is difficult to
measure, or whose contribution to production is for various reasons bound
to be limited' (1962:para 43).
However, the incomes policy announced in the Government's White Paper in April 1965
represented a major challenge to the general consensus regarding the use of comparisons.
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'If wages and salaries per head are to keep in step with the long-term rate
of increase in national productivity, less weight will have to be given to...
comparisons with levels and trends of incomes in other employment'
(cmnd. 2639: paragraghs 12-13).
For more than a decade following, the operation of systems of 'fair comparison' were
suspended during periods of statutory incomes policies (1966-69; 1972-74; 1975-78). The
National Board for Prices and Incomes, established in April 1965 to 'investigate particular
cases of prices and incomes behaviour and to advise on the behaviour of prices, wages and
salaries in relation to the national interest as set down by the Government', was appointed
to implement the incomes policy.
In its first General Report (No. 19 1966), the NBPI argued that its investigations
endeavoured to put forward concrete suggestions for increased productivity, providing the
only avenue for increasing incomes that would not lead to increased prices and inflation.
From the mid 1960's, the productivity exception to incomes ceilings was worked far harder
than any other exception. The 'doctrine of comparisons' was argued to be inflationary.
Moreover, the wage structure was criticised on the grounds that it provided both an
inefficient and insecure method of payment. The proposed introduction of incentive
productivity increments together with the consolidation of basic wages, to reflect the
minimum number of hours likely to be worked, was argued to alleviate the wasteful use of
capital and labour typical of the British system (Report 19 1966: 13; Report 23 1966: 17).
In a similar vein, the Incomes Policy of 1969 notes that '[S]ince the war, governments have
needed to find a new approach, breaking the hitherto link between expansion and inflation'
(1969:para 1). This statement suggests that the special problems with pay in the public
sector, specifically, the difficulty in measuring output and making a direct link between
efficiency and pay, result from the fact that a 'market price' cannot normally be assigned to
the value of labour's output, 'thus removing one of the major factors which bear on pay in
other sectors of the economy' (1969: para 93).
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Productivity agreements and incomes policies proceeded to develop in tandem in the
ensuing battle to halt wage inflation. Trade union acceptance of productivity agreements
facilitated their growth; their introduction gave more control to local level trade union
officials to increase wages above the levels set by central government. Similarly,
productivity bargaining arrangements were tolerated and often encouraged by government,
affording them the defence that wage increases reflected ostensibly 'market' criteria of
improved productivity and efficiency.
Nevertheless, throughout the 1970's, many public service workers went on strike against
imposed incomes policies which, on several occasions, seriously hampered productivity
agreements and comparability systems of pay determination. Despite the introduction of the
Employment Protection Act 1975, the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 and
1976, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and legislation against sex and race
discrimination, giving new rights to workers and local union activists, job security was
becoming a major issue for public service workers. From 1976, following the International
Monetary Fund's directives that the British Government drastically cut its Public Sector
Borrowing Requirement, public expenditure cuts were effected by a new system of
budgetary controls taking the form of cash limits. Consequently, containing the growth of
public expenditure (and wage increases) was pursued not only through the use of incomes
policies, but also cash limits.
'In planning total public expenditure, the Government have to ensure that
the resources taken by the public sector are sensibly related to the total
resources available in the economy as a whole' (Cash Limits on Public
Expenditure 1976: para 1).
Public service workers and trade union activists increasingly opposed the imposition of such
cash limits as the value of their wages declined. This culminated in the so-called 'winter of
discontent' (1978/79), which evidenced many national strikes by public service workers and
led to the appointment of the 'Clegg Commission' (Standing Commission on Pay
Comparability 1979).
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The Clegg commission was established to report on the possibility of re-establishing
acceptable bases of comparison for the determination of pay and conditions of service for
particular groups of workers referred to it by government. In March 1979 the commission
began with an 'urgent remit' to inquire into the pay of various groups of workers, including
NHS ancillary staffs.
In its selection of 'comparators', the Clegg commission decided to 'follow the spirit of the
principles' laid down by the Priestley commission (1953-55). Thus, the organisations
selected were to be 'good employers', that is to say, not the ones who necessarily paid the
highest wages, but rather, those who offered 'stability and continuity of employment'. The
Clegg commission drew further guidance from the Priestley commission, substantiating the
viewpoint that :
'the doctrine of fair wages, as we have always held...has been the doctrine
not that wages outside were in the main fair, but that it was fair to pay to
Crown servants something which was, by and large, the same sort of thing
as they would get in other employment' (Priestley 1955: 7).
In discussing the role of 'comparability', it is clear from Clegg's analysis that a great deal of
the oscillation of policy and confusion about the advantages and disadvantages of
comparability centres on the question of the applicability of the so-called 'laws of the market'
to public service employment.
'A common argument of its (comparability) opponents is that public sector
pay should be set by the interplay of supply and demand. However, pay in
the public services cannot be automatically determined by supply and
demand...One highly relevant type of information is what other employers
are paying for the same or 'comparable' jobs; and that is the information
which we have sought to find... There are of course other indicators of the
state of the labour market besides pay for comparable jobs, such as the
percentage unemployed in the occupation concerned, the level of unfilled
vacancies and the rate of wastage' (Cmnd 7995 1980: 32).
The state of the labour market and efficiency criterion are said to be central to comparability
exercises and pay settlements. Nonetheless, it is argued that it is not possible for
independent assessors to specify precise levels of wages and salaries. Rather, the decision
to fix pay (within the limits specified by the independent assessors) is one for management
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to make, bearing in mind the efficiency standards of, and the state of the labour market as it
affects, their workforce (1980: 34).
The best of the 'fair comparison' arguments put forward in this ongoing debate concerning
the principles determining the pay and conditions of service in the public sector, then,
establishes that the government should act as the 'leading follower" of 'good employers'
operating in the labour market (Priestley 1955; Clegg 1979). Opposition to proposals that
the government act in any way other than as an exemplary follower of market employers, is
based on the belief that it would be inappropriate for any government to initiate a reform of
pay determination (effecting 'social outcomes') where such an alteration is not evidenced in
the 'wider economy'. That is to say, government reform measures should merely mirror or
ratify so-called 'economic' change within society (Tomlin 1930; Priestley 1955; Clegg
1979).
Since 1981, Public Expenditure Surveys (which form the basis for government decisions
about public expenditure finance) have been conducted in terms of cash rather than
'volume' expenditure. This cash planning is a further extension of the general principle of
cash limits introduced, in the mid-1970's, as a means of controlling cash spending. The
purpose is 'to decide first what can and should be afforded, then to set expenditure plans for
individual programmes consistently with that decision' (1984:para 25).
Again it is argued, but more forcefully, that it is the nature of public services which creates
the problem of allocating resources because demands are not restrained by the 'price
mechanism'. Public pay and pensions, said to account for about one third of public
expenditure, or 13% of GDP, are criticised further for having a far heavier effect on public
services such as law and order (73%), education (62%), health and personal social services
(56%) and defence (37%) (1984:para 43).
'Wherever it is possible and sensible to do so, the government is seeking to
transfer the provision of services into the market sector. In other areas it
may be possible to use charges as a more direct way of testing demand,
even within the public sector. There may, too, be a case for hypothecating
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revenues to individual expenditure programmes, particularly in the social
field, in order to bring home the costs' (1984:para 26).
The implied 'oversupply' of public services in this statement should be noted. The policy to
privatise, particularly in the form of contracting-out, is also attractive to the government, in
terms of its anticipated impact on the role of trade unions. The government's desire is to
weaken the strength of the trade unions - to reduce trade union membership and alter
collective pay bargaining structures. Privatisation is pursued on the grounds that public
sector trade unions have flagrantly flouted the 'disciplines of the market' in relation to wage
determination and employment conditions. Public sector trade unions are considered to
have been a bad influence on private sector trade unions and are implicated in the
'excessive' wage demands of trade union workers generally and the costs of the public
sector in particular.
Until the early 1980's, the principle of pay comparability has existed alongside, though
sometimes in abeyance to, incomes policies which, at best, have been intended to permit
wage increases in line with improvements in the 'efficiency of production'. Though the
incoming Thatcher government did partially honour the recommendations of the Clegg
Commission on pay comparability in the NHS, the Commission was disbanded in 1980. In
1981, the Government suspended the pay research procedures in the civil service and
withdrew from the existing civil service pay agreement. Following the report of the Megaw
Inquiry into civil service pay in 1982, the Civil Service Pay Review Unit, which had
developed the pay comparability system operating over the post-war period in the civil
service, was also dismantled.
The government, perceiving that pay comparison was not an alternative to a 'market
approach', but was a part of that approach (crnnd 8590 1982: para 110), nonetheless
criticised the assumption that 'fair comparison' would adequately reflect 'market' rates of
pay. Essentially the Government believed that the range of comparator employers was too
selective, raising pay levels in the civil service above their 'true market value', and that civil
servants were further privileged by underrated benefits, such as job security. Thus
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privatisation, particularly policies tendering public sector services to private contractors
(contracting-out) pursued since 1983, has become another, though more direct, torm ot
comparability exercise in which 'fair market rates' represent the lowest wages provided by
the range of outside employers.
Collective Pay Bargaining In the National Health Service
For the National Health Service, the application of the comparison principle has meant that
health service workers' pay reflected pay settlements obtained in other public authorities,
primarily in local authorities. These, in turn, reflected settlements obtained in private
industry. Concomitantly, health service workers waited primarily on the action of other
public authorities, who in their turn waited for the outcome of negotiations in private industry.
This 'delayed reaction' approach to settling pay claims in the public sector, and in the health
service in particular, has in the past been a major source of contention, widely criticised as
contributing to the prevalence of low pay in these areas of employment.
World War II brought about direct government involvement in health service provision to
ensure sufficient levels of staffing and service provision. Through its actions, the
government cut across the existing pattern of service provision and collective bargaining.
The pre-war pattern of collective bargaining, reflecting hospital ownership, left workers in
voluntary hospitals with virtually no collective bargaining provision, though there were
strong professional associations. In local hospitals, domestic, manual, clerical and
administrative employees were only partially covered by locally negotiated agreements. On
the other hand, workers in mental hospitals and institutions had been organised by various
unions since 1910 (Clegg and Chester 1957).
Having initially relied on voluntary agreements, in 1941 the government began to
strengthen its involvement in hospital administration and finance. Various committees were
established to investigate particular services and the pay and conditions of employment
required to ensure adequate service provision. The government also began to fix salary
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and wage rates and local authorities and voluntary hospitals became accustomed to the
practice of wage-rate fixing. Moreover, from 1940, trade unions had the power to force an
unwilling employer to arbitration under the Conditions of Employment and National
Arbitration Order. Initially this procedure was introduced for the war period, but in 1951, it
was given a more permanent shape in the Industrial Disputes Order (Clegg and Chester
1957: 11-12).
It was in this context that in 1945 the Voluntary National Joint Council for Staff of Hospitals
and Allied Institutions in England and Wales, the 'Mowbray Committee', was formed to cover
all hospitals (except mental hospitals which already had a single national wage structure).
The Committee settled national minimum rates and imitated local authority (Whitley)
machinery by establishing provincial councils to deal with local disputes and fix higher
rates. The two sides of each council consisted of employers' representatives (British
Hospitals Association, Local Authority Associations, London County Council) and workers'
representatives (National Union Of Public Employees and Confederation of Health Service
Employees). By the end of the war, collective bargaining was extended to almost all
clerical, administrative, technical and professional staff, due not simply to direct government
intervention, but also to war-time pressures more generally.
The 1944 White Paper issued by the coalition government, accepting Beveridge's proposals
for a 'comprehensive national health sen/ice', entailed plans for a radical reorganisation of
hospital finance and administration, with extensive centralised control. The NHS Act 1946
and the NHS (Scotland) Act 1947 established that hospitals should be transferred to public
ownership.
Regional Hospital Boards were established to undertake the general administration of
regions on behalf of the Minister of Health (in England and Wales) and the Secretary of
State for Scotland. Hospital Management Committees were established to carry out the
day-to-day management of particular hospitals. Under these provisions, the majority of
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hospital employees were employed by the various Regional Hospital Boards, working under
the instruction of Management Committees, with their wages and salaries borne by the
Treasury. A very similar structure exists today.
The scheme for the incoming General Whitley Council and its Functional Councils was
influenced by the structure of the existing councils and committees operating in the health
service during the war-time period. These, in turn, were modelled on those operating in
local authorities and the Civil Service. The Whitley System (or 'Whitleyism'), a product of
the Whitley Committee established in 1917, provided a structure in which collective
bargaining was formally conducted by staff and management representatives in Whitley
Councils. The terms of reference of the Whitley Committee were to consider ways of
securing permanent improvements in industrial relations. The first of its reports, published
in 1917, called for the formation of an organisational body for each industry , made up of
representatives of both employers and employees, to consider all matters affecting the
progress and well-being of the trade, from the point of view of those engaged in it.
Fundamental to its recommendations were the conditions that employers recognise trade
unions at all levels, and that agreements be voluntary.
In the construction of the NHS Whitley System, the General Council, a central joint body
covering the whole of the service, was responsible for decisions on 'conditions of service
other than remuneration...of general application'. The General Council also had the task of
completing the Whitley System by settling arbitration procedures and the constitution of
local and regional bodies. The Functional Councils, separate negotiating bodies for the
main groups of staff, were responsible for the political and technical difficulties of
determining the remuneration and conditions of every employee. Even though two health
services were created under separate acts (for England and Wales and, Scotland
respectively), the writ of the General and Functional Councils operated in England, Wales
and Scotland alike.
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Presently, the General Whitley Council covers the entire NHS for general terms and
conditions of employment1. The 'Mowbray Committee' of 1945 became the Whitley
Ancillary Staffs Council (ASC), with very little change. Three of the four unions representing
the staff of the ASC had operated Provincial Councils in the local authority Whitley System
and under the 'Voluntary National Joint Council for Staff of Hospitals and Allied Institutions'
(Mowbray Committee). The ASC inherited a simple wage structure from the Mowbray
Committee which originated from that applied to local authority manual workers. Two
national minimum rates were fixed : one for men and one for women; and there were 7
groups into which the different grades were placed. Provincial Councils under the Mowbray
Committee settled 'plus rates' paid to all employees (generally different rates for men and
women) within its area. Juveniles were paid a proportion of the adult rate, according to
age2.
The government is directly represented on the management sides of Whitley Councils by
officials from the Health Departments. This fact, together with the statutory powers provided
the government in the NHS Act 1946, NHS (Scotland) Act 1947, and the NHS Act 1977,
1 Its management comprises 15 members appointed by the Secretary of State, and its staff 29
members nominated by the functional Whitley Councils. Apart from the General Whitley Council, there
are 7 other functional councils : Administrative and Clerical (including Ambulance Officers);
Ambulancemen; Ancillary Staffs; Community Dental Service Staff; Medical and Hospital Dental Staff;
Scientific and Professional Staffs; Professional and Technical 'B' Staffs. The Whitley System
encompasses almost a million employees, represented by 43 union and staff organisations.
2This structure was then further simplified by the new ASC : provincial rates were abolished and
replaced by national urban and rural rates with a special rate for London; and new national minimum
rates for men and women were created, replacing the variations created by the system of 'plus rating'.
The present 18 group grading structure operates weekly pay rates based on specific job titles and
descriptions (rather than sex). Group six and above tend to be supervisory grades. There is an
enormous concentration of women in grades (pay groups) 1 and 2, most are domestics and most work
part time. Men's jobs are concentrated in grades 3 and 4, particularly in the job of portering.
At tfie end of 1953, the ASC covered approximately 239,000 workers: just under 184,000 (77%) were
whole-timers and just over 55,000 (23%) were part-timers. About 72,000 (39%) of the whole-timers
were males but only 3,000 (5.5%) of the part-timers were male (op.cit.:32). At present, there are
approximately 280,000 ancillary workers : 173,600 (62%) work full-time and 106,400 (38%) work part-
time. Of those who work part-time, 103,208 (97%) are women and 187,600 (67%) of the total ancillary
workforce are women (ASC Trade Union Side, 1986).
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gives the government great power over those who administer the health services. This
legislation grants the Secretary of State for Social Services and the Secretary of State for
Scotland the power to issue directives and regulations to health authorities and to fix rates
and terms of pay and conditions for all NHS employees. In practice, these powers are used
to establish the national agreements reached by the general and functional Whitley
Councils or other bargaining forums. Nevertheless, the government has the means to
influence NHS pay settlements independently of either voluntary or statutory incomes
policies.
Where no agreement is reached by the management and staff representatives, the matter is
generally referred to conciliation or arbitration. However, the government does have the
power to veto pay awards, and to refuse to allow third party arbitration over its right of veto.
Moreover, on several occasions it has used these powers to directly determine NHS pay
negotiations in order to enforce principal aspects of an incomes policy (Dimmock:1982:329).
The NHS is funded almost entirely by national taxation and from the outset, successive
governments have sought to exercise a large measure of control to contain both labour
costs and general expenditure. This sense of overriding concern with expenditure costs
began within the first two years of the formation of the NHS, when annual expenditure
estimates were heavily overspent. During the first four financial years, the only means of
financing wage increases was out of sums allotted to employing authorities for other
purposes, or by means of supplementary estimates. The Treasury, however, was reluctant
to allow supplementary estimates (Clegg and Chester 1957: 111-112). The importance of
the perceived overspending by the health service from its inception should not be
understated. The health service was and remains perhaps the most potent emblem of the
welfare state. As such, its apparent overspending immediately following its inception has
had a far reaching impact on general perceptions about the costs of welfare state public
service provision.
The cost of NHS expenditure came under heavy 'public' criticism in its first few years,
furthering cautious scrutiny on the part of management and government. The Guillebaud
Committee was appointed in 1953 to 'review the present and prospective cost of the
National Health Service...to advise how, in view of the burdens on the Exchequer, a rising
charge upon it can be avoided while providing for the maintenance of an adequate
service...' (1956:1).
The 'Committee of Enquiry Into the Cost of the NHS' (Guillebaud) commissioned a statistical
analysis of expenditure on the NHS in England and Wales during the period 1948 - 1954.
This memorandum, prepared by Abel-Smith and Titmuss, indicated that the widespread
belief that there had been an increase of vast proportions in both money costs and real
costs was ill-founded. Their study suggested that after the first year, the NHS in fact
absorbed a decreasing proportion of the country's resources (measured as a % of GNP).
Also, in terms of 1948/9 prices, more than 60% of the increase in expenditure was
attributable to higher prices and wages rather than to an increase in the volume of real
resources (materials and 'manpower').
Informing the trend of public opinion and parliamentary debate about costs were the
government's Appropriation Accounts which, as the study illustrated, were unreliable and
inaccurate. Not only did the Accounts fail to provide a useful measure of costs, they also
presented an inadequate measure of secular trends. From the beginning, the prevailing
costs of medical care were shown to be grossly under-estimated, due in part to the scarcity
of data before the 1948 nationalisation and to the use of unrealistic concepts of cost (1956:
1-2).
A different and particular concept of cost was adopted in the study by Abel-Smith and
Titumss.: 'cost' consisted of expenses arising from current consumption of resources (goods
and services) that could have benefited the community in alternative uses, The transfer of
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money without any use of goods and services was excluded from the definition of cost, as
were costs inherited from the past (1956:11).
The overall conclusion of the study was that wages and salaries, and drugs and medical
goods, dominated the upward changes in costs. At the same time, demographic changes
were said to be sufficient to account for the increase in the cost of the NHS to public funds
between 1949/50 and 1953/4.
'Allowing for the fact that some part of the total increase was accounted for
by the use of additional labour who were unlikely to have found
employment elsewhere (married women, part-time workers, Irish and other
overseas workers specially recruited) it would seem that the net diversion of
resources to the NHS between 1949/50 and 1953/54 was relatively
negligible. It is also relevant that this small diversion of resources took
place during a period when the population of England and Wales
increased by about 800,000 ' (Abel-Smith and Titmuss 1956: 66).
Summary
McCarthy (1979) notes that he is unable to discern any single or overriding principle for pay
determination in the NHS, although the principle of 'fair comparison' with outside work is
said to have predominated. However, as outlined above, the application and acceptability
of the comparison principle was modified over the period from the mid-1960's to the late
1970's. This was in part due to the impact of incomes policies. But it also coincided with a
growing recognition that the existence of low pay among government employees warranted
some form of mitigation (Prices and Incomes White papers: NBPI). Instead of the
comparison principle, which is an 'implicit' 'market' principle, the more 'explicit' 'market'
principle of directly linking pay to performance, or productivity bargaining, was introduced.
For more than a decade, low pay was explicitly associated with a problem of low productivity
and inefficiency, a general criticism levelled at the structure of British earnings. In part, the
trend linking pay to productivity and incentive agreements represented an attempt to
consolidate basic wages at a higher rate. It was intended that this would entail a move
away from the prevailing insecure method of remuneration, which relied on the extensive
use of overtime to boost wage packets to an acceptable level (NBPI). The explicit
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assumption that low pay is a problem of workers' low productivity, however, is precisely that
employed in neoclassical labour market economic theory.
From the outset, the NBPI was committed to recommendations focused on productivity and
efficiency improvements as a means of improving pay. According to the NBPI, the root
cause of the problem of low pay was low productivity. The NBPI did, however, hold that the
relationship between prices and wages was not automatic, and that security of income was
essential. It therefore believed that government had a leading role to play by providing
greater security of earnings, thus setting an example for outside industry. Nonetheless, the
fundamental tenet brought to each investigation was that the only method of increasing
incomes that would not lead to increases in prices, would be to improve productivity and job
performance. The Board investigated numerous trades, industries and services throughout
its lifetime (1965-1971). After it was disbanded, various bodies with similar terms of
reference were established and government prices and incomes policies continued to
stress that the only means of combatting low pay in a period of recession Was through
improved job productivity.
The institution of the Clegg Commission in 1979 was a concession to public sector
employees and unions, in an attempt to quell the lengthy spate of industrial relations
aggravations. Once again, the adopted principle for the determination of pay and conditions
of service of public employees returned to comparison with 'outside' work in productive,
trading and private industries. Therefore, whether the principle for pay determination for
public sector employees was that of 'fair comparison' or linking pay to work performance,
the assumption has been that, in both the private and public sectors, a market determination
of wages in some form must prevail. The persistent refusal of such commissions and of
governments to contemplate any alternative coherent wage policy which establishes a floor
to incomes rather than a ceiling, stems from their reluctance to see this as anything other
than an incursion into what is, ostensibly, a field of 'free contract' between individuals and
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organisations. The doctrine of 'comparable occupations' and of 'non-intervention' go hand
in hand.
Since 1980, the application of 'market' principles in public service provision and wage
settlements has been unequivocally advocated. Pay comparability machinery has been
disbanded. In the initial wake of privatisation policies, productivity bargaining has flourished
as public authorities have expanded work study measurement operations to try and achieve
'efficiency savings' as their budgets are cut. 'Efficiency' exercises have continued to
proliferate as public authorities attempt to reduce their operating costs in order to retain
services in the public sector. Rather than pay incentives, however, the 'bargain' offered
public sector workers is that the service might remain in public hands, with job security and
conditions of employment thereby afforded greater protection than otherwise might be
obtained in the private sector.
As this summary of post-war wage and employment policy developments illustrates, the
obsession with public expenditure over the post-war period has become progressively
intensified, reflected in the increasing severity of measures adopted to curtail public
expenditure growth. Wage recusance is the primary factor implicated in the undesired cost
increase. I would suggest that this overriding concern, to prevent wage inflation, rests on
inadequate assumptions about wage determination and erroneous notions of public sector
accounting. In the following chapter, I consider these assumptions in greater detail.
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2. Wages and Market Performance: The Case of the
Public Sector
Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was argued that privatisation is one (albeit determined) example
of various government policies pursued throughout the post-war period concerning wages
in the public sector that promotes 'market forces' in allocating resources (wages, jobs etc.).
It was also suggested that the legitimacy of and increasing emphasis given to criteria such
as efficiency and productivity in the name of 'economic necessity' have been cultivated as a
result of the power given to economic, as against social explanations, rather than emanating
from any intrinsic 'economic' logic.
In the present chapter, this critique of the underlying economic/social divide will be
developed: the separation of economic and social processes apparently legitimates
'market' explanations of the allocation of resources (resource allocation is, purportedly, an
essentially economic phenomenon). But in fact, the consequence of invoking social
categories in explanations of the structuring of employment and resource distribution,
fundamentally challenges the perceived residual status of social factors. Briefly the
argument is that conventional stratification theories and theories of wage determination
present explanations of processes as primarily 'economic' and residually 'social'. The use
of residual categories in theoretical explanations, however, undermines and renders
untenable the analytical system which employs such categories (Goldthorpe 1978; Stewart
et at. 1985; Prandy 1986). This argument will be elaborated by examining in more detail
the relations of these arguments to wage determination in the public sector.
Central to both the class theory of stratification and orthodox economic theory is the concept
of the (private) 'market' as a mechanism for the distribution of occupations and earnings. A
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large body of evidence, however, points to the inherently imperfect nature of 'labour
markets', suggesting that as most of the preconditions for the efficient workings of the
'market' are non-existent, they are unable to perform the efficient allocation that economic
theory requires of them1.
Political and social research concerning the privatisation of public services, though often
highly critical of the government's philosophical and economic beliefs, nevertheless has
perpetuated and ultimately reinforced these beliefs by failing to challenge fully the principles
underlying the privatisation agenda. The privatisation debate is premised upon the
assumption that 'the logic of the market' provides a salient description of the overall process
occurring. I suggest that this needs to be reconsidered and an alternative conception
established to further our practical and analytical understanding of the processes observed.
I do not question that the alterations to employment and service provision witnessed
exacerbate forms of inequality. However, it is suggested that the restructuring occurring in
the wake of privatisation policies, though heralded (by supporters and critics) as resulting
from the introduction of 'disciplines of the market' to public services, cannot be
straightforwardly attributed to the operation of 'market processes'. Thus, the observed
diversification is not one of 'privatisation' in the sense in which it is widely used and
intended, as increasing the role of 'market forces'.
As Block has argued (1986:177-181), both free-market theorists and leftists share similar
analytical understandings of the tension between politics and the 'logic of the market
economy'. Both positions assume that improvements in social welfare through government
action constitutes interference with the 'logic of the market' or the exigencies of
accumulation. This in turn rests on the assumption that the 'market economy' is
1 cf. Doeringer and Piore 1971; Piore 1973, 1978; Edwards Reich and Gordon 1973; Cain 1976;
Phellps Brown 1977; Rubery 1978; Rubery and Wilkinson 1981; Wilkinson 1981; Craig et at. 1980,
1981,1982.
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autonomous, obeying a single logic. Thus government policies represent superstructures
on top of an economic base and are perceived to either ameliorate or obstruct 'market
forces'. When referring to 'market forces', then, I am primarily using the term in the sense
that it is employed as an economic rationale for processes of resource distribution and
exchange in society; that is, as an economic function, the 'market' is assumed to have an
internal logic of its own which governs allocative processes.
In arguing that the privatisation strategy is coextensive with post-war public sector wage
policies, what I wish to emphasise is the persistent underlying presumption that a market
determination of wages operates in the private sector and that public sector forms of
resource distribution are not simply different, but essentially aberrant. It is this rationale
which has seriously constrained all forms of public sector resource distribution and has
been a critical factor shaping the perceived 'crisis in welfare'. This crisis, signalled over the
past decade or so by the collapse of consensus regarding the 'mixed-economy' of 'market'
and 'state' welfare assumed by pioneers of the 'welfare state' (Mishra 1984), could be
argued to have been endemic2. Accordingly, I would suggest that a better perspective and
account of the current welfare crisis or 'rolling back of the welfare state', in which valued
services and citizenship rights are being seriously eroded, should be provided. The
Keynes-Beveridge rationale for state intervention pandered to the notion of the 'economic
2 I wish to briefly elaborate this proposition as it is important to distinguish it from the (predominantly
functionalist-marxist) arguments that welfare is functional for capitalism or similarily, that state welfare
developments have and can merely serve to partially compensate individuals against the full impact of
market/capitalist forces (cf. O'Connor 1973; George and Wilding 1976; Gough 1979; Taylor-Gooby
and Dale 1981). These arguments deny processes of social change and transformation of any real
solidity and thus can only present an impoverished strategy for progress. In contrast to such
arguments, the point I wish to stress is that, to a large degree, problems of welfare are borne out of the
restrictive conceptual parameters determining this debate. Problems of understanding and explaining
social processes are, then, an integral part of 'material' experiences/events. A more promising line of
argument is that welfare 'increases the need for more sharply focused social criticism' (Wilensky 1975:
110).
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logic of the market' and, whether as a force to be mitigated or elevated, this logic is, I would
suggest, entirely misleading3.
The future of welfare, a question central to issues of citizenship and the universality of social
rights in contemporary society, is necessarily linked to controversies concerning the
distribution of income and resources. This debate, which has focused on the role of the
public sector, involves distinctions between apparently alternative forms of income, that is,
income from individual 'civil rights' (participation in the economy) and income from 'social
rights' (Marshall 1964:72). As Friedland and Sanders (1986) argue, the pressure to hold
down 'social' wages and cut back welfare state provision generally, is rooted in the
presumption that different logics govern the allocation of 'private' and 'social' wages. Public
sector employment is doubly implicated in this given, that the public sector serves both as a
source of employment and a form of welfare provision.
Welfare issues, particularly those of public as opposed to private sector service provision,
thus highlight the problematic nature of the division of economic and social processes - a
common feature of theories addressing the distribution of resources. The assumed
dichotomy, the separation of economic and social factors, is a contrived one, imposing
serious limitations on our understanding of social processes and fostering unconvincing
explanations of inequality4.
3 Despite his pioneering work conceptualising citizenship and the right to welfare as consisting of
legal through to social and even moral rights, Marshall too perceives the role of welfare to be that of
modifying the operations of 'economic market processes' (1981: 107).
4The economic/social divide apparently underlined by welfare developments is rooted in the
convention which maintains an axiomatic separation of conceptions of 'natural' and 'social'
phenomena. As Stewart et. al. argue (1980), the dissolution of this distinction is necessary to facilitate
a more adequate understanding of human activity. Such distinctions are, however, both diverse and
deep-seated. This is an area which I hope to develop in later work.
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'Economic' Rationales for Wage Determination.
The theory of wages rests on the alleged 'economic proof that in normal circumstances the
market is in equilibrium, and in this state, workers will be paid a wage equal to their
marginal productivity. The market is said to adjust the wage structure to reflect efficiency
differences between workers. All else being equal, the skills acquired by individuals
investing and reinvesting in themselves through education and training (a process referred
to by the term 'human capital'), is argued to establish a direct correspondence between the
product market valuation of the goods and services produced by workers (the price of
commodities) and individual wages (the price of labour). Thus it is assumed that wage
differentials are determined by differences in worker characteristics. If, in equilibrium,
wages are below what is socially acceptable, they nevertheless reflect the low productivity
of the workers concerned.
Over the post-war period, economists' views about the determination of wages have
vacillated in relation to the 'Simple Phillips Curve', the 'Expectations Phillips Curve' and
'Keynesian' and 'Institutionalist' views of money wage determination (Artis 1981; Davies
1983; Bleaney 1985). The neoclassical foundations of the Phillips curve model and its
successor, the Expectations Phillips curve, seem clear. Originally, the Phillips curve,
developed to counter the Keynesian 'revolution' in macroeconomic thinking which since the
1930s had been perceived as a major challenge to neoclassical thinking, seemed to cripple
the Keynesian 'wage theorem' view. According to Artis,
'...one reason for its ready acceptance is no doubt that it seemed to fill a
missing box in the Keynesian system: it endogenised the money wage to
the economy modelled by the system, an intellectually more satisfying
achievement (and more appealing to the intellectual imperialism of
economics) than the orthogonality implicit in the wage theorem' (1981:8).
The basis for the Phillips curve is the suggested relationship between the rate of change of
wages and the level of unemployment, whereby wage changes are said to be inversely
related to the level of unemployment - as supply of labour exceeds demand, wages
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decrease. According to Davies this construct was very popular during the 1960's, as it
apparently explained why price stability was difficult to achieve in a period of full
employment. An implicit assumption, that there is a strong relationship between wage
changes and price changes, is also evident. The general view expressed in the 'mark-up'
model, that prices represent a 'mark-up' over cost with wages counting for the largest
element of these costs, informs the Phillips curve. This model suggests that, all else being
equal, price stability can be achieved if wages grow at the same rate as labour productivity,
and indicastes why productivity criteria have featured so strongly in most incomes policies
(1983:420-421).
The so-called 'stagflation' of the late 1960's and early 1970's, where high levels of inflation
were accompanied by relatively high levels of unemployment, challenged the idea that
inflation and unemployment are alternatives (which the Simple Phillips curve suggests).
The detection of a marked instability in the Phillips curve led to the revival of Keynesian
economics (and support for incomes policies) and the development of the
'augmented/expectations' Phillips curve propounded by monetarists, most notably Friedman
(cf. Davies 1983; Artis 1981).
The breakdown of the relationship between wages and unemployment as specified in the
Simple Phillips curve is supposedly explained by the Expectations Phillips curve, which
indicates that the true relationship is between unemployment and anticipated real wages,
rather than between unemployment and actual money wages. A critical factor in this model
is conjecture about future price movements. The monetarist analysis suggests that unless
productivity increases offset wage increases, wage inflation will ensue: wage increases will
lead to price increases, and as prices rise so will price expectations, causing an upward
shift in the Phillips curve, increasing inflation still further. To keep inflation under control, the
monetarists stipulate a reduction in 'demand' (by limiting the money 'supply') to raise the
level of unemployment until it reaches a level at which wage increases are brought back
into line with the growth in 'labour productivity'. A period of high unemployment is,
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therefore, argued to be a temporary phenomenon. The assumption is that, if left to
themselves, the untampered forces of supply and demand in the market would produce full
employment - or at least, the 'natural rate of unemployment' (though this rate is not fixed).
To the extent that market imperfections and rigidities (evidential problems with the model)
are recognised, they are generally depicted as being created by institutional interference in
the market. State legislation is perceived to be the primary form of such institutional
interference. The Thatcher government re-emphasises such a 'market' approach to wage
determination :
'The 'new' supply side economics provides the rationale for reducing all
institutional controls on wage regulation, and for repealing
antidiscriminatory pay legislation on the grounds that differences in pay
between blacks and whites, men and women, reflect object differences in
their productivity...' (Craig et al 1982: 10)
Thus, the pressure to abolish wages councils and the rescindment of the fair wages
resolution stems from the belief that these provisions keep wages above some 'market
clearing level', increasing unemployment5. The preference for ('private) 'market-based'
activity as opposed to ('public') state-based activity, is premised upon the contention that
'market' mechanisms maximise both economic prosperity (efficiency and productivity) and
individual freedom.
An alternative wage determination proposition is put forward by the
Keynesian/lnstitutionalist theories of inflation. The Keynesian view is reflected in a number
of different perspectives. This in part stems from the fact that the General Theory does not
itself provide a model of money wage determination, but implies that wages are determined
orthogonally to the economy, that is, outwith the economy. Both Keynesian and Institutional
theories of wage determination generally emphasise social and political, rather than
economic, forces. In particular, trade unions and issues of 'comparability' are seen as being
the primary cause of increasing wages and costs. Within this perspective, it is argued that
5 Explanations of 'low pay' are more extensively considered in Chapter 6.
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the maintenance of full employment during the post-war period enabled trade unions to
successfully push for higher wages, hence increasing inflation, a phenomenon independent
of (economic) market forces (Artis 1981; Davies 1983; Flemming 1978).
A more recent critique of orthodox market explanations, developing out of the recognition
that there is a lack of convergence between pay and human capital, is the analysis of
segmented labour markets. The segmentation thesis consists essentially of two strands:
modified market segmentation and dual labour market segmentation. On the one hand, it is
argued that gender divisions serve to modify the market, with women being located at the
bottom of the market. On the other hand, different markets are said to be produced,
explained by the operation of dual labour markets - one 'primary' and the other
'secondary'6.
The oscillation of wage determination rationales, characteristic of the post-war period, may
be set out as a question of the perceived location of this process in relation to the economy;
that is, whether the determination of wages is endogenous or exogenous to the economy.
The Phillips curve model, through its various stages of 'refinement', is predicated on the
assumption that the determination of wages is endogenous to the economy. So-called
socio-political explanations do not generally enter this debate, which uncritically accepts the
neoclassical presumption that laws of supply and demand in a market economy determine
the price of all commodities, including labour. Yet the failure of these models to explain the
behaviour of wages, in particular in relation to issues of gender, generation and ethnicity,
which are not adequately accommodated, has led to the search for explanations external to
'the economy'. This search focuses on social and political processes as independent forces
either impinging on the essentially autarchic economic processes determining wages or
else operating entirely outwith the economy.
6 Labour market segmentation theory will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
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It is important to recognise that all these perspectives can be aligned in relation to the
position taken regarding conceptions of 'social' and 'economic' processes: where the
economic and social are not set up as mutually exclusive categories which have no bearing
upon one another they are, nonetheless, accorded intrinsic autonomy as systems which
have independent status but may operate interactively. Thus, for example, wages are
argued to be paid to positions on 'economic' grounds; but who gets into the positions is
argued to be a different matter and is generally explained in terms of 'social' factors. It is this
assumption of the relative independence and coherence of 'economic' versus 'social'
categories, informing theories of wage determination and government policies, which is
criticised here7. The separation of economic and social issues, though difficult to relinquish,
entails a form of analysis which inevitably contains contradictions (Stewart et al 1980;
Holmwood and Stewart 1983; Prandy 1986).
The explanatory failure of, and contradictions inherent in, analyses which assume that
social and economic factors act upon wages as different and mutually exclusive
orientations, may be further underlined through a consideration of the response to
neoclassical economics evidenced by Keynesian and segmentation analyses. One of the
main points to be developed in the remaining sections is that explanatory contradictions,
arising from the mobilisation of residual categories in explanations of wage inflation, wage
determination and employment positions generally, suggest that the analyses concerned
are no longer tenable. Given that economic theories of wage determination and resource
allocation play such a critical role in interpreting and influencing both conventional
stratification theory and public service sector developments, it is important for sociologists to
consider the adequacy of these explanatory models.
7 Neoclassical advocates of the market as a 'social institution' notwithstanding (Barry 1987), the
'welfare judgement' implied by a 'market' allocation of resources consisting of an equilibriating system
of exchange, is that individual private actions in the market economy bring about the most beneficial
allocation of resources. Thus the institution of the 'market' could only (and at best) be argued to have
'social' outcomes but not entail social processes.
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'Keyneslan Economics': A Revolutionary Post-War Orthodoxy?
The idea that Keynes' General Theory produced a new revolutionary economics,
challenging the neoclassical tradition in a very fundamental way, has been effectively
dispelled (Bleaney 1985). As Bleaney argues, Keynes unquestioningly accepted the bulk of
orthodox economic assumptions as a basis for further development.
'In sum, the General Theory does not present its own distinctive
Weltanschauung, there is nothing new in its underlying vision of the
economic and social order. The great weakness of the 'left Keynesians' is
that they have never absorbed the true significance of this point, a further
reflection of which is the fact that there could be a Keynesian revolution in
Marxian economics...as much as in neoclassical economics' (Bleaney
1985:2).
Nonetheless, the problem of so-called 'short-run' disequilibrium characteristic of the 'real
market world', which neoclassical economists have systematically avoided, is addressed by
Keynes' analysis. Thus, the remedial concept, 'effective demand', ressurrected by Keynes,
attempts to explain why actual 'market transactions' fail to operate consistently in terms of
the primary (neoclassical) theory. Bleaney suggests that the neoclassical preoccupation
with relative price movements as the solution to economic disequilibrium8 precluded the
concept of 'real effective demand' which Keynes adopted and developed from the early
classical tradition (1985:2-17).
The starting point for the concept of 'effective demand' is the acceptance of the neoclassical
idea that general equilibrium (and therefore full employment) is a matter of finding the right
relative prices. Keynes' intention is to describe transactions 'in the market' which take place
at disequilibrium prices - where both 'perfect competition' and complete information are
absent. The resultant transaction at disequilibrium prices is argued to reduce the quantity of
transactions compared to what would have occurred if general equilibrum had prevailed.
The concept of 'effective demand' purportedly describes a situation in which the absence of
8 That is, the belief that commodities in excess supply should fall in price relative to those in excess
demand, whose price should rise.
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equilibrium constrains transactions by reducing the notional demands and supplies from
their hypothetical level. Hence Keynes' theory allegedly explains why the full employment
level implied in the primary theory fails to be achieved (Bleaney 1905:18-27).
The notion ol 'long-run' equilibrium as the benchmark remains, nonetheless, unchallenged.
Bleaney's suggestion that Keynes analysis adequately overcomes the gulf between
favoured explanations and social circumstances, which has been the great weakness of
neoclassical theory, is thus called into question. On the contrary, the remedial concept,
'effective demand' is a development which does not eliminate explanatory contradictions,
but simply shifts them to the contradiction between short-term (social) and long run
(economic) processes. As Holmwood and Stewart (1983) argue in relation to a parallel
problem confronting stratification theory, the contradiction between class (economic) and
status (social) categories:
'Fuither attempts to deal with these emerging explanatory failures may
have the appearance of the elaboration of theory but...[t]hey take their
problems entirely from the preexisting theory and are determined by ils
explanatory deficiencies...[as] they themselves are lite embodiment of these
problems' (1983:238).
The issue of the conceptual limitations of analytical systems is also addressed by
Goldthorpe (1978) in his consideration of the problem of inflation. As he cogently illustrates,
economists' analyses of inflation resort to the use of 'residual categories' (which are
typically negatively defined) in an attempt to explain why modes of social action fail to
conform to the behaviour prescribed by the particular economic analyses concerned. The
difficulty, in using such residual categories, as highlighted above and as Goldthorpe
suggests, is that their application both undermines and radically departs from the central
tenets of the analysis (1978:212). Thus, following Parson's analysis in 7/re Structure of
Social Action (1937), Goldthorpe argues that:
'...the limits of an analytical system are best indicated by ttie occurrence of
'residual categories': that is, categories which are introduced to deal with
phenomena recognised as relevant to the enquiry in hand...but categories
which are at the same time distinguished by their lack of theoretical fit will)
liiose that are central to the analytical system in use and 'positively defined'
within it' (1978:186).
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Returning to the consideration of the Keynesian analysis, then, the problem of 'short-run'
dynamics, the 'empirical reality' of disequilibrium which is set against the 'long-run'
theoretical principles of equilibrium, is indeed exposed but is not resolved by Keynesian
analysis. Instead of leading to the development of a new, theoretically integrated basis,
failure has prompted the ad hoc separation of explanatory principles, in an attempt to
explain away the observed countervailing tendencies. The absence of the assumed
equilibrating economic laws of supply and demand of market-commodity production, is
presented as simply a short-run empirical question and not subject to theoretical
determination. That is to say, counteracting influences appear to be produced by a process
external to the analytical theory as though they are given, rather than acknowledged as an
intrinsic explanatory failure generated by the theory itself.
Problems of Explanation • the Poverty of Conventional Theories.
The separation of social and economic categories in conventional stratification and
economic theory is presented as necessary, though the intention is to elaborate an
integrated theory. This mobilisation of distinct exogenous-social / endogenous-economic
components is intended to provide explanations of experience which cannot be accounted
for by the other component; nonetheless, the separate explanations contradict each other,
giving rise to incoherent principles of income determination. Social categories and
explanations are presumed to merely impinge upon established economic accounts.
However, under closer scrutiny, the consequence of invoking 'social' categories and
explanations is more powerful than simply exerting an influence which modifies, as their
utilisation negates 'economic' accounts (Stewart et aI 1985). As such, the use of these
distinctions should signal the occasion to produce an alternative understanding in which
explanations of processes, previously identified as primarily 'economic' and residually
'social', are accomplished with categories which encompass the full range of social
circumstances. This should facilitate greater theoretical integrity. Instead, the
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respecification of traditional wage relationships is contingent, and generally specified
counterfactually, as what-is-not-but-should-be, rather than what actually is.
Given that unintegrable 'short' versus 'long-run' dynamics ('internal' versus 'external') and
'economic' versus 'social' processes are mobilised in these analyses, how is change over
time accounted for? Goldthorpe suggests that sociological investigation permits recognition
of processes of structural change. Thus, in relation to theories of inflation he argues that:
'...the ambition of any sociological enquiry must be...to investigate how
inflation, understood as the monetary expression of distributional conflict, is
ultimately grounded not in error, ignorance or unreason on the part of
actors involved, in the way that economic analyses are constrained to
suggest, but rather in on-going changes in social structures and processes'
(1978:195).
That is to say, the use of residual categories in theoretical explanations indicates that
changes in social processes have occurred, undermining and rendering untenable the
analytical system which employs such residual categories. Furthermore, Goldthorpe
suggests that approaches to explanations of inflation by sociologists and economists are
necessarily competitive, rather than complementary, because of their different evaluations of
the capitalist market economy. Indeed, I would emphasise that they are competitive
because social theory attempts to develop the 'residual categories' in a way that challenges
their residual status. Whereas economists are said to perceive the market economy to be
inherently stable (or capable of being stabilised), sociologists are said to view it as
inherently unstable. In Goldlhorpe's words, the sociological view of the market economy is
that it exerts a
'constant destabilizing effect on the society within which it operates, so that
it can itself continue to function satisfactorily only to the extent that this effect
is offset by exogenous factors: most importantly, by the integrative influence
of some basic value consensus in the society, deriving from sources
unrelated to the economy...'(1978:194).
Evaluations of the market economy are indeed of central concern and economic and
sociological analyses do tend to conceptualise the market economy in the manner
described by Goldthorpe. But I consider the underlying conceptual dualism to be highly
problematic. More specifically, I do not share Goldthorpe's approval of this particular, albeit
45
predominant, Parsonian form of sociological theory. It appears to me that Goldthorpe fails to
critically appraise social theory as rigorously as he does economic theory.
Contrary to Goldthorpe's suggestion, social theory has simply displaced, not resolved, the
problems highlighted by the use of residual categories in economic theory and, moreover,
has reinforced a restriction of the relevance of social theory to a limited set of circumstances.
Goldthorpe is critical of the position adopted by economists that in the 'long-run' the market
economy is stable, as day-to-day social circumstances and 'modes of social action' fail to
conform to the behaviour prescribed by economic theory. Economic theory, then, can only
try and explain social circumstances through the use of residual categories. Social theory,
however, adopts a similar strategy. In portraying the market economy as unstable in the
'long-run' only, because factors exogenous to the economy are said to permit its continued
satisfactory functioning in the 'short-run', sociological analyses also fail to take account of
processes of social change. Moreover, this form of analysis, which maintains the notion that
social factors are 'exogenous', restricts the relevant field of study for social theory to a
limited set of circumstances, perpetuating their perceived residual status.
Understandings of social change and transition are crucial. As Abrams (1972:18) argues ,
one of the most important aspects about the sociological emphasis is that it searches for
'tendentious explanations'; that is, it attempts to account for both structure and action over
time. That sociological analysis has not been entirely successful in this pursuit, which is
highlighted above, is significant. More specifically, sociology has perpetuated the
'objectification' and 'abbreviation' of history (Abrams 1972:26) through its own use of
'conceptual polarities' (and often by not challenging their use in related disciplines). As a
result, processes of change are not recognised; indeed, they appear to be impossible to
delineate.
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The following section extends the discussion about forms of explanation that rely on the use
of residual categories in engendering the controversies which beset issues of public sector
provision and, in particular, the perceived crisis in welfare.
Issues of Public Sector Provision and Accounting.
Concerns about public sector wage determination and productivity issues reflect problems
which are created and sustained by the spurious separation of 'economic' and 'social'
processes; in particular, the reluctance to challenge the assumed unassailability of the
'economics' of market and commodity production. The separation of economic and social
categories has far reaching policy implications which are reflected in the analysis and
design of policies concerning the provision of social services, and wage and employment
legislation.
The public sector dilemma is two-fold. On the one hand, it is the apparent lack of a price
mechanism allocating resources (including wages) which is problematic. On the other
hand, the lower imputed productivity gains in the public service sector (which is argued to
be an essentially 'unproductive' or 'non-progressive' sector), further exacerbates the
perceived difficulties caused by the absence of a 'market' allocation. Together, these
apparent malfunctions have not only generated the pressure to keep wage costs down, but
moreover, have operated against the expansion of public service provision and have
generally restricted its development, in an insidious way. This is not to say that public
service provision has not grown, as obviously it has. However, there has always been a
critical tension between the drive to expand and improve welfare services, and escalating
concerns regarding the relative costs of public service provision which, more often than not,
focuses on wage costs alone (mirroring economic models).
The importance of public sector pay movements in public expenditure is evidenced by
structural constraints on public expenditure, produced by historical trends in a phenomenon
47
known as the 'relative price effect' (Price 1979). As Price argues, the impetus to keep public
expenditure costs down, in particular the drive to effect public expenditure cuts by the
Conservative Government which came into office in 1979, stems from the tendency for
public expenditure to increase in relative cost over time. This adverse relative price effect,
more contentious in periods of relatively high inflation, is always present and, furthermore,
tends to reemerge as a more intractable problem because it has not been recognised as a
continuous problem. The root of the problem, according to Price , is the failure to measure
public service output properly. He suggests that :
'...whereas pay rises in the 'enterprise' sector (public as well as private) are
not fully translated into price changes because of productivity offsets, in the
government sector productivity growth is assumed to be zero (in effect it is
not measured), so that prices increase as fast as wage and salary rates.
This means that the price of the services provided by government
employees rises r per cent per annum faster than the price of goods and
services provided by the rest of the economy, where r is the rate of
productivity growth in the non-government sector' (1979:69).
Hence, as long as pay in the public services tends to move in line with pay in other sectors
(and as long as productivity in the economy generally continues to grow), the share of public
spending in GDP will appear to increase, the relative price effect being positive,
representing a productivity disadvantage to the economy as a whole. The convention which
fails to impute productivity gains to government employees, Price argues, also
circumscribes measurements of growth in government services: any volume growth in
services provided can only occur through increased employment and therefore cost.
Price's argument is that the cyclical suppression of constraints on public spending plans has
meant that plans for the volume growth of public spending in these periods have been
established on questionable grounds, given that the adverse long-term relative price effect
is not explicitly addressed (1979:70). The remedy Price proposes - to avoid the recurrent
financial crises of control over public spending caused by this erratic behaviour - is to
recognise that:
'public servants will not, in the longer run, accept lower growth of real
incomes than their counterparts in the non-government sector purely on the
grounds of lower imputed productivity gains. Attempts should therefore be
made to identify actual or notional productivity gains in the public services
and this would at once relieve some of the pressure to expand through
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recruitment and would prevent also the unjustified suppression of relative
incomes in the government sector. This succeeds in the short term at the
cost of disruption later' (1979:75).
That Price regards this remedy as a viable short term solution only, concluding his paper
with the suggestion that nevertheless, the problem will reemerge as strongly in the future,
indicates that perhaps his account is not an entirely adequate statement or understanding of
the problem.
Price's account, on the one hand, argues that if only one could ascribe some productivity
gain to public service output, then individuals (governments, taxpayers, consumers) would
no longer demand expanded service provision in the form of employing more people.
Instead, by imputing 'actual' or 'notional' productivity gains, such persons would realise that
the service was improving without any employment increase. The implication is that (at
best) without there being any actual change in service provision (notional productivity gains
merely credited to its performance), individuals should be placated by the 'fact' that these
services are productive and are thus deemed to be expanding, as though their previous
assessment of the adequacy of service provision was incorrect. Price further argues that if
productivity gains were imputed, then there would also be less pressure to suppress
incomes in the government sector, as wages could increase in line with the attributed
productivity gains in that sector. Wage increases would, therefore, no longer represent a
productivity disadvantage to the economy as a whole.
There is a point to be made that public services are inaccurately classified as 'unproductive'
and their contribution to society incorrectly assessed. The remedy is not, however, one of
imputing 'notional or actual productivity gains' to the public sector. This is because the root
of the problem is not, as Price would have it, simply the failure to measure public service
output properly9. On the contrary, the classification of public services as 'unproductive'
9 Ironically perhaps, Price's suggestions are being applied in the public service sector presently. For
example, in the health service, the stricter application of cash limits expressed in terms of cash
expenditures rather than volume expenditures (introduced in 1981) has certainly constrained specific
expenditure programmes and continues to do so. Also, the 'competitive' tendering programme,
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reflects entrenched assumptions about the salience of market-commodity production; it is a
conventional reaction, consisting of counterfactual categorisation and explanation of
activities which do not conform. The problem of identifying and measuring outputs, although
common to all products, especially services (whether public or private) (Brown and Jackson
1986:106), is perceived as a threat to economic stability only when the services involved are
not seen to be 'viably' operating on the 'free market'.
Price's analysis is, in fact, modelled on Baumol's (1967) formal examination of the
perceived 'problem of unbalanced growth in the economy'; that is, the observed growth of
service employment and the persistent cumulative rising costs of producing personal
services in the public sector. Baumol argues, quite simply, that there are two types of
economic activities, one 'progressive' and the other 'non-progressive': maintaining the
output of the non-progressive sector entails cumulative rising relative costs and the
absorption of more of the labour force, and a decreasing labour force in the progressive
sector, slowing 'economic growth'. (Baumol ignores the fact that 'economic growth' is
measured in such a way as to favour the 'progressive' sector.)
'...the place of any particular activity in the classification is not primarily a
fortuitous matter determined by the particulars of its history, but rather...it is
a manifestation of the activity's technological structure, which determines
quite definitely whether the productivity of its labour inputs will grow slowly
or rapidly' (1967:416).
It is important to unpack this statement. In doing so, one discovers that the critical
'technological structure' referred to in fact consists of labour's perceived role in the
process10. In the 'progressive' sector, labour is argued to be an instrument merely required
for the achievement of the final product, whereas in the 'non-progressive' sector, labour is
euphemistically presented as the opportunity for ancillary services in the NHS to prove 'just how
productive and efficient they really are' has brought about the widespread introduction of productivity
bargaining in a relatively short period of time as in-house teams attempt to retain the services. The
proliferation of 'efficiency excercises' and incentive bonus payment schemes, explicitly linking pay
rewards to 'productivity gains', is precisely the 'remedy' prescribed by Price - 'productivity measures'
are imputed to services classified as 'unproductive' in order to persuade the public that the services
are improving despite expenditure and labour force reductions.
10 To this end, all non-wage costs are ignored in the analysis - an 'incidental premise' simplifying the
mathematical model.
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said to be itself the end product (labour services are part, if not all, of the product being
produced). In this formulation, a productivity differential exists between the 'progressive' and
'non-progressive' sectors, not because labour in the non-progressive sector is working
inefficiently11. Rather, regardless of the most 'efficient' use of labour and technologies, the
price of the non-progressive sector will 'rise cumulatively and without limit'.
It is argued that in the progressive sector, unit costs remain constant because improvements
in labour productivity are accompanied by equivalent wage rate increases. In the non¬
progressive sector, alternatively, unit costs rise because wage increases equivalent to that
in the progressive sector take place while productivity remains constant, if not actually
decreasing. Hence the relative price of non-progressive sector outputs increase compared
to those in the progressive sector. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that the non¬
progressive sector absorbs an ever increasing proportion of resources (essentially labour),
to the detriment of the progressive sector. The employment expansion in the non¬
progressive sector and the contraction in the progressive sector is argued to occur because
the progressive sector experiences cumulative increases in productivity (restricting labour
growth), whereas the non-progressive sector simply absorbs more and more labour to
maintain its output12.
There is a certain pathos to Baumol's argument. Despite the argued dangers to economic
growth represented by the expanding non-progressive sector (largely identified as public
services), Baumol concludes that :
'This is a trend for which no man and no group should be blamed, for there
is nothing that can be done to stop it' (1967:423).
11The model assumes that there is no 'x-inefficiency' in the system, that is, it is assumed that the
services are being produced at minimum cost, with no over-staffing - the most efficient technologies
being employed.
12 Fuchs (1968), provides an empirical confirmation of Baumol's thesis.
The argument, however, is tautological and mobilises residual definitions. Baumol's 'proof
consists merely of a restatement of the observed expansion of personal service employment
because of its lack of 'productivity'. As Fraser (1987) notes, services are essentially defined
negatively; that is, as activities not producing material goods. Once again, we witness the
mobilisation of residual categories when observed phenomena fail to conform to the
assumed theoretical model. The pattern of expanding service employment should
represent a serious challenge to assumptions about labour and market-commodity
production, but it is not regarded as such. Instead, it is set up as an emphemeral or
superficial aberration, with the theoretical model presumed to be unscathed and intact.
Contrary to Baumol's (1967:416) assertion, the classification of activities as 'progressive' or
'non-progressive' is, in fact, crucially determined by a historical tradition of insufficient
responses to explanatory crises generating residual components and contradictions in
explanations. Moreover, the deliberate focus on wage-labour costs alone, ignoring all other
costs, and the particular concern about services which do not operate on the 'free market'
(1967:420-422) underline the persistent and unresolved difficulties posed by the public
service sector in the face of obdurate refusals to relinquish the 'economic' market-
commodity model of price determination, whether for labour (wages) or other 'commodities'.
Public sector developments have created significant problems for this general framework of
understanding, taxing both its ability to explain the 'price of labour' and economic
accounting practices. The 'relative price effect', borne out of the contradictions and
explanatory failures of economic theory, is not an inevitability; it has, nonetheless,
deleterious consequences for welfare developments, constraining public service provision.
Its rationale restricts conceptions of 'economic' and 'social' systems, circumscribing forms of
organisation. Furthermore, the escalating 'economic' costs implied by the 'relative price
effect' find their counterpart in the increasingly rigid policy measures adopted to control the
'problem'. In a sense, the post-war development of incomes policies, cash limits and,
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ultimately, privatisation, demonstrates the desperate resolve to try and effect a 'market-
based' price mechanism.
Rethinking the 'Public Welfare'/ 'Private Market' Division.
In this chapter I have suggested that the crisis in welfare, linked as it is to issues of wage
determination and the distribution of resources more broadly, is a matter not simply of
scarce resources combined with philosophical preferences for private enterprise, but one
which, should be perceived to reflect and to have been exacerbated by, the conceptual
framework delineating resource production and distribution in society. Furthermore, I
suggest that recourse to notions of a 'market distribution', relies upon a contrived separation
of allocative and distributional processes, and is a critical factor in the escalating crisis.
From the point of view of most economists, the position adopted by many social theorists
(including factors other than economic ones as part of the explanation) is iconoclastic.
However, it is my contention that most sociological arguments are inadequate and should
be developed much further to challenge the whole notion of the operation of 'markets'. In
summarising attempts to interpret women's employment participation, especially their
concentration in social welfare jobs, Rein concludes that,
'The problem of interpretation lies in the twin reluctance of economists to
move beyond labour market supply theory and of sociologists to enter this
terrain arid establish a theory of the sociology of labour markets' (1985:55).
I would go a step further and remark that to the extent that sociologists have erred, it is in
doing precisely what Rein wishes them to do - they have entered this terrain and attempted
to provide market-based sociological explanations. Their reluctance has been to move
beyond market theory, to establish an alternative theory; I would suggest that an alternative
inclusive explanation of social welfare and resource distribution is required. As Stewart et
al. (1980:106-107) argue, the production of multi-dimensional models of stratification to
accommodate antithetical processes is at odds both with the underlying belief that the
stratification system operates consistently and attempts to provide a theoretically integrated
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model. The intellectual appeal of an adequate endogenous account of theory and practice
should be upheld.
The tendency to depict public welfare as 'unproductive' and a drain on the 'private market
sector' because public sector developments do not conform to 'economic laws' of 'market-
commodity production', are all the more arbitrary in light of the forms of welfare provision
developed over the post-war period. Criticisms of public service provision mobilise a
stereotypical conception of 'the welfare state' which conveniently disregards the broad
range of welfare benefits provided by the state for those in secure employment.
'The latent assumptions which commonly underlie these criticisms [of the
public sector],..have little relevance while they remain attached to a
stereotype of social welfare which represents only the more visible part of
the real world of welfare. The social history of our times inevitably becomes,
in the process, sadly distorted' (Titmuss 1958:53).
As Sinfield (1986) argues, Titmuss' contribution regarding the 'social division of welfare'
remains highly relevant. Titmuss identified three systems of 'social services' - social
welfare, fiscal welfare and occupational welfare. The first, 'social welfare' refers to the
traditional area of social policy and administration generally understood as 'welfare state'
services; Sinfield prefers the term 'public welfare' to emphasise the visible nature of the
welfare provision. The second, tax or fiscal welfare, includes tax reliefs and allowances
from the government, though these are not included in the public expenditure accounts,
despite the fact that they provide 'similar benefits and express similar purpose in the
recognition of dependent needs and social welfare' (Titmuss 1958:44). The third,
occupational welfare, includes benefits received by an employee through or as a result of
employment, including industrial and fringe benefits.
Those who benefit from both fiscal and occupational welfare (the so-called 'welfare state for
the rich') are those in secure employment and, especially, well paid employment. Fiscal
and occupational welfare are funded by government in the form of 'tax expenditures'. The
result is a reduction in tax revenue which not only limits the amount of resources perceived
54
to be available for 'public welfare' but also may be reflected in lower wages and salaries for
some (Sinfield 1986).
Titmuss argues that though the three systems are regarded as distinct and independent
systems, perpetuating the stereotypical conception of 'the welfare state', the division is
contrived. He suggests that the three systems
'signify that man can no longer be regarded simply as a 'unit of labour
power'; they all reflect contemporary opinion that man is not wholly
responsible for his dependency, and they all accept obligations for meeting
needs of the individual and the family' (Titmuss 1958:3).
I would, however, further develop the framework delineating the social divisions of welfare
as it is crucial to the debate about 'market' distribution. The most salient analytical point
illustrated by attempts to specify the nature of the social divisions of welfare is precisely that
the division between 'economic determinants' and 'social influences/outcomes' is
impossible to sustain. All forms of the divisions of social welfare - 'public', 'fiscal' and
'occupational' - constitute public expenditure on welfare, effecting a distribution of
resources. The debate about the social divisions of welfare needs to be made absolutely
central to the debate about welfare 'efficiency' and 'market' distribution.
It is therefore important to emphasise that typically, the Thatcher government, and
governments in the past, have maintained the false distinctions between the various forms
of welfare identified by construing both the 'fiscal' and 'occupational' forms of welfare as
essentially 'productive' processes, compatible with the operation of 'market forces'. In
contrast, 'public' or 'social' welfare is depicted as 'unproductive' and incompatible with the
operation of the 'market'. Consequently, the contrived link between productivity and market
forces on the one hand, and low productivity (or unproductiveness) with state service
provision on the other, is preserved.
This process of distinguishing and undermining the legitimacy of public welfare highlights, I
believe, the contradictions inherent in approaches assuming market validity. As Mukherjee
cogently points out in respect of state responsibilities:
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'Statutory intervention...has been in the interest of re-establishing freer
markets. From long usage, a seal of respectability is attached to
government intervention in making product and capital markets work in a
way approximately resembling text book models' (1974:3).
Sustaining the notion that there is a credible system of 'market distribution', even if its
perceived mode of operation falls short of the model described in text books is, I suggest,
part of the process which increasingly undermines the legitimacy, not only of 'public'
welfare, but also of social welfare in its broadest sense, as it concerns understandings of the
production and distribution of resources.
Increasing public and scholarly interest in the interrelationship between the governmental or
state sector, the for-profit business sector and the non-governmental non-profit or voluntary
sector further underlines the fact that the public/private dichotomy is an inaccurate
conceptualisation of social reality (Ostrander 1987). Whether viewed as 'third party
government' (Salamon 1987) or 'mediating structures' (Van Til 1987), the longstanding
history and growth of 'non-governmental' (welfare) service provision and extensive state
financial backing of these services (funded through an array of fiscal policies), in both Britain
and the United States, challenges conventional assumptions about the nature of, and
responsibility for, social welfare provision. In particular, a redefinition of what constitutes the
'public' sector is needed, rethinking and challenging '[njotions of 'public' as governmental
and 'private' as nongovernmental (and thus outside the realm of accountability)' (Ostrander
1987: 128).
Summary
In proposing that there has been a public sector wage and employment policy continuum
bound largely by 'economic' rationales, I have suggested that social theory is centrally
implicated in the current crisis in welfare. Controversies concerning welfare reflect
problems of understanding regarding processes of resource distribution and allocation. The
area of 'labour market' research is an important area of stratification research but has
glossed over important theoretical questions. Specifying the mechanisms by which
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outcomes are produced is an issue of theoretical capacity. The problems of theories of
wage determination, in particular in relation to both the public service sector and those it
employs (predominantly women), constitute an explanatory crisis and consist of the
attempted subsumption of social processes under the centrality of market-commodity
production. The contradiction inherent in this separation of 'economic' processes from
additional 'social' influences prevents an endogenous and theoretically powerful account of
social practice.
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3. Wages arid Market Performance: The Case of Gender
Divisions
Introduction
In seeking to impose a 'market' determination of resource allocation, privatisation policies
have been marshalled in relation to circumstances where market distinctions are most
problematic. Market-based explanations fail to coherently account for public service sector
employment and the growth of 'social wages'; they are also unable to adequately explain
gender differences in earnings. The standard classification of the public service sector as
'unproductive' or 'non-progressive', as discussed in Chapter 2, is highly problematic and
inadequate; this residual conceptualisation of social welfare services is perpetuated
through economic determinism and an embedded (but questionable) obeisance to
principles of the 'market economy' by economists, sociologists, social policy analysts and
governments alike. The deficiency of this approach, which treats social issues and policies
as 'leftover' or peripheral components, becomes all the more glaring when an attempt is
made to incorporate women into the analysis. The nature of employment experienced by
women - the generally lower levels of return and higher job insecurity - has highlighted the
serious limitations of conventional labour market analyses. 'Malestream' analyses focusing
on 'economic man', have been criticised for their general disregard and inappropriate
treatment of women as 'other' and subsidiary1 . There are, then, clear parallels in the way in
which public welfare services and women are analytically treated: as 'social' categories
they are construed to be secondary and therefore marginalised. To the extent that the
public sector is a litmus test of normative economic understandings of the 'market' as a
mechanism for resource distribution in society, women (or gender divisions) in the public
sector pose an even greater challenge. Women's employment in the public sector
1 Cf. O'Brien, 1981; Kenrick, 1981; Delphy1981; Stacey1981; Cohen 1982
counterpoints the 'non-market' elements associated with domestic/home influences to the
'non-market' elements associated with a public service. In particular, it is the scale of
increase in the participation of married women which underlines the inadequacies of the
economic/social divide represented in the paid/domestic-labour dichotomy.
The growth of public sector service employment over the post-war period has been a
significant source of employment growth and, crucially, has been associated with the
marked increase in female employment. This trend has been a major impetus in the attempt
to redress the exclusion of women from both empirical enquiry and theoretical
consideration. It is telling, therefore, as Beechey and Perkins (1987) point out, that
analyses of service sector employment have been neglected and are not very well
developed theoretically, while concurrently, the state (through its welfare services) is the
largest employer of women. The present study attempts to contribute to research which
aims to redress this imbalance.
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to further explore the issue of the adequacy of
market explanations, focusing on the problems which gender divisions present; and to
briefly consider gender divisions and secular trends in women's employment and pay,
providing, where possible, a comparison of patterns in the public and private sectors. The
first part will provide an examination of labour market segmentation theory as it is being
employed to explain patterns of gender inequality, followed by an examination of patterns of
women's labour force participation and pay in the public and private sectors. The
development of labour market segmentation theory has evolved out of the recognition that
'market' criteria are limited; it will be argued, however, that segmentation theories, though
unable to demonstrate the explantory power of 'market' processes, typically remain
entrenched within a normative economic frame of reference and thus fail to cope with the
centrality of social processes.
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Discovering the Limits to Market Distinctions
Since labour markets have been justified in terms of rewarding productivity, forms of
employment discrimination including that of unequal returns to women and to men,
underline the fact that, at the very least, the 'market' is not a 'free' one and is influenced by
many factors. The marginal productivity theory of distribution suggests that the wage
structure reflects efficiency differences between workers. All else being equal, the skills
acquired by individuals investing and reinvesting in themselves through education and
training (a process referred to by the term 'human captital'), is argued to establish a direct
correspondence between the product market valuation of the goods and services produced
by workers (the price of commodities) and individual wages (the price of labour). Thus it is
assumed that wage differentials are determined by differences in worker characteristics,
defined in terms of job performance. Differences in pay are said to reflect object differences
in workers' performance and productivity. Thus, if in equilibrium wages are below what is
socially acceptable, they are argued to nevertheless reflect the low productivity of the
workers concerned. Wages, then, are construed to be strictly allocated according to the
demands of 'the market'.
A large body of evidence, however, points to the inherently imperfect nature labour market
performance, suggesting that as most of the preconditions for the efficient workings of the
'market' are non-existent, they are unable to perform the efficient allocation that economic
theory requires of them . In critiquing orthodox economic explanations, the analysis of
segmented labour markets has developed out of the recognition that there is a lack of
convergence between pay and 'human capital'. Segmentation theory has been motivated
by the need to explain a number of phenomena, including the prevalence of low pay and
poverty, employment discrimination, the failure of education and training programmes to
affect income or occupation in the predicted direction, and the growth of monopolies or
'market imperfections'. For example, gender inequalities in pay have led to attempts to
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explain the operation of the market by suggesting that gender divisions either modify or
produce different markets.
Labour market segmentation, typically defined as a process of compartmentalisation, has
been of particular interest to economists because of its perceived outcome: the differential
financial reward to workers of 'equal efficiency', and therefore the misallocation, or
inefficient use of, resources.
'Segmentation becomes interesting when it results in the failure of the
labour market to treat its participants evenhandedly, in that it accords
significantly different opportunities and rewards to otherwise comparable
people' (Ryan 1981: 4).
Feminists have been keen to incorporate the basic concepts of segmentation theory in an
attempt to explain the process whereby women are isolated from 'primary sources' of
employment and receive lower wages. There are essentially two strands of segmentation
theory: the basic dual labour market model, which encompasses primary/secondary
markets, and modified market segmentation theory, in which groups of workers have
restricted access within a single market.
Dual labour market theory suggests that the existence of non-competing groups has
important implications for the structure of employment. Barriers to mobility means that there
are groups of workers for whom the relationship between pay and labour productivity is not
equalised. Therefore, it is argued that employers can hire labour from segments where pay
is low relative to labour productivity. Dual labour market theory suggests, furthermore, that
the distinction between the primary and secondary sectors is intensified (if not defined) by
the characteristics of the workers themselves. Workers with potentially unstable work habits
and with weak orientation towards work are argued to be employed in the secondary sector;
worker attributes reinforced by the secondary nature of the jobs (Kenrick 1981; Craig et al
1982: 77-78).
Modified market segmentation theory, like orthodox economic theory, asserts that a
relationship exists between the worker's quality and low pay. The difference between the
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two is that whilst the orthodox position locates the productivity and pay level directly with the
individual workers, segmented labour market theory recognises both uneven or segmented
employment and industrial structures, resulting in high productivity and low productivity jobs
(outwith the direct control of the worker). The latter analysis nonetheless deduces 'the
supply characteristics of the workers from the demand side structure of the labour market
and asserts that low productivity workers will be found in low productivity jobs' (Craig et al
1982:.88). Moreover, social and sex differentiation of the labour supply is argued to
reinforce and develop the segmented labour market structuring.
There are, however, a number of problems with segmentation theories, which reflect
practices derived from conventional ('male stream') models of the labour market. It has
been suggested that segmentation theories, evolving out of basic dual labour market theory,
generally derive supply from demand and thus assert that a relationship exists between the
worker's quality (measured in terms of job performance) and low pay2. Most analyses
which attempt to locate women's work in terms of their occupational segregation and
'secondary position' have not seriously challenged the normative approach of the basic
dual labour market model, which suggests that the allocation of workers between sectors
operates in terms of the demand for different kinds of worker behaviour or characteristics
(Kenrick 1981; Lonsdale, 1985)3. In these analyses, worker characteristics are simply 'read
off job characteristics. Normative labour market theory is not alone in this practice,
however. There is an established body of sociological literature which questions the the
salience of conventional occupational categories as units of stratification, for the same
2 Cf. Kenrick 1981; Craig et at., 1982, 1985; Rubery et al., 1984; Beechy and Perkins 1987;
Rubery and Tarling 1989.
3 Notable exceptions are represented by the work of Rubery (1978), Sengertberger (1981)
and Hartmann (1979a; 1979b) which have focussed on the 'supply side': the role of male
workers and unions in structuring jobs to protect their own interests at the expense of female
workers' interests, particularly in the face of rising unemployment. The Cambridge Labour
Studies Group also emphasises 'supply side' factors, but augments arguments about the role
of collective action and sectionalism' in an attempt to further incorporate processes of social
reproduction in addition to those of (economic) production (Craig et al 1982; Rubery et al
1984; Craig et al 1985; Rubery and Tarling 1989). In this latter endeavour, the contribution of
the Cambridge Group is invaluable.
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reason4. As Stewart et al. (1980:203) argue, the reification of occupations as categories of
stratification experience reflects the conflation of characteristics of the job and those of the
incumbent, obfuscating 'the relationship between the distribution of occupations in a society,
and the processes underlying the distribution of individuals to occupations throughout their
working lives'.
Mistaking characteristics of the job for those of the incumbent stems from the tradition in
which so-called 'background' characteristics of individuals occupying jobs, that is social
criteria, are considered to be peripheral or secondary factors, and therefore not central to
the analysis Age, for example, is typically considered to be one of these 'background'
characteristics. In their study of relative pay in the public and private sectors, Elliott and
Murphy's (1987) treatment of the category 'age' is standard, but crystallizes the deficiencies
of this analytical approach. Elliott and Murphy find that the changing age structure of the
labour force accounts for a substantial proportion of the growth in earnings. But they argue
that the effects of age have to be 'removed':
'...if we can discover and remove these effects, we can distinguish more
precisely what has really been happening to relative pay in the public and
private sectors over the period. Adjusting the average earnings figures for
groups of employees in this way gives us a much clearer picture of what
has been happening to the earnings of the individuals who comprise each
group.' (1987: 112 emphasis added).
That is, age is not considered to be a central feature of but to have a peripheral and
exogenous influence on pay determination. The implication is that age obscures rather than
constitutes an integral feature of the forces maintaining wages. Further, the changing age
structure and its effects is argued to be an 'empirical question' only. However, the
considerable amount of information concerning women's participation in employment
suggests that, on the contrary, age and its attendant life-cycle effects are significant factors
affecting wages and these are not adequately explained in conventional economic and
4 Cf. Stewart et al. 1980; Brown 1982; Prandy et al. 1982; Holmwood and Stewart 1983;
Crompton and Jones 1984; Harris and Morris 1986; Prandy 1986.
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sociological theory. Age, then, is not simply an empirical issue but has important
ramifications for theoretical analysis.
Importantly, by marginalising social criteria and explanations, conventional 'male-stream'
models of the labour market and their derivatives have to resort to the use of negatively or
residually defined categories to explain patterns of women's employment. As Kenrick
suggests, such analyses rely on the use of negatively defined categories.
'In practice,...since the primary sector is largely staffed by adult (usually
white) males, these provide the norm for work behaviour. Secondary-
sector worker characteristics then come to be defined negatively as
deviating from this norm; their objective characteristics may be discussed
but they are not explicitly incorporated into the model' (1981: 169).
Consequently, employment experiences and practices, though the subject of discussion,
are not actually incorporated into the models. Women, part-time employment, and public
service employment have all been classified as 'non-standard' and marginal to 'the
economy'. Thus, in reference to 'secondary labour forces', Goldthorpe asserts;
'What...is distinctive in their case...is their lack of integration specifically into
the world of industrial work...For the implication of this is not that they are of
limited economic importance but, on the contrary, that they are of functional
value to the economic system because of the fact that they are highly
disponible or, in other words, because they stand largely outside, and in
fact may not seek strenuously to become involved in, the 'web of rules'
which...represents the characteristically modern way of regulating
employment relationships. (1985; 144).
The increasing numbers of women in part-time public service employment, however, poses
a major problem for conventional explanations of the structure of employment and wages. It
is becoming apparent that classification of the large and expanding share of employment
secured by women (especially married women with young children) as 'disponible' and
marginal, is both descriptively and conceptually inadequate. Empirical evidence suggests
that women do not act as a minority flexible reserve (Rubery and Tarling, 1989) to be drawn
into employment and disposed of according to the demands of 'capitalist industrial
economies'. Further, the implication that women workers have low labour-force attachment
and are unreliable (Goldthorpe 1985: 143), is simply not substantiated by patterns of
women's employment. Women are working for more of their lifetime than af any {ime in the
64
past century and do not appear to change jobs any more often than men. Like Rimmer and
Popay (1982), Martin and Roberts (1984) found that women are increasingly returning to
work between births and returning to work sooner after child-bearing is finished: the
majority of part-time work is over 16 hours and a substantial minority is around 30 hours a
week. In their sample, the majority of cases where a worker left her employer was for job-
related reasons. The most important reason was to go to a better job.
'...it is clear that the common view that women leave jobs and stop work
mainly for domestic reasons is a distortion of a more complex reality.'
(1984:142)
Finally, almost half the women working indicated that they would like further training, which
counters the dual labour market theory claim that women have a low interest in training (and
consequently lower wages).
As argued in Chapter 3, the use of residual categories, typically employed to explain why
modes of social action fail to conform to the behaviour prescribed in economic analyses,
both undermines and radically departs from the central tenets of the analytical system. The
application of residual categories, then, points to the fundamental limitations of the
analytical system and to the need for an alternative inclusive conceptualisation which
resonates more fully with social experience.
Arguments for the Operation of Social Factors 5
Attempts to more fully incorporate processes of social reproduction in analyses of women's
position in employment can be found in the work of the Cambridge Labour Studies Group,
among others6. In arguing for a more radical critique of human capital theory, Craig et.al.
(1982) suggest that the supply of 'good' jobs is independent of the stock of human
5 The arguments presented here will be developed and expanded in Chapter 6 which
considers in more detail explanations of low pay, and the pattern of low pay among the
respondents in the present study.
6 Cf. Craig et al. 1982; Rubery et al. 1984; Craig et al 1985; Hartmann 1985; Siltanen
1986; Beechy and Perkins 1987; Rubery and Tarling 1989.
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capabilities, and that there is no positive relationship between pay and the skill content of
jobs. Job content is said to become important in determining pay only if it influences the
worker's bargaining power. But bargaining power is not depicted as a simple function of job
content - disadvantaged workers often have to undertake demanding and skilled work
without experiencing an improvement in their 'labour market status' and bargaining position.
Economic factors of production are argued to be inadequate in explaining the divergent
developments in pay and employment structures. As 'primary' industries do not guarantee
'primary' employment conditions, and the emergence of a 'primary' sector within an industry
does not mean that the 'secondary' sector will be eliminated, Craig et al. argue that the
relationships between industrial structure, collective bargaining institutions and pay levels
are not clear-cut, contrary to the predictions of dual labour market models (1982: 60-69).
Rather, the institutional regulation of wages, that is, the strength of employer associations
and traditions of labour force organisation, the family system, the state welfare system, and
the education system are said to determine the social costs of reproduction and hence the
'price of labour' or wages (1982:.94, 73; 1985).
'The forces maintaining wages in the labour market are the acceptable
minimum standards of living, which are protected by social convention and
worker organisation rather than the working of supply and demand' (1982:
135-136).
In this analysis, the secondary position of women in the workforce (the lower rates of pay
and attendant insecure conditions of work obtained) is largely explained in terms of
processes of social reproduction, not levels of efficiency. Changes in the differential
between men's and women's earnings in the 1970's and 1980's substantiates the argument
that women's pay levels are determined by the social and institutional conditions of their
labour supply (Rubery and Tarling 1989: 119). That is, in contradiction of the predictions of
neoclassical economics, women's earnings remained around 60% of men's until the 1970s,
despite increasing demand for their labour. Moreover, there was a considerable increase in
women's relative pay after the mid-1970s, which has been sustained, as a result of the
Equal Pay Act, the trade union policy of implementing this legislation by raising minimum
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wage rates for women to those for men, and by the flat rate incomes policies adopted in the
mid-1970's.
The analysis put forward by the Cambridge Group represents an attempt to endogenise
social processes within an analysis of labour market functioning. In providing a focus which
does not marginalise the conditions under which women supply their labour, the family/work
dichotomy is undermined. But to the extent that their analysis aims to integrate segmented
labour market theory into a 'more radical economic analysis' where primary and secondary
sectors are seen to be 'ideal types' (Rubery and Wilkinson 1981; Craig et at. 1982), the form
of explanation adopted is multi-causal rather than truly integrated or continuous (Holmwood
and Stewart 1983; Stewart et al 1985; Prandy 1986). Nevertheless, though not resolved,
the question of the relationship between the sphere of paid employment and of domestic or
family responsibilities (economic and social relations) is addressed: the research clearly
calls into question the apparent 'characteristically modern way of regulating employment
relationships' referred to by Goldthorpe.
As Stacey (1981) argues, the deficiencies of theories of 'production' and 'reproduction' stem
from the fact that they are not analysed as parts of a single process:
'The problem arises because we lack a conceptual framework, let alone a
theory with any explanatory power, which will permit us to analyse paid and
unpaid labour in a variety of social institutions and social settings within
one notion of the division of labour...which can articulate the home as well
as the market place and the state and relate the class order to the gender
order; and which can comprehend the nature of the social relations
involved not only when people work for others (personal service), but when
they do work to others (human service or people work)...The lack of a theory
which relates these problems to each other matters not because one
particularly hankers after an over-arching theory, but because it is clear,
both theoretically and empirically, that relationships exist among these
various factors although they have hitherto been dealt with discretely and
under different theoretical conceptualisations' (1981: 172).
In considering trends in women's labour force participation, and the case study of domestic
ancillary employment in the NHS, the relations of social circumstances (including domestic
responsibilities) to employment experiences will be highlighted in the forthcoming chapters.
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Secular Trends In Women's Labour Force Participation
Changing demographic characteristics
Significant demographic changes, reflected in longer life expectancy, a more equal sex
ratio, younger marriages and higher marriage rates, and small families with fertility confined
to a narrow band of years, have affected the lives of women as workers, wives, and mothers.
These changes, most prevalent since the second world war, have been accompanied by a
vast increase in the number of women entering the labour force, especially married women.
As Hakim's study (1979) illustrates, during the period 1901-1971, women's participation in
the labour force increased proportionately by 45%. Over the same period, men's
participation declined by 4%, mostly after 1961. Much of the increase in the female share of
employment is a post-war phenomenon: census data indicates that before 1950, women's
share of employment remained around 27-30% but increased by 7% between 1951 and
1971 (Joseph, 1983: 70). Women's share of employment has continued to increase
throughout tfie 1970's and 1980's and in 1986, women accounted for 44.8% of the total
workforce (Rubery and Tarling, 1989: 101).
The increasing participation of women in employment has reduced the sex differential in
labour force participation. In the first half of this century, 38% of women of working age were
in employment; this increased to 43% by 1951 and to 55% by 1971 (Hakim, 1979a: 3).
According to OPCS data, by 1979 61% of women of working age had a job (Martin and
Roberts, 1984: 1). Evidence from the Women and Employment Survey (WES), conducted in
1981, suggests that while 60% of women in the survey were employed, 69% of women were
'economically active' (1984:19).
In addition to the changing sex composition of the labour force, a number of other important
shifts in employment patterns have occured. The composition of the female labour force
itself has undergone a dramatic transformation in terms of the marital status and age profile
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of workers. As mentioned, the greatest change is the rate of increase in the participation of
married women; according to Hakim's analysis, married women's employment rates
increased by 390% over the period 1901-1971 (1979a: 4). Between 1911 and 1971, the
participation of married women in tfie labour force increased from 9.6% (of all married
women) to 42.9% (Joseph, 1983: 127); by 1981, married women's activity rates had
increased to 55% (Beacham, 1984). At the turn of the century, only 13% of working women
were married; in 1971, 65% of working women were married (Hakim, 1979a: 12).
Another striking change in the profile of the workforce is the changing age structure. Three
factors - the increasing average age of the population, the delay in entry into the labour
force due to longer periods of schooling and training, and the fall in the average age of
retirement - have significantly influenced the age composition of the male and female labour
forces (Hakim, 1979; Joseph, 1983; Beechey and Perkins, 1987). The activity rates of both
younger and older men and women have declined (Joseph, 1983; Dex and Philipson,
1986). The decline in the activity rates of younger men (aged 15-24), occurring until the
1960's, was due to the increasing number of full-time students (Joseph, 1983: 70) and is set
against the backdrop of an overall decline in male employment this century. But the more
recent decline in the participation of 16-17 year-olds is also the result of increasing youth
unemployment and corresponding expansion of youth training schemes (Office of
Population Censuses and Surveys, 1983; Beechey and Perkins, 1987). With the spread of
early retirement, older men's participation in the labour force has declined substantially:
during the period 1951-1983, the proportion of men over 65 in paid employment decreased
from 31% to 9% (OP CS, 1983; Walker, 1984-5). Even more striking is the rate of decline
in the participation of men aged 60-64 years (pre-'official' retirement age) between 1971
and 1983: during this period, the proportion of men in paid employment was reduced from
83% to 50% (Central Statistical Office, 1986; Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 12). Since the
mid-1970s, the activity rate among men aged 55-59 has also begun to drop dramatically.
The 9% drop in activity rate recorded between 1975 and 1984 reflects the growing use of
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early retirement to downsize the labour force (White , 1981; Walker, 1984-5; Beechey and
Perkins, 1987).
Though the participation rate of women over 65 has not fallen as much as that for men, the
same influences appear to operate for female and male workers - decreasing the activity
rates of those at the extreme ends of the age spectrum. But while the age profile of the male
labour force reflects that of the male population more generally, the relationship between
the female labour force and population is not as straightforward (Joseph, 1983). The female
labour force has 'aged' at a much faster pace over this century than has the general
population, due largely to the increasing participation of married women. At the turn of the
century, 73% of women of working age were under 35 years; by 1971, only 40% of women
of working age were under 35 while the proportion of those aged over 35 had increased
two-fold from 27% in 1901 to 60% in 1971 (Hakim, 1979a: 10). Again the trend of female
workers participating in the labour force becoming older is largely a post-war phenomenon.
In the early part of this century, the rate of female participation was at its peak (averaging
61%) for women aged 15-24, declining continously thereafter (1979: 5; Beechey and
Perkins, 1987: 14). By the 1960s, however, a bi-modal or two-phase work profile for women
had clearly emerged; the trend toward re-entry to the labour force at a more mature age is
the result of the increased activity of married women returning to work after their children
had reached school age. As a result of this bi-modal pattern of employment, the peak
activity rate for women had changed from 15-19 years in 1901 to 45-49 years in 1971
(Hakim, 1979a: 4). Since the early 1970s, not only has the period of absence from the
labour force (largely for family formation) become increasingly shorter, but also younger
women are more likely to return to work between births. Thus, no longer is the two-phase
pattern of employment as pervasive (Dex, 1984; Martin and Roberts, 1984).
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Part-time employment
Closely associated with the increased participation of women in the labour force is the
striking increase in the number of women working part-time. Information on the number of
women working part-time is only available for the post-war period. Further, information prior
to 1971 is limited because regularly collected official statistics disregarded service
industries in favour of manufacturing industries (in the 1950s, as now, women were largely
employed in service industries) (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 25). Nevertheless, census
material (based on household surveys) indicates that there has been a steady increase in
the proportion of women working part-time between 1951 and 1981. Joshi and Owen's
(1984) analysis of census data suggests that the proportion of women employees working
part-time increased from 13% to 42% over this period. According to the 1981 census, more
than 90% of part-time workers were female and 87% of these were married; only 9% of
part-time workers were male, most of whom were over the age of 60 (Office of Population
Censuses and Surveys, 1981). Looked at from a slightly different angle, part-time male
workers only accounted for 1.4% of total male employment in 1981 (OECD, 1985).
When women workers began to be mobilized on a large scale during the second world war,
part-time work was not initially very popular among employers. By the end of the war,
however, part-time work had come to be seen as advantageous for various reasons:
absenteeism was greatly reduced because workers had more time to see to their domestic
duties outside of working hours; workers had greater stamina over the shorter working day
and therefore were said to be more productive; less desirable kinds of work were better
performed on a part-time rather than full-time basis (Summerfield, 1984; Beechey and
Perkins, 1987). Due to labour shortages after the war, women were encouraged to stay on
in employment and throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with the increasing availability of part-
time work, more marked women kegan to participate.
71
In the early post-war expansion era, women were especially encouraged to work in the
textile and clothing industries and hospital domestic and laundry services (Summerfield,
1984). In a study conducted in 1957, Klein (1965) tound that 31% of all married women
worked in domestic occupations, the majority part-time (75%); of all part-time married
women workers in the study, 45% worked in domestic occupations. A substantial minority of
married women were also employed on a part-time basis in factories, offices (clerical
workers) and as shop assistants. Throughout the 1960s, however, there was a substantial
growth of part-time employment in manufacturing, extending into 'non-traditional' areas of
'female' employment within manufacturing (Beechey and Perkins, 1984; Rubery and
Tarling 1989). Between 1971 and 1981, the number of part-time employees in Britain grew
by about one million - from approximately 15% to approximately 20% of total employment.
Almost all of these employees were married women (Martin and Roberts, 1984: 15). The
major expansion was in the service sector of the economy, with the growth in part-time jobs
in the manufacturing sector coming to a halt in 1978 (Beechey and Perkins, 1984: 30).
While 82% of male part-time workers and 84% of female part-time workers now work in the
service industries (Hurstfield, 1980), these figures can be broken down to show that roughly
13% of all male employees, whereas 71% of all female employees, work in this sector on a
part-time basis. That is, though the majority of male and female part-time workers are to be
found in the service sector, because a much larger proportion of the female workforce work
part-time, women workers are concentrated in service sector jobs.
As Martin and Roberts' analysis of the Women and Employment Survey (WES) illustrates,
the presence of children, and in particular, the age of the youngest child, is an important
factor affecting the distribution of part-time work and hours worked part-time among women
workers. Only 7% of childless women in their sample worked part-time, whereas 75% of
women with a youngest child aged 5-10 years worked part-time, 32% of whom worked less
than 16 hours per week. The proportion working part-time declines as the age of the
youngest child increases. Where the youngest child was 16 or over, the proportion working
72
part-time had decreased to 58% with only 17% working less than 16 hours per week (1984:
15-17).
After a long and sustained period of growth, the period 1979-1983 witnessed a decline in
the overall numbers of women employed. The number of female full-time employees had
fluctuated during the 1970s, but the trend from 1980 has been downward. In contrast, the
number of part-time jobs rose significantly throughout the 1970s and only decreased over
the period 1981-1983. The decline in female employment, occuring in a period of recession
when the underlying upward trend in unemployment was quickening, coincided with the
Thatcher government's application of monetarist policies specifically aimed at restricting the
growth of public expenditure7. By 1984, however, the number of women employed, full- and
part-time, was rising again while the number of men employed declined slightly (Rubery and
Tailing, 1989: 101).
Women's employment and pay in the public and private sectors
The tremendous expansion of the 'Social Welfare Industry' (Rein, 1985) over the post-war
period has not been confined to Britain. As Rein notes, the expansion of the health,
education and social service sectors in Britain has been equivalent to or much greater than
the increases in female participation rates observed in Sweden, the United States, Great
Britain and Germany (1985: 44). Social welfare services have thus made a decisive
contribution to the inclusion of women in the labour force. As Table 3.1 suggests, welfare
service employment is a major component of government or public sector employment and,
as a proportion of both total government and welfare state employment, women workers
form the clear majority. Britain is second to Sweden in terms of the high proportion of
7 A more detailed discussion of the effects of the Conservative government's policies on
employment opportunities in the pubic sector - particularly the health service - can be found
in Chapter 5.
women in government and especially welfare service employment, with 75.7% of welfare
service workers being female (compared to 82.1% in Sweden).






(1981) 62.5% 77.2% 75.7%
(1983) 66.6% 79.1% 82.1%
(1982) 60.1% 74.2% 59.6%
(1983) 57,1% 71.2% 66,2%
(a) Welfare state employees as a percentage of government employees
(b) Women as a percentage of total government employment
(c) Women as a percentage of welfare state employees
Source: Compiled from data collected by Rein (1985: 44-45)
Given the growing size and importance of the public sector as a source of women's
expanding employment opportunities over the post-war period in Britain, the public sector
has been increasingly identified as a critical factor in protecting the gains that have been
achieved by women. In addition, it is generally perceived that while the public sector may
afford lower hourly wages, the total remuneration package received by its employees is
superior to that obtained by private sector employees; that is, while wage rates may be
lower in the public sector, this is argued to be compensated for by its more generous
pension provisions and paid holiday, maternity and sick leave entitlements, among other
benefits. The public sector is thus widely regarded as safeguarding women's employment
in at least two fundamental ways. The public sector has not only provided a growing source
of employment, it has also, arguably, provided employment with superior terms and
conditions and greater security.
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Table 3.2 Sources of employment change by sector 1971-1984
Total All All Full-time Part-time Females:
males females females females wte3
1971-4
All sectors +649 -60 +70 +45 +664 +376
Manufacturing -181 -195 +14 -102 +116 -44
Other industry0 -89 -110 +21 - +21 +10
Public services^ +395 +73 +322 +120 +202 +22
Private services +522 +170 +352 +27 +325 +189
1974-8 e
All sectors -24 -264 +239 -28 +267 +105
Manufacturing -590 -321 -268 -163 -105 -216
Other industry -116 -124 +8 +8 +1 +8
Public services +290 +40 +250 +112 +138 +181
Private services +393 +143 +251 +16 +234 +133
1978-81e
All sectors -888 -822 -66 -195 +129 +131
Manufacturing -1048 -701 -347 -264 -83 -306
Other industry -135 -162 +27 +18 +9 +22
Public services -40 -63 22 -35 +57 -6
Private services +335 +103 +232 +86 +146 +159
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1981-4 e
All sectors -540 -580 +40 -1 +41 +20
Manufacturing -773 -580 -193 -105 -88 -149
Other industry -252 -244 -8 -10 +3 -9
Public services -74 -13 -60 +5 -66 -28
Private services +562 +259 +302 +111 +192 +207
a Wliole-tirne Equivalent - Part-time jobs for women are counted as half a full-time job.
b SIC 1968
c Agriculture, mining and quarrying, construction, gas electiricty and water, transport and
communications.
d Education, health and public administration. All other services are classified as private
services.
e SIC 1980
Source: Department of Employment Gazette and Historical Supplement August 1984, April
1985. Department of Employment Gazette January 1987 in Rubery and Tarling, 1989: 116.
As Table 3.2 illustrates, public and private services expanded between 1971 and 1974 and
again between 1974 and 1978. At the same time, total employment in 'other industry' and
manufacturing decreased. From 1978 to 1984, private service employment was the only
form of employment to expand. But because the contraction in public services was relatively
minor compared to ttiat which occured in manufacturing and other industries, Rubery and
Tarling suggest that public service employment can be considered as a stabilising
influence, protecting areas of women's employment (1989: 115). Beechey and Perkins
(1987: 33) are correct in cautioning against the practice of assuming that there has been a
growth in service sector employment simply because the number of people employed in
service industries and occupations has grown. Given that much of this growth reflects an
increase in the number of people employed part-time, the service may in fact be declining
rather than expanding. Even so, focusing on public and private service employment
together over the period 1971-1981 (Table 3.2) the growth in female full-time equivalent (or
whole-time equivalent) positions was positive overall and exceeded the growth in male
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employment, almost all of which would have been on a full-time basis. For the period 1981-
1984, the overall growth in female full-time equivalent employment in the public and private
services was again positive, but was less than the growth in male employment. Also, based
on their analysis of changes in female part-time employment against changes in female full-
time employment and against total male employment for industry class groups, Rubery and
Tarling suggest that the growth in part-time employment is more connected to overall growth
in an industry than with the substitution of part-timers for full-timers within a declining labour
force (1989: 117-118).
More ominously, however, two-thirds of the increase in part-time employment over the
period 1971-1981 was in the private sector, concentrated in the service industries, including
the distributive trades, banking, insurance and finance, catering and leisure activities
(Robinson and Wallace, 1984: 3). Further, as Table 3.2 indicates, while female employment
in private services continued to grow between 1981 and 1984, female employment in public
services fell absolutely (part- and whole-time equivalent) and fell more than male
employment, though there was a very slight increase in the number of full-time female jobs.
Rubery and Tarling's analysis suggests that women accounted for 85% of the job loss in the
public sector. Also, for the period 1981-84, though the number of women employed in
private services increased by 302,000, again almost two-thirds of these jobs were part-time.
Consequently, there were only 207,000 more full-time equivalent jobs for women, compared
to 259,000 for men in private services.
Given that much of the data concerning pay in the public and private sectors comes from the
New Earnings Survey (NES), the general caveat regarding the limitations of this data
source for the purpose of analysing movements in women's pay must be reiterated. NES
data excludes those whose gross earnings fall below the thresholds for National Insurance
and Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) contributions. The proportion of female part-time workers
with earnings falling below these thresholds, on the part of either the employee or the
employer, rose from 18% in 1975 to 33% in 1982 (Robinson and Wallace, 1984: 8). The
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NES thus under-represents low paid and many part-time workers, most of whom are
women.
Drawing on NES data, Elliott and Murphy (1987) restrict their analysis to full-time
employment only. As has been documented, the growth in public and private sector service
employment, in particular that occuring throughout the 1970s (when NES data became
available), is heavily concentrated in part-time employment. Due to the difficulties in
obtaining reliable data on the movement of pay in the public sector relative to that in the
private sector, NES data is an important source of information; however, a very major
shortcoming is the fact that comparisons of public/private sector pay for women is seriously
limited because NES data fails to cover a large section of the female workforce.
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Table 3.3 Average weekly earnings of manual workers In the public and
private sectors, 1950-75
Public Private Ratio private
October £p £p to public
1950 7.53 7.64 104.0
1955 10.99 11.32 103.0
1960 14.20 14.70 103.5
1965 19.10 10.79 103.6
1970 27.21 28.31 104.0
1975 64.80 59.52 91.9
Source: Dean (1975 and 1977)
As Table 3.3 shows, the average earnings ol manual workers in the private sector exceeded
those in the public sector over most of the period from 1950 to 1970. Throughout this
period, private sector workers received on average 4% more than public sector workers.
After 1970, the relative position of the private sector deteriorated substantially with public
sector earnings averaging 10% higher than those in the private sector. In recognition of the
fact that there are differences in pay levels between different areas of public employment,
the distinction is made between three different areas in comparing private and public sector
pay movements: central government, local government and public corporations (Elliott and
Fallick, 1981; Dean. 1981; Elliott and Murphy, 1987). For similar reasons, the distinction is
also made between male and female manual and non-manual employment within each
area specified, and within the private sector. Average earnings for both male and female
manual workers in the public sector are highest in public corporations and lowest in local
government (Elliott and Fallick, 1981: 147). As was indicated in Chapter 1, the principle of
pay comparability operating in the public sector over much of the post-war period resulted in
time lags for public sector pay settlements - local authorities were in second-last position
(the health service being last) in the queueing system. Thus, local authorities had to wait for
the outcome of pay negotiations in the public corporations, who in turn waited for pay
settlements to be awarded within private industry. Whether for pragmatic reasons or
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through omission, the private sector itself is not identified as requiring further breakdown
into areas of employment. This is in spite of the fact that a large body of research points to
the wide variations in pay that exist between industries as, for example, represented by
labour-market segmentation analyses.
The rapid and substantial improvements in pay rates documented for the public sector,
compared to the private sector in the first half the 1970s, is widely regarded as resulting from
the more militant wage demands of public sector (unionised) workers, especially manual
workers. These workers, who had been more severely treated under the incomes policies
of 1968 and 1969, argued not only for a restoration of their traditional wage relationship with
the private sector, but also for a restoration of their real disposable income. As Table 3.4
indicates, however, since the mid-1970s non-manual earnings in the public sector have
deteriorated signficantly, with manual earnings beginning to fall in 1981. The relative
protection of manual workers' earnings in the public sector and the poor position of non-
manual workers is largely attributed to the sharp contraction of the manufacturing sector
since the late 1970s, and the adverse affects of the recession on the pay of manual workers
in the private sector. In contrast, where the recession was less severe in non-manual areas
of private sector employment, earnings were rising while non-manual employees' earnings
were deteriorating due to the government's strict application of a new form of cash limit.
It is, then, only relative to private sector earnings that the wages of manual workers in the
public sector have been 'competitive'. Further, Table 3.5 shows that male weekly earnings
in the public sector, both manual and non-manual, have fared better than have female
earnings: relative to the private sector, female manual weekly earnings increased by 12.3%
compared 33.7% for male manual earnings; relative to the private sector, female non-
manual weekly earnings fell by 35.1% compared to a fall of only 3.8% for male non-manual
employees. When changes in average hourly earnings are considered, the ratio of male to
female earnings remains largely the same (Elliott and Murphy 1987: 114).
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In analysing changes in relative pay in the public and private sectors, Elliott and Murphy
(1987) investigated the effects of changes in weekly hours worked, holiday entitlement, the
changing age structure of the working population, and the changing occupational
composition of employees. Their findings suggest that when all these factors are taken into
account, the weekly earnings considered above provide a misleading picture as to 'what is
really happening' to relative pay in the public and private sectors. There has been a
general reduction in weekly hours worked during the period concerned while holiday
entitlements for all groups, apart from non-manual female workers in local government,
have risen, especially since 1978. While public sector non-manual workers' holiday
entitlements remain superior to those in the private sector, the differential has been eroded
(1987: 114-116). The combined effect of the reduction in weekly hours worked and
changing holiday entitlements has benefitted manual female employee earnings in the
public sector (relative to the private sector employees) most. Male manual employees in the
public sector also improved their relative position - marginally - while both male and female
non-manual employees in the public sector experienced a deterioration in their relative
position, especially the female employees (1987: 113-116).
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Central government 113.3 117.2 112.4
Local government 112.0 117.0 109.6
Public corporations 110.6 112.4 111.7
Women
Central government 115.1 106.5 102.2
Local government 109.2 114.5 112.6
Public corporations 95.3 96.9 97.5
Non-manual workers
Men
Central government 109.7 101.2 92.5
Local government 110.0 104.3 96.5
Public corporations 110.7 109.3 107.2
Women
Central government 104.2 91.7 84.5
Local government 99.1 92.2 81.2
Public corpgrations 105.9 101.4 100-8
Source: New Earnings Survey 1978 onwards Table 1, for 1970-1977
Department of Employment Gazzette, vol.85, no.11, p.1340, Table4, in
Elliott and Murphy (1987 p.111).
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Table 3.5 Changes In average weekly earnings relative to the private sector
over the period, 1970-1984 (per cent)
Men Women
Manual Non-manual Manual Non-manual
Central government +12.4 -7.5 +2.2 -15.5
Local government +9.6 -3.5 +12.6 -18.8
Public corporations +11 -7 +7.2 23 ±03
Source: Elliott and Murphy (1987: 112)
Over the period 1975-1983, there was a sharp fall in the average age of manual and non-
manual employees in the public and private sectors. The decreasing average age was
most marked for all employees within central government and the private sector, for manual
workers in local government, and for non-manual employees in public corporations. It is
argued that the effects of voluntary redundancy and early retirement largely explain the
decrease in the average age of the working population observed, concentrating
employment rather more into peak earnings years. As a result, a substantial proportion of
the rise in earnings that occurred between 1975 and 1983 is argued to be linked to the
changing age structure rather than to 'real' improvements in pay. That is, as pay typically
increases with age - whether through age-related increments in non-manual employment or
through over-time earnings of manual workers which peak during middle-age - the
presence of more 'middle-aged' rather than older workers by 1983 is said to have acted as
a secular source of earnings growth. Thus, much of the improvement in earnings recorded
in the relative pay of public corporations and local government is said to simply reflect the
differential changes in the age structure of the workforce in the public and private sectors.
Notably, by taking into consideration the effects of the changing age structure, the relative
earnings of non-manual women were found to have declined much more substantially than
initially recorded, and the relative improvements in the earnings of manual women were
found to be much reduced (1987: 119-123). Elliott and Murphy's findings regarding the
changes in public sector earnings relative to the private sector suggest that the relative pay
of manual and non-manual women in central and local government worsened considerably
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over the period 1970-1984, with non-manual women experiencing the worst deterioration in
their relative position (see Table 3.6). The overall conclusion is that women in the private
sector have fared much better than their public sector counterparts (1987: 125).
Table 3.6 Changes In effective hourly earnings adjusted for changes In the
age and occupational composition of the workforce
Men Women
Manual Non-manual Manual Non-manual
Central government +20.4 -2.3 -9.0 -14.0
Local government 0.0 -2.0 -6.7 -21.9
EubliC corporations -4A iflLS ~AA
Source: Elliott and Murphy (1987: 121)
The magnitude of the effects of changing hours worked, changing age, and occupational
structures on earnings in the public and private sectors is provided in Table 3.7 below.
Table 3.7 also provides a picture of the growth in real earnings, as opposed to the changes
in public sector earnings relative to the private sector considered above, over the period
1970-1984, and the effects of the hours/age/occupational changes on the growth in real
hourly earnings. From column (a) in Table 3.7, it can be seen that the increases in real
weekly earnings have been higher for women than men. Thus, for example, the real
earnings of manual women in local government employment rose by 76%, compared to a
rise of only 25% for non-manual men in central government employment. From column (e),
which records the growth of hourly rates of pay controlling for the hours/age/occupational
effects, it can be seen that the increase in the real basic pay of non-manual workers in
central and local government employment is less than half of that received by non-manual
workers in either the public corporations or the private sector. Female manual workers in all
sectors experienced higher increases in real basic pay than did their male counterparts.
(
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Table 3.7 Accounting for the growth In real earnings over the period, 1970-84
(a) (b) (s) (d) (el
Central government
Manual men 41.6 -2.2 -11.0 -2.5 +57.3
women 59.6 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 +60.7
Non-manual men 25.1 -3.2 -1.8 +3.5 +26.6
women 41.7 +1.1 +6.0 +2.5 +32.1
Local government
Manual men 38.0 -4.5 +4.6 +2.8 +35.1
women 76.0 -1.3 +6.3 +2.7 +68.3
Non-manual men 30.3 -3.1 +5.1 -1.3 +29.6
women 36.1 +2.5 +5.8 +0.7 +27.1
Public corporations
Manual men 40.7 -5.4 +13.7 -0.6 +33.0
women 52.2 -3.3 n/a +4.3 +51.2
Non-manual men 44.7 -3.9 -34.4 +0.3 +82.7
women 68.8 -2.1 +2.5 +2.7 +65.7
Private sector
Manual men 26.0 -3.5 +1.4 -3.9 +32.0
women 56.2 -1.0 -2.6 -5.9 +65.7
Non-manual men 35.1 -1.8 +1.9 +1.0 +34.0
women 67,6 +0,1 +2,3 +1.0 +64.2
(a)Real growth in weekly earnings (change in gross weekly earnings over the period
April 1970 ApriH984 deflated by the growth in the RPI over the same period).
(b) Of which: changes in hours worked
(c) Of which: age effect
(d) Of which: occupational effect
(e)Residual growth of hourly rates of pay
Source: Elliott and Murphy (1987: 122)
While the 'bottom line' depicted in Table 3.6 would suggest that females in public sector
employment have fared poorly compared to female workers in the private sector, I would re-
emphasise the fact that Elliott and Murphy's analysis pertains to full-time employment only.
As we have seen (Table 3.2), the growth in women's employment since 1970, especially in
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the private sector, has been overwhelmingly part-time. Whether the changes observed for
full-time earnings are representative of changes occuring for part-time earnings is not clear.
In Elliott and Murphy's study, the occupational changes recorded for female employees in
the private sector suggest that among non-manual employees, there has been a reduction
in the concentration of workers in the lower-paying clerical and related occupations, with
movement into the higher-paid general management and professional jobs. Among private
sector female manual workers, it is suggested that there has been some growth in the share
of semi-skilled and skilled employment, with a reduction in the share of unskilled jobs (1987:
124). This factor was an important one in terms of negatively influencing the relative
position of female earnings in the public sector. One questions, however, the extent to
which the improvements in occupational position achieved by female full-time workers in the
private sector were achieved by their part-time counterparts.
It is conceivable that the concentration of female part-time employment in lower paying jobs
is more exaggerated in the private sector. Wages Council Inspectorate records suggest that
the incidence of low paid jobs in wages council industries (private sector) has increased
substantially since the mid-1960s: the share of low paying establishments visited by the
Inspectorate increased from 20% or less in the 1960s to about 35% in 1976, and has since
remained at this level. Part-time workers are especially affected by such practices (Rubery
and Tarling, 1989: 121).
By industry group, the highest concentration of female workers - and highest concentration
of female part-timers - can be found in 'Professional and Scientific Services', 'Distributive
Trades', and 'Miscellaneous Services'. Roughly half of the female workforce in
'Professional and Scientific Services' work part-time. This industry recorded an increase of
77% in the proportion of female part-timers over the decade 1961-1971. But the most
noticeable increase in the proportion of part-time female employees was in 'Insurance,
Banking and Finance', whicli recorded an increase of about 90% in the proportion of female
part-time workers over the same period (Joseph, 1983: 93-94). According to Martin and
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Roberts' analysis of the Women and Employment Survey (1984: 24), of the occupational
groups which make up the 'Professional and Scientific Services', the two largest are
'Teaching' and 'Nursing, Medical and Social Welfare' professions. Interestingly, as Table
3.8 indicates, the average gross hourly earnings of female part-time non-manual employees
in 'Professional and Scientific services' are considerably higher than those in either
'Distribution' or 'Banking, Finance and Insurance': £3.74, compared to £2.35 and £3.21
respectively. Similarly, the average gross hourly earnings of nurses is much higher than
those of non-manual female part-time earnings in 'Distribution' or 'Banking, finance and
Insurance': £4.32, compared to £2.35 and £3.21 respectively. The 'Teaching' and 'Nursing,
Medical and social Welfare' professions (the 'lower professions') are, of course, largely
confined to the public sector in Britain. It could be argued, therefore, that by not considering
the changing relative earnings of female part-timers in the public and private sectors, Elliott
and Murphy's study does not capture significant developments in trends of women's pay
over the post-war period, particularly during the last two decades. Importantly, by failing to
include the large component of part-time workers in the 'lower professions' found primarily
in the public sector, Elliott and Murphy's findings probably over-estimate the relative
earnings losses of public sector female employees and over-estimate the apparent relative
gains occuring in the private sector.
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Table 3.8 Earnings of female part-time employees by sector for (I) manual
and (II) non-manual workers and by occupation
By Sector Average gross Average weekly Average gross
mManual workers weekly earnings hours hourly earnings
All industries
and services 44.6 18.9 2.39
Vehicles,
engineering and
metal goods 55.0 22.1 2.53
Food, drink, tobacco
manufacture 58.8 22.8 2.60
Retail distribution 45.3 19.4 2.36
Hotels and catering 37.5 17.8 2.18
Education 37.2 15.9 2.32
Hospitals and
nursing homes 49,3 21.3 2.32

























By occupation Average gross Average weekly Average gross
weekly earnings hours hourly earnings
Registered and
enrolled nurses 91.0 22.3 4.32
Clearical and related 58.1 20.5 2.88
Sales, shop assistant,
shelf-fillers 43.1 18.9 2.28
Packers, assemblers,
Droduct insDectin 57.0 23.0 2,52
Note: All figures are for females on adult rates of pay whose pay for the period of the
survey was not affected by absence.
Source: New Earnings Survey, April 1986, Tables F78-81.
Further, given that male workers in the public sector fared better, on the whole, than their
private sector counterparts, the question also arises as to whether the comparison of the
differential position of men and women in the public sector, relative to the private sector, is
really an appropriate one in this case. That is, it may be incorrect to draw the conclusion
that, relative to male and female earnings in the private sector respectively, male earnings in
the public sector have been more protected than female public sector earnings, even
though the evidence provided in Table 3.6 might suggest this to be the case. The figures
presented in Table 3.6 are based on partial information: while the majority of male
employees in the public and private sectors work full-time and are thus comparable, a
comparison of female public and private sector full-time earnings may be misleading for the
reasons outlined. Thus, making an indirect comparison of the changing relative position of
male and female earnings within the public or private sector might also be misleading.
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4. The National Health Service: A Case Study
Introduction
This chapter provides a more detailed consideration of the pursuit of efficiency in public
service provision, specifically in regard to developments within the NHS. In focusing on
strategies affecting NHS domestic ancillary employment, both the current policies pursued
to further the contracting-out of ancillary services to private contractors, and the actions and
implications of the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI), operating two decades
ago, will be discussed. Research material gathered on employees in NHS domestic
ancillary employment forms the basis for assessing the impact of efficiency initiatives on
employment conditions, service provision and working patterns more generally. This
research will be presented and developed in the second half of this chapter and in the
remaining text.
As suggested in Chapter 2, the observed diversification of service provision in the public
sector is not one of 'privatisation' in the sense in which is it widely used and intended - as
increasing the role of 'market forces'. This is borne out by the tendering process in the NHS
as it has evolved over the past 5 years. In respect of public services, the working definition
of privatisation typically adopted implies both the movement of services and/or labour from
public ownership and control to the so-called 'private market economy', and the introduction
of a process of competitive bargaining, whether for goods or for labour.
Available evidence, however, indicates that this is not happening. Rather, cost-cutting
mechanisms, which usually take the form of 'efficiency exercises' and productivity
bargaining within the public sector, are proliferating. The introduction of incentive bonus
payment schemes for ancillary workers in the health service is a prime example. Their
introduction gained momentum from 1979 and expanded, particularly since 1981, as a
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consequence of the more extensive and stringent use of cash limits and cash planning to
reduce public expenditure. Available Scottish data also suggests that there was an
increase in the use of bonus schemes by health boards as a result of the 1983 government
instructions to put ancillary services out to 'competitive' tender in order to effect 'efficiency
savings' or 'cost improvements', without actually having to contract-out their services.
The purpose and recommendations of the NBPI are highly relevant to the analysis of current
developments in ancillary health service employment, particularly in regard to the policy of
tendering or contracting-out ancillary services. The central recommendation put forward by
the NBPI, that ancillary health services introduce work study methods and schemes that
relate pay to 'improvements in efficiency' to improve control over labour costs, though not
fully embraced by health service management or unions in the 1970's, has become much
more prevalent in the 1980's. Thus the remit and posture of the NBPI regarding ancillary
employment over its lifetime (1965-1972) serves both as a useful starting point for
considering the history of measures developed to effect 'efficiency savings' in ancillary
health services and concommitantly, as a reminder that issues of 'efficiency' and apparent
wage recusance are not peculiar to the Thatcher administration. Rather, concerns about
'market' ('productive') versus 'non-market' ('non-productive') forms of employment have
been long-standing.
The National Board for Prices and Incomes - In Pursuit of 'Productlvty'.
As suggested in Chapter 1, the establishment of the NBPI in the mid-1960's by the Labour
Government was a response to conflicting pressures. On the one hand, the government
was concerned about inflation and wage increases, particularly in the public sector, which
represented the main source of inflation implicated in the weakening national economy; on
the other, the 'rediscovery' of poverty and the existence of large numbers of very low paid
workers in public services and in NHS ancillary employment in particular, together with
increasing union demands for improved pay, placed the government in a difficult position,
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particularly in light of the approaching general election. Pay settlements on the basis of
comparison were increasingly being criticised as inflationary, wage increases in line with
improvements in productivity, on the other hand, were generally more favourably
considered.
Established in 1965, the general remit of the NBPI was to investigate particular cases
referred to it by the government, to advise on the behaviour of prices, wages and salaries in
relation to the 'national interest' as set down by government incomes policies. This applied
to both 'private' and 'public' sector industries and services. It was maintained by the NBPI
that the only grounds for increasing incomes that would not automatically lead to price
increases, were productivity increases. The Board therefore endeavoured to put forward
concrete suggestions for increasing productivity to encourage tighter control over labour
costs. However, as the case of NHS domestic ancillary employment indicates, the NBPI's
infatuation with 'productivity increases' had more to do with measures to reduce costs within
the public service sector than with measures to improve the quality of work performance.
From the outset, then, the NBPI was committed to recommendations centring on productivity
and efficiency improvements as a means of improving pay. The need to improve payment
systems was argued to be critical because of the perceived insecure, but predominantly
'inefficienct', means of remunerating employees. That is, it was inferred that the imperfect
operation of the labour market contributed to the widely disparate levels of pay existing for
the same occupations (an anomaly considered, for example, to contribute to the
'inflationary' wage demands based on 'comparable occupations'). In addition, though the
standard hours worked had been steadily declining through legislative intervention over the
post-war period, the actual weekly hours worked had declined less - as a result of the
widespread use of overtime. Weak managerial control was blamed for the ready
acceptance of overtime as a means of raising workers earnings to what was regarded as an
acceptable take-home packet, in disregard of the requirements of production. The NBPI
argued that shiftwork, to facilitate a more continuous use of capital equipment, together with
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the use of payment by results, such as piece work and incentive bonus schemes, were
necessary to increase productivity. For those workers who 'produced', the associated
'benefit' would be improved pay.
In 1966, the government referred the question of the principles for the determination of
wages and conditions of service of manual ancillary workers in the NHS (among other
public services) to the NBPI. The primary reason for this was that a new pay settlement was
needed for the period after June 1967, following the expiry of the previously operating wage
policy. According to the government, given the policy of playing down comparative methods
of negotiating pay settlements and the difficulty of assessing productivity in non-trading
services, some clarification of principles and guidance was required (cmnd 3167 1966).
In considering the wages and conditions of service of male and female ancillary workers in
the NHS, the NBPI concluded that increases in male weekly earnings over the previous five
years were distinctly below those obtained in all industries (cmnd 3230 1967: 9), and that as
a whole, NHS ancillary workers represented the largest proportion of lowest paid workers
among the industires referred to the NBPI for investigation (1967: 15). Criticising the wage
structure as 'unscientific' - lacking any system of job evaluation- the NBPI suggested that the
compressed wage structure in the NHS failed to ensure that genuine differences in skill
would be properly rewarded. At the same time, however, unnecessary small differentials
existed where there were no genuine differences in skill and responsibility. It also argued
that the wage compression frustrated the case for the special treatment of groups of low paid
workers, as to increase their wages would effectively swamp existing differentials, which
likely would precipitate a series of 'leap frog' pay claims (which would precipitate and fuel
inflation). Thus in the NHS, where low pay was considered to be a particular problem, a
policy of concentrating pay increases on the low paid was rejected as an inflationary device.
Similarly, to award a general increase for all workers, to improve the position of the lowest
paid workers while safe-guarding differentials, was also rejected as imposing an
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'unreasonable burden' on taxpayers and was, in any event, inconsistent with incomes
policies.
The NBPI therefore recommended methods of linking pay more closely to the 'efficient
utilisation' of labour. The principal recommendations were to improve supervision and
standards of labour management, employ work study measurement in a wide range of
tasks, and introduce incentive bonus schemes, measured day work, and productivity
bargaining to relate earnings to the level of individual performance. Criticisms of the
efficiency of the ancillary workforce were based on the assumption that an improved labour
market performance was required. The effectiveness of improving the labour market was in
turn believed to be dependent upon the motivation of individual workers to seek higher pay,
to obtain training, take on more onerous work, and look for better work (cmnd 4648 1971:
35). That is, in keeping with conventional labour market economics, individual worker
characteristics and behaviour was identified as the most important determinant of pay. In
particular, individual worker behaviour was used to 'explain' the occurrence of low pay. The
NBPI's conclusion was that the root cause of the problem of low pay was low productivity. It
suggested, therefore, that by improving the standards of labour utilisation, the standard of
pay would be simultaneously raised 'because the standards of work justify it' (cmnd 3230
1967:32).
The adopted definition of 'productivity' assigned an increase in output in relation to
resources used as improving productivity, or effecting a more efficient use of resources. The
concern for improved performance was tied to the notion of greater output at the lowest cost,
rather than to improving the quality of work. This was made absolutely clear in the way in
which NHS cleaning services were compared to private (Contract Cleaning Trade) services.
In comparing the Contract Cleaning Trade (CCT) and the domestic ancillary services of the
NHS, the NBPI concludes that the CCT is more efficient. The evidence used to support this
conclusion, however, is wholly inadequate. The NBPI indicates that in the CCT, little is used
in the way of formal management techniques such as work measurement and method study.
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Nonetheless, the private trade is said to achieve increased efficiency, in part through the
use of new materials and equipment manufactured by the larger of the firms concerned, but
mainly because the cleaners' performance itself 'appears' to be better; that is, cleaners in
the private sector are said to clean at a faster pace, 'albeit at a rather low standard' (cmnd
4637 1971: 25). Moreover,
'when a customer is concerned with quality as well as price, the selection of
a tender may be difficult.' (1971: 8).
However, their survey indicated that this was not a real issue in the private sector because
the majority of CCT customers were not particularly concerned with quality, provided they
received no complaints from their customers/employees. The Board does note that part of
the reason that contract cleaning is cheaper (and in their view, more efficient) is because the
costs of the two services are not entirely comparable. Direct cleaning tends to be restricted
to smaller building sites, which entails more expense. In addition, the conditions of service
obtained by direct (NHS) cleaners is far superior to those of contract cleaners, and a larger
proportion are employed full-time, compared to the largely part-time contract cleaning
workforce (1971: 24). The Board fails to note the significance of the fact that 80% of the CCT
work was in offices, compared to only 3-4% in hospitals. Furthermore, the bulk of NHS
cleaning work in hospitals requires greater fastidiousness, patient-related duties and
services. Issues of standards of cleanliness are paramount in hospitals, as opposed to
office cleaning.
These differences notwithstanding, the NBPI maintains that the CCT is relatively efficient
and therefore felt it necessary to suggest mechanisms for introducing work study methods
and productivity agreements for NHS ancillary services only. Moreover, it rejects the TUC
proposal that the Fair Wages Resolution be amended so that government departments have
the power to determine what constitutes a 'fair wage' and to monitor contractors (ie.
establish a minimum wage for outside contractors). Agreeing with the government on this
matter, the NBPI states that there is no logical reason why work and payment schemes in
the CCT should follow public sector systems because the latter are designed to meet
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different needs and circumstances (1971: 28). This argument is advanced in spite of the fact
that the comparison of NHS and contract cleaning services actually underpins many of the
Board's efficiency recommendations for direct cleaning services in the NHS.
Following recommendations by the National Board for Prices and Incomes (cmnd. 3230,
1967), incentive bonus schemes were to be introduced in ancillary health services from
1969 onwards on the basis of a nationally agreed code of requirements established by the
Whitley Ancillary Staffs Council (cmnd. 4644, 1971). Despite the NBPI's recommendation
that productivity bargaining be introduced, and the government's endorsement of the
recommendations, hospital authorities throughout Britain were very slow to implement such
schemes. It has to be said that there was much controversy regarding the feasibility of the
interim productivity scheme originally recommended, and what form it should take.
Consequently, in its second report on NHS ancillary workers' pay and conditions (cmnd
4644 1971), the NBPI proposed a standardised Ancillary Work Efficiency Scheme package.
The majority of the pilot studies conducted on the basis of these proposals were shortlived,
and this scheme was generally considered to be a failure. Nevertheless, work study
methods and productivity bargaining began to be introduced by health authorities, but not
on a large scale. They were, however, widely used in ancillary employment in local
government authorities and other public service industries.
In 1975, however, the government imposed an embargo on all incentive bonus schemes
which lasted for two full years. During this period, work study units were directed to suspend
all new work on the design and implementation of bonus schemes. It was argued by the
Labour Government then in office that such schemes were inflationary in practice because
they were not applied rigorously enough and had been abused by unions and workers as a
means of getting around incomes policies.
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'Tendering' In the Health Service
Despite the Conservative Government's encouragement and pressure to introduce the use
of commercial contractors in the provision of NHS ancillary services, health authorities had
been reducing their use of private contractors for cleaning, laundry and catering between
1978 and 1983 (Hansard: 28 November 1984, col. 535W). Consequently, in 1983, the
Government released a circular titled 'Competitive Tendering in the Provision of Domestic,
Catering and Laundry Services' for the NHS. This document represented the government's
fourth attempt to cajole health authorities into putting services up for tender, giving
commercial companies the opportunity to quote for specified services.
This circular, however, represented more of a threat to in-house organisations (the
established direct/public service management and workforce team) than did previous
directives, as a result of two Government decisions. The first of these allowed health
authorities to be refunded the VAT paid when a commercial contractor was used, providing
a financial incentive to make the use of private contractors more attractive. The second
decision, to rescind the House of Common's Fair Wages Resolution (1946), meant that
contract companies could undercut nationally agreed Whitley rates of pay and conditions of
employment for NHS staff. The Government also requested that health authorities submit a
timetable for tendering. A similar circular was issued by the Scottish Home and Health
Department (SHHD) in September 1983, and a second in June 1984, to hasten the process
in Scotland.
In April 1985, a year after the Government's deadline for health authorities to submit
timetables for competitive tendering, of the 190 contracts that had been awarded, 52% had
gone to private contractors and 48% had been kept in-house (NUPE, 1985). By September
1986, the number of NHS ancillary contracts remaining in-house had increased
substantially to 75% (Public Service Action, September 1986: 11). The running total of
contracts awarded between 1983 and March 1988 indicates that 78% of contracts remained
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in-house and 22% went to private contractors (Joint NHS Privatisation Research Unit,
Contract Summary March 1988). In the first few years following 1983, of all ancillary
services, domestic services had been most affected, with up to 68% of domestic contracts
going to private companies (NUPE 1985). By early 1988, however, of all cleaning contracts
tendered, 73% had remained in-house and only 27% had gone to private contract
companies (JPRU March 1988:2).
The timetables for contracting-out are most advanced in South, East and Central England,
whereas far fewer authorities have submitted completed timetables for tendering and fewer
contracts have been awarded in Wales and particularly Scotland. Health boards in
Scotland have been far more reluctant to comply with government tendering instructions,
opting instead to pursue 'efficiency savings' with in-house organisations. This lack of
'progress' in successfully tendering and contracting-out ancillary health services in Scotland
lead to the issue of another government circular in December of 1987, instructing Scottish
health boards to carry out a competitive tendering exercise by April 1988 in order to 'test the
cost effectiveness' of their domestic and catering services. Up to March 1988, only 24
contracts had actually been put out to tender by Scottish Health Boards, and of these, only 4
had gone to private contractors (JPRU, 1988). Nonetheless, all 14 boards did finally agree
to comply with the instructions. This round of tendering is intended to illustrate whether or
not the Health Boards can compete with the private sector and to 'encourage' further cost
savings, it is expected, nevertheless, that the majority of the services will remain in-house,
following the established trend in England.
Most health authorities in England are nearing completion of the first round of tendering
(three year contracts are awarded to private contractors). Many health authorities, however,
particularly in London, are already re-tendering contracts. The pattern emerging from this
second round of tendering indicates that many contracts awarded privately in the first
instance have gone back in-house on re-tendering, due in part to rather high contract failure
rates. A summary report of all contracts awarded in the NHS up to 1987 shows that one in
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five private contracts were failures - the firm's contract has been terminated (the contractor
pulled out or were dismissed) because of extremely inadequate performance standards
(JPRU, 1987). The re-tendering exercises are also being used by health authorities as a
further opportunity to re-examine contract specifications with a view to making additional
cuts.
According to the Government, the purpose of contracting-out public services is to instill
'competitive market forces' in order to secure the most 'efficient' provision of sen/ices at the
lowest cost to the employer and state. It has been argued, both by those critical of the
privatisation strategy and by its proponents, that it is the degree of market competition in the
tendering process which is decisive. Nonetheless, despite the Government's efforts to
ensure that ancillary services fall into private contractors' hands, the Contract Cleaning and
Maintenance Association (CCMA) is complaining that they are not winning enough
contracts, as the trend to negotiate in-house contracts continues to grow.
Not only is the pattern of contract provision one of public ownership and control, contract
cleaning firms have been rapidly merging, destroying any pretext that market competition is
the salient mechanism. BET and Hawley Group already hold over 60% of all cleaning
contracts awarded to private contractors by local government council refuse collection and
street cleansing contracts, 60% of all NHS domestic service contracts which have been
awarded to private contractors, and 40% of the civil service cleaning contracts awarded to
private contractors (Labour Research September 1986:2; JPRU 1988). The irrelevance of
'market competition' is not restricted to the area of contracting-out, but is also a feature of the
sale of national assets. Two companies who have acted for the Government in many of the
'privatisation' sales, merchant bankers Shroders and accountants Touche Ross, have
reported that the achievement of market competition through privatisation is no longer the
government's objective. Rather, its single objective is to reduce the public sector borrowing
requirement (Labour Research October 1986:2).
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It is clear, then, that though the tendering exercises are not resulting in a takeover by private
contractors, the process itself is being used to effect massive cuts in service provision on the
grounds that public services are 'economically inefficient'. Financial cost-cutting measures
are primarily directed at labour/wage costs. The downward drive on wages is argued to be
a mechanism of market equilibrium and hence 'economic efficiency'. The extent to which
these cuts in services and wage costs are translated into overall financial savings for the
public sector, however, is debatable. So too is the facile claim by the government that the
'savings' purportedly achieved, are being spent on 'improvements in services to patients'.
Financial costs to the public sector
There are considerable 'hidden' financial costs entailed in the tendering of services which
are not included in the cost analysis procedures. These include the administrative costs
resulting from the extensive time spent by managers preparing tender specifications and
negotiating with staff and unions. Since ancillary work in hospitals is not entirely
predictable, a great deal of flexiblity is required. Nonetheless, tender specifications
disregard the costs of contingencies in ancillary work because such work is deemed to be
outside 'routine work'. Where contractors satisfactorily accomplish the standard job
specification and take on the 'extra' work involved, this generally results in private
contractors charging health authorities for services rendered which were not explicitly
included in the original contract specification, again representing a financial cost to health
authorities not reflected in the official 'savings' achieved by the contract (Radical Statistics
Health Group 1987).
As indicated above, however, many contractors fail to maintain required standards of
cleanliness. In these circumstances, the health authority incurs additional costs in providing
emergency cover to bring the work up to standard. Where the contractor is eventually
dismissed, the health authority has to absorb the further costs of respecifying and
retendering the service (PSA 1986). Further under the Wages Act 1986, the health authority
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is responsible for all redundancy costs (The Health Service Journal 31.7.86) when a
contractor is dismissed. These redundancy costs, moreover, add up to more than the
sum total of redundancy payments to the workers themselves. A survey conducted on
behalf of Michael Meacher MP found that in 1985, where private contractors had been used,
nearly 3,000 workers had been make redundant. The claimed savings for each employee
made redundant amounted to £3,400 but the net cost to the public sector through the loss of
tax and social security benefits paid was £7,000 (Guardian 11.6.85). If in the end, the health
authority decides to return the service in-house, there are considerable costs involved in
rebuilding the necessary infrastructure, requiring funds which are not guaranteed to the
health authority.
Even by the government's own figures, the 'savings' achieved by tendering ancillary
services are called into question. The House of Commons Social Services Committe
reported that the £9.4 million savings achieved by 1985 had to be compared to the £27
million cost of the VAT refund by health authorities to contractors (Radical Health Statistics
Group 1987). Similarly, the government's claimed 'savings' of £73 million by September
1986 represented 0.8% of the total NHS budget. As private contractors had only won 18%
of the tendered contracts at that time, their contribution to the 'savings' amounted to, at best,
approximately 0.3% of the budget (Hansard 25.11.86). Thus, rather than achieving savings,
the tendering programme has cost the public sector. This conclusion is supported by
evidence from the USA. Studies in the US suggest that the shift from managing and
providing an in-house service to that of monitoring, supervising, and evaluating a service
provided by private contractors, increases rather than reduces public sector administrative
costs, contrary to the claim of free marketeers (Schlesinger et at 1986).
Resource constraints
Despite the apparent failure of the tendering exercises to achieve real finanacial savings, all
health authorities throughout Britain over the past 9 years have experienced reductions in
their operating budgets and have had to introduce major cost-cutting measures. Contrary to
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the government claims that it is not cutting health service expenditure but is spending more
than ever before, information provided by the Radical Health Statistics Group (1987)
suggests otherwise. For example, though the Government's 'input volume' increased by
8.4% during the period 1978/79 - 1984/85, with a further increase of 0.6% in 1985/6 , almost
half of this growth occurred in the year 1980/1 alone. This largely resulted from the Clegg
Commission pay awards, agreed by the Labour Government and honoured by the new
Conservative administration, and the shortening of the working week to comply with EEC
directives (1987: 38-40). In general, current spending on hospital and community services
grew very slowly from 1878/79-1984/85 compared to expenditure on family practitioner
services and capital development, and in fact fell in 1984/5 by 0.1% (1987 : 42-44).
Even though there has been an increase in 'input volume' expenditure on the NHS, this
does not necessarily translate into resources available for expanding and improving
services (let alone maintaining existing levels of service provision). In order to maintain the
same level of service provision, NHS resources must grow a certain amount each year to
take into account demographic and technological changes. The growth in expenditure on
hospital and community services required to keep pace with demographic changes (in
particular the aging of the population and the increase in the 'very elderly') amounted to, for
example, 4.9% over the period 1978/9-1984/5. During the period 1985/6-1988/9 the
required increase amounted to 3.8%. It is generally agreed that in order for the health
service to keep up with technological innovations and some changes in priorities for
meeting health care needs, resources must also increase by a further 2% per annum (1987:
44-46). When these factors are taken into consideration, then, the government's claim of
'growth' in resources to the NHS is misleading. The health service does not have sufficient
funds to maintain existing levels of service given the increasing demands on services
created by demographic changes and technological innovation.
In the face of increasing resource constraints, health authorities have primarily looked to
'rationalising' ancillary and other support services in an attempt to keep their overall
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expenditure within the cash limits prescribed by the government. This is underlined by the
increasing gulf between the wage increases awarded to 'front-line' staff (doctors, dentists,
nurses and other professions allied to medicine) and 'support' staff (ancillaries,
maintenance staff, technicians, administrative and clearical staff). Over the period 1980/81-
1984/5 the average percentage pay increases awarded to 'front-line' staff considerably
exceeded those awarded to 'support staff (1987: 52-54).
In response to financial constraints, productivity bargaining in ancillary health services,
particularly the growth of incentive bonus schemes, has flourished. From the information I
have been able to collect, coverage of ancillary staff in Scotland, though variable, is high in
many of the 12 health boards: for example, the coverage in Lothian is 75%, Fife 50%, and
the Borders 100%; another seven boards have a similarly high coverage which has largely
been achieved since 1979. It is estimated that approximatedly 80% of NHS ancillary
workers in Scotland are covered by some form of incentive bonus payment system; in
England, while there is no central collection of statistics, it is estimated that the coverage
nationally is approximately 50% of ancillary workers.
Efficiency Measures and Domestic Ancillary Services In Scotland
In fact the future of incentive bonus schemes is in question, as the pressure on health
authorities to tender their ancillary services to private contractors mounts and their spending
capabilities are further curtailed. In the face of widespread resistance by Scottish health
boards to government instructions that ancillary services be tendered to private contractors,
tfie Scottish Home and Health Department (SHHD) and the Scottish Management Efficiency
Group (Scotmeg) have considered various action plans to produce greater savings in an
attempt to circumvent the government's instructions.
In domestic services, the pressure is perhaps greatest because labour accounts for almost
the entire cost of the service (the relative expenditure on equipment is negligible). The
possibilites for reducing costs by intensifying the work (and generally deteriorating the
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standards of service provided), thereby reducing wage costs, is greater than could be
achieved in other ancillary services which involve much greater infrastructure costs (eg.
catering and laundries). Thus all health boards were requested to adopt specified cleaning
frequencies produced by the Common Services Agency (CSA) by February 1988, and to
report on the implementation of revised rota systems.
As labour accounts for 96.5% of total domestic costs (£50 million), the recommendations
were expected to achieve potential annual savings of approximately £6 million. These
cleaning frequencies and revised rotas were, in fact, used for many bonus schemes
introduced and revamped during 1985-88. Essentially, the revised rotas involve a
substantial reduction in weekend work, concentrating the work on week days, providing only
skeletal staff coverage and service provision at weekends. This has important
consequences for take-home pay: weekend work has, in the past, provided an important
source of income for domestic workers due to enhanced pay rates. The recommended
rotas, therefore, entail a significant reduction in potential and actual take-home pay. Bonus
schemes, where they have been introduced using these cleaning frequencies and rotas,
provide payments that, at best, simply equalise the earnings lost by those who experience a
loss in weekend work.
'Savings' that are achieved have been largely pursued by the introduction of standard
cleaning frequencies and bonus schemes. The trend now, however, is to simply introduce
standard frequencies and revised rotas without the 'bonus' payment for workers. Reflecting
the increased emphasis on 'efficiency savings', Work Study Teams established in the late
1960's in the health service, responsible for measuring and streamlining work performance,
have been re-named 'Management Efficiency Units'. Thus, even though bonus payments
themselves may be on their way out, the work study measurement principles underpinning
their operation, aimed at 'cost improvements', continue to operate. Moreover, as the
tendering programme in England has shown, even though in-house organisations are
succeeding in winning the majority of tendered contracts to the detriment of private
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contractors, where bonus schemes have existed it is at the expense of bonus payments
(and wages generally), even though the work is intensified and workers continue to work
above 'bonus' levels.
The discussion in the preceeding sections clearly demonstrates that the policy objective to
contract-out ancillary services has not been entirely efficacious in terms of removing the
majority of these services from the public to the private sector. Increasingly, the tendering
exercises have resulted in 'successful' bids by the in-house (NHS) team. Moreover, until
the autumn of 1988, most Scottish health boards had resisted instructions to tender their
services to private contractors, opting to pursue alternative measures to effect 'efficiency
savings'. With the threat of 'competitive tendering' overhanging them, health service
management pursued efficiency exercises to make their own services 'more effective', in
order to be able to withstand the pressures to contract-out services to private contractors.
Short of the Government being removed from office, however, the prospect of compulsory
tendering was believed to be inevitable.
The measures typically adopted by health service management to cut service costs have
involved work study measurement of ancillary services in order to achieve target savings in
both 'supplies' and 'pay' budgets. To give employees a cash incentive to work with the
lower staffing levels required and to 'increase their work performance', incentive bonus
payment schemes (IBPS) have been more widely introduced. The present research
concerns domestic ancillary employment in two general hospitals in the Lothian Health
Board where incentive bonus payment schemes had been recently introduced as part of this
overall strategy. The chapter now turns to discuss the research design and findings.
Research Design
There were essentially three criteria used in the selection of the two hospitals included in
the study: type of hospital (general rather than specialised); size of hospital/unit (in order to
be able to select a suitable interview sample; and history of incentive pay bargaining. The
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data base in the present study consists of information relating to 204 workers in the two
hospitals studied. The information gathered regarding these workers (see below) provided
a profile of the entire domestic workforce at Hospital 'A' (N=142) and of domestic workers in
the 'surgical unit' at Hospital 'B' (N=62). In addition, interviews were conducted with: health
board personnel from the management efficiency unit, finance division, and management in
domestic services; personnel from the Scottish Health Management Efficiency Group
(MEU); union officials and shop stewards; and a sample of domestic employees (N=76). In
total, 92 individuals were interviewed. Access to confidential Work Study Reports was also
obtained.
Apart from the interviews with the domestic employees, which were based on a structured
interview schedule, the interviews were open-ended. The interview schedule used for
domestic employees was not fully completed until initial investigative interviews had been
conducted with the domestic services management advisor, management efficiency unit
and finance personnel. The information obtained from these interviews regarding health
board policies on target savings, efficiency exercises and the operation of incentive bonus
payment schemes, informed both the selection of the appropriate hospitals to study and the
sections of the interview schedule which pertained to the circumstances of domestic
ancillary work and the impact of productivity bargaining (the incentive bonus payment
scheme) on work content and employment conditions generally.
Once the interview schedule was completed, the domestic manager at the first hospital
selected for the study ('Hospital A') was approached and a copy of the schedule provided
for approval. At the same time, area and branch trade union officials and shop stewards
from COHSE and NUPE, the two unions representing domestics at the hospital, were
contacted and given a copy of the schedule for approval. The study thus followed a process




With the help of the domestic manager at Hospital A, I obtained information relating to the
sex, current age, age at recruitment in current job, length of service, marital status, basic
weekly hours, shift worked, and residence locality for all of the domestic staff in post at the
time (N=142). From this information, I selected six workers for the pilot study and a
representative sample of fifty workers on the basis of age, marital status, basic hours, shift,
length of service, and employment before or after the official date of commencement of the
bonus scheme. The six workers selected as potential pilot interviewees - which included
the chair of the COHSE union branch at the hospital, who also approached the other pilot
interviewees - all agreed to be interviewed.
It was agreed with the domestic manager that the interviews could be conducted during
normal work hours; a time limit of an hour was permitted for each interview. The six pilot
interviews confirmed that the original length of the schedule and open-ended format of
some of the questions made it impossible to fully complete the schedule within the time
allowed. Therefore, the schedule was amended - a few questions were entirely omitted and
some others were changed to a fixed-choice answer format. In essence, however, the
interview schedule was not radically changed.
Those workers initially selected to be interviewed were sent a letter informing them of the
study and asking if they would participate. The letters were hand delivered by the COHSE
chairperson (who was a domestic worker herself) to the individual workers concerned,
allowing her to answer any questions they might have had about the study. The letter had a
tear-off section which was to be filled out if the person was not interested in being
interviewed, to be posted in a box provided in the clocking-in area. Those workers who did
not respond negatively to the letter were then contacted by letter again, confirming the date,
time and place of the interview. This letter was put in the worker's mail box in the clocking-in
area. The actual time of the interview was determined by the domestic manager and
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relevant supervisors in order to facilitate the least disruption to the worker's schedule.
Generally, the interviews took place in the first or final hour of the interviewees' working day
or after their lunch break.
Due to sickness and holidays, not ail of the workers initially considered were able to be
interviewed. Also, there were a considerable number of negative responses in the first
instance, though after the first few days, once word about the study was transmitted, there
were fewer negative responses from those subsequently contacted. On the whole, the
majority of negative responses came from older workers and in particular, from one group of
domestics who worked in the staff residence block. Further, only one of the domestic
supervisors agreed to be interviewed. In the final outcome, all staff in post, excluding those
on holiday or long-term sickness were contacted and 56 workers were interviewed,
representing 47% of those contacted.
At the second hospital selected (Hospital 'B'), the 'surgical unit' which employed
approximately 65, workers was chosen because of its size relative to other managerial units
in the hospital complex and because the bonus had been introduced in this unit. For
logistical reasons, the bonus was being gradually introduced throughout the hospital -unit
by unit - and was not yet in operation in all of the units. The procedure for selecting and
contacting the workers at Hospital B was generally similar yet different to that in Hospital A
in a number of important ways. There were, unfortunately, no domestics in the unit who
were union shop stewards. Therefore, the assistant domestic manager responsible for the
unit took responsibility for delivering the letters to the workers herself and decided to inform
the domestics about the study in groups. For those who did not respond negatively to this
letter, confirmation of the time, date and location of the interview was transmitted by the
supervisors or the assistant domestic manager. The fact that communication regarding the
study came from domestic management was unfortunate, not simply because of the
potential association of the study with management, but because the introduction of the
bonus had been more of a contentious issue than at Hospital A - further reason to be
108
concerned about the association of the study with domestic management. The response
rate was thus poorer than that achieved at Hospital A: only 20 of the 56 workers contacted
(36%) agreed to be interviewed. Many of the refusals, however, came from domestics
working the evening or 'backshift'. Thus, only 1 of 19 (5%) of workers working the 'back
shift' agreed to be interviewed compared to 19 of 37 (51%) of those working the 'day shift'.
Further, I was able to discuss the study with the domestic supervisors directly and the
response rate from this group was much better than that achieved at Hospital A, where I was
not able to do so.
Domestic ancillary workforce - general profile.
At Hospital A, of the domestic ancillary workforce (N=142), 96 (68%) were married, 27 (19%)
were single, and 19 (13%) had been previously married (separated, divorced or widowed).
Altogether, 115 (81%) worked part-time; 80 (83%) of married workers, 20 (74%) of single
workers, and 15 (79%) of previously married workers. Only two (1%) of these employees
were male (one married and one previously married). Table 4.1 below provides a summary
of the age, hours worked and length of service (in months) by marital status of this group.
Table 4.1 Age, length of service, and hours worked of domestic ancillary
workforce, by marital status (Hospital A, N=142)
Married Single Prev. Married
Mean (Range) Mean (Range) Mean (Range)
Age 43(18-65) 28(17-61) 49(27-60)
Service(Months) 90(1-324) 26(1-144) 65(1-168)
Hquts 27(11-40) 29(20-40) 30(22,5-40)
Full-time 17%(16) 26%(7) 21%(4)
Part-timg 83%(8Q) 74%(2Q) 79%(15)
The profile of the sample of employees interviewed at this hospital (N=56) was
representative of the domestic ancillary workforce. Thirty-nine (70%) of the respondents
were married, 9 (16%) were single and 8 (14%) had been previously married. Altogether,
42 (75%) of worked part-time; 30 (77%) of married workers, 7 (78%) of single workers, and
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5 (62%) of previously married workers. A summary of the respondents' age, hours worked
and length of service by marital status is provided in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Age, length of service, and hours worked of sample of Interview







Age 40 42(18-63) 28 24(17-61) 49 54(33-61)
Service(Months) 70 19(1-266) 23 10(4-109) 66 43(6-174)









At Hospital B, of the domestic ancillary workforce in the 'surgical unit' (N=62), 44 (71%) were
married, 11 (18%) were single and 7 (11%) had been previously married. Six (10%) of
these employees were male (one married, 4 single and one previously married). Overall,
39 (63%) worked part-time; 32 (73%) of married workers, 3 (27%) of single workers, and 4
(57%) of previously married workers. Table 4.3 below provides a summary of the age,
hours worked and length of service by marital status of this group of workers.
Table 4.3 Age, length of service, and hours worked of domestic ancillary
workforce, by marital status (Hospital B, N=62)
Married Single Prev. Married
Mean (Range) Mean (Range) Mean (Range)
Age 43(17-64) 28(17-58) 46(30-63)
Service(Months) 61(1-300) 21(7-60) 48(12-132)
Hours 25(15-40) 36(15-40) 31(20-40)
Full-time 27%(12) 73%(8) 43%(3)
Part-time 73%(32) 27%(3) 57%(4)
As these figures indicate, the general profile of the domestic ancillary workforce at Hospital
B (marital status, mean age, hours worked and length of sen/ice) is comparable to that found
in at Hospital A. The main differences are in the mean hours worked by workers who are
(
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single - single workers at Hospital A worked on average fewer hours than their counterparts
at Hospital B. Also, there were considerably more male workers employed at Hospital B.
The difference in hours worked by single workers may be explained by examining the
history of productivity bargaining at the two hospitals. The negotiation of the bonus and
introduction of efficiency measures had been a more lengthy but less conflictual affair at
Hospital A. The domestic managers had adjusted their hiring policy by gradually
introducing the practice of employing workers for shorter hours. The negotiation of the
bonus and efficiency measures had taken place over a shorter period but had been far more
acrimonious at Hospital B.
At Hospital B, the managers explained that in order for the bonus to be introduced in the
surgical unit, management had to 'get rid of a lot of dead wood' (that is, older workers and
'lazy workers' who were said to be incapable of keeping up the pace of work required) by
moving them to other areas of the hospital where the bonus had not yet been introduced - or
by means of 'voluntary dismissal'. The surgical unit was then staffed by its 'best workers'
and those from other areas of the hospital where the bonus had not yet been introduced, as
well as by a few new recruits.
At both hospitals, the unions had been fairly successful in protecting the basic weekly hours
of the staff in post. As a large proportion of the staff in the surgical unit at Hospital B had
been moved there from other areas of the hospital, with a smaller proportion of new recruits
making up the workforce, many had their existing basic weekly hours protected. As will be
discussed in further detail in the following sections of this chapter, the hours of single
workers employed before and after the introduction of the bonus were very different, with the
new recruits working significantly fewer hours than existing staff in post.
While the general profile of the domestic ancillary workforce at the two hospitals were
similar and the sample of interview respondents at Hospital A closely resembled that of the
total domestic ancillary workforce, the sample of interview respondents at Hospital B was
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not as closely comparable. Of the 20 interview respondents at Hospital B, 11 (55%) were
married, 7 (35%) were single and 2 (10%) had been previously married. Nonetheless,
despite the proportionately fewer married respondents (due to the very few numbers of
respondents who worked the evening shift) and proportionately greater number of single
respondents, the mean age of married and single respondents (and hours worked by single
respondents) was not dramatically different from that observed for the domestic ancillary
workforce in the surgical unit at Hospital B. Overall, 5 (25%) worked part-time; 3 (27%) of
married workers, 1 (14%) of single workers, and 1 (50%) of previously married workers.
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the age, hours worked and length of service by marital
status of this sample of interview respondents.
Table 4.4 Age, length of service, and hours worked of sample of interview
respondents, by marital status (Hospital B, N=20)
Married Single Prev. Married
Mean Med(R) Mean MedfRt Mean Med(R)
Age 40 41(23-57) 28 24(19-48) 22 22(-)
Service(Months) 23 21(2-65) 26 26(8-61) 30 30(-)
Hours 35 40(22-401 36 40122.5-40) 40 40(4
Full-time 73%(8) 86%(6) 50%(1)
Part-time 27%(3) I4%(p 5Q%(1)
The differences in the marital status, hours worked and age profile of the two groups of
interview respondents is primarily due to the high negative response rate of one group of
staff at Hospital B. This group of workers worked the evening (or 'backshift') and were
mostly married women. I attribute the high negative response rate to a combination of
factors, but primarily to the approach adopted by the domestic manager and supervisor
concerned. Given that the interviews were taking place during work time, it was agreed with
management at both hospitals that the respondents would be assured that they could be
freed from their ususual work responsibilities during the period concerned. (It was clear
from the interviews, however, that the majority of workers tried regardless to get their
required work done by working harder and covering for each other).
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At Hospital B, however, only 45 minutes (rather than an hour) was allowed for each
interview and it became clear that the manager and in particular the supervisor (who
participated in the interviews herself), by insisting that all of the required work had to be
completed in order for the staff be interviewed, effectively discouraged the evening shift
workers from participating in the study. In fairness to the management and supervisor, these
workers were only employed for 3 hours each day (on average); 45 minutes thus
represented a large proportion of their working day. Also, this shift was short-staffed, and
there was already a great deal of 'cover-work' being undertaken in order to get the work
done. Nonetheless, this was also the case at Hospital A, and the management there found
it possible to facilitate staff participation in the study.
Given the similar general profile of the domestic workforce at both hospitals, both the
respective domestic ancillary workforce populations and the sample of interview
respondents have been combined for purposes of analysis. Thus the total (combined)
domestic ancillary workforce for the study is 204 (142 + 62) and the total sample of interview
respondents is 76 (56 + 20). In analysing the material, however, information obtained from
the two hospitals was compared before combining the results. Generally, the material which
will be presented regarding this study relates to the combined domestic ancillary workforce
and interviewed populations, unless significant differences emerged indicating that the
results should be considered separately for each hospital.
Of the combined domestic ancillary workforce (N=204), 140 (69%) were married, 38 (19%)
were single and 26 (13%) had been previously married. In total, 154 (76%) worked part-
time; 112 (80%) of married workers, 23 (60%) of single workers, and 19 (73%) of previously
married workers. Table 4.5 provides a summary of the age, hours worked and length of
service by marital status of the combined domestic ancillary workforce.
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Table 4.5 Age, length of service, and hours worked of combined domestic



























Of the combined sample of interview respondents (N=76), 50 (66%) were married, 17 (22%)
were single and 9 (12%) had been previously married. Thus the marital status profile of the
sample of interview respondents is representative of that of the combined domestic ancillary
workforce. In total, 47 (62%) of respondents worked part-time; 33 (66%) of married
respondents, 8 (50%) of single respondents, 6 (60%) of previously married respondents.
Table 4.6 provides a summary of the age, hours worked and length of service by marital
status for the interviewed sample.
Table 4.6 Age, length of service, and hours worked of combined sample of



























As Tables 4.5 and 4.6 indicate, then, the hours worked, length of service and age profile of





Interview schedule and data analysis
The interview schedule (Appendix A) was composed of ten sections headed as follows:
Respondent's current job as a domestic assistant/supervisor; Respondent's other current
jobs and future job expectations; Respondent's work history and education; Characteristics
of respondent's job; Comparison - work content and conditions of employment before and
after the bonus; Respondent's earnings; Respondent's household; Household finance;
Trade union affiliation and participation; Wages and jobs generally - respondent's
perceptions. In devising this schedule, both the Cambridge schedule 'Understanding and
Evaluation of Income Differentials' used in the Social Inequality Project and the schedule
from the Women and Employment Survey (1984) were used as guides in organising the
schedule and formulating certain questions.
The interview schedule was designed to explore both the circumstances of domestic
ancillary work and the changes brought about by productivity bargaining, and the social
circumstances of domestic ancillary workers. The information obtained was analysed using
SPSSX and supplemented with qualitative analysis of questions which elicited lengthier
and more detailed responses. The quantitative analysis produced frequencies,
breakdowns, and crosstabulations of existing variables and those created in the process of
analysing the data1. In addition to the material obtained from the interviews, I collected data
on the numbers of leavers and starters at Hospital A, covering a period of 16 months. This
information was used to quantify the changes in overall staffing levels over the period and to
provide a more detailed picture of the rate of labour turnover. The obtained information
relating to the domestic ancillary workforce (N=204) was analysed for the purposes of
providing a detailed profile of the domestic workforce population and to assess whether the
efficiency initiatives had any impact on this profile.
1A discussion of the statistical tests used in the analysis is provided in Appendix B.
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An important area of investigation in the study, then, is the impact of the efficiency exercises
on the circumstances of domestic employment and on domestic employees themselves.
Thus, the comparison of employment terms and conditions and workforce profile before and
after the introduction of the bonus scheme is an important one. In analysing the interview
material, I was constrained to use the official date of commencement of the bonus for
comparison purposes. When selecting the sample, I was not fully aware how artificial this
date was and the sample was in part selected on the basis of employment before or after the
official date of commencement of the bonus. In order to achieve a more balanced
proportion of respondents employed before and after the bonus, the official date of
commencement of the bonus is, nevertheless, used for comparison purposes in analysing
the interview material. (Of the sample of 76 respondents, 57 were employed before the
official commencement of the bonus and 19 were employed after this date.) Thus, the
findings probably understate the changes brought about by the introduction of the bonus
scheme.
The information collected for the group of leavers and starters at Hospital A (N=247)
covered a period of 16 months up to and including the period of study. The accessible
information was limited to the numbers of staff involved, the date of employment
commencement and/or departure, and hours worked for each person, in the majority of
cases. (For those workers who left during the period in which the study was being
conducted, I had access to more detailed information.) This data on labour turnover relates
to a period of 6 months before and 8 months after the official commencement of the bonus
scheme. That is, these persons either started or left their employment in the months in
which the bonus was being negotiated or after the bonus had been officially introduced. I
was not able to obtain information on leavers and starters prior to this period. For this
reason, in comparing leavers and starters, the date when the full bonus officially began is
that which is used to distinguish those employed and departed 'before' and 'after' the
bonus.
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As the introduction of the bonus scheme involves a 6 month trial period preceeding the staff
vote for and official commencement of the scheme, the information obtained on labour
turnover only relates to the period of employment conditions and practices associated with
the efficiency initiative. Therefore, even though I am able to identify changes in staffing
levels and hours worked by staff during the period considered, it is likely that these findings
underestimate the extent of changes. Had I been able to collect information relating to
staffing levels and hours worked prior to the period in which the bonus was being
'requested', negotiated, and studied by the MEU, it is likely that the observed changes
would be more striking.
In contrast, the information obtained for the domestic ancillary workforce (N=204) does
permit a more appropriate distinction of employment practices 'before' and 'after' the bonus,
since I had access to relevant information for the entire sample population of employees.
The introduction of an incentive bonus payment scheme is a lengthy process. In the case of
this study, it became clear that the domestic managers knew well in advance the general
nature of the changes to shifts and hours that were required by the efficiency studies, and
anticipated these in terms of their employment pratices in the period immediately preceding
the trial period. This action was taken in order to facilitate the full introduction of the bonus
by gradually habituating the existing workforce to the changes in staffing levels entailed.
Thus, workers categorised as employed 'before the bonus' are those who were employed
before the start of the calendar year in which the bonus was introduced, and workers
categorised as employed 'after the bonus* are those who were employed in the calendar
year that the bonus was actually introduced (ie. in the months before, in addition to those
after the official date of the commencement of the bonus). In other words, those workers
described as employed 'after the bonus' were employed in an eighteen month period up to
and including the time of the study while those employed 'before the bonus' were employed
prior to eighteen months before the time of the study.
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'De-Servlclng' Domestic Ancillary Work
As part of various efficiency initiatives undertaken by the health board, both the hospitals
considered in this study had introduced an incentive bonus payment scheme for their
domestic services. Though officially an incentive bonus payment scheme is only introduced
'at the request' of the staff concerned, management practices were clearly important
determinants in steering the 'staff request' of, and ultimate 'vote for', the bonus scheme.
That is, the majority of staff interviewed2 reported that whether or not they wanted or voted
for the bonus, the reduced staffing levels and work intensification involved in such an
efficiency initiative would prevail. Management had made it clear to the workers that the
pressure to privatise (contract-out) the service meant that efficieny savings had to be
achieved if the service was to be kept in-house. Therefore, staff were advised to accept the
bonus scheme as a more palatable means of achieving the cost reductions required.
The following comments typify respondents' views regarding their involvement in the
negotiation of the bonus and whether they were in favour of it:
'We weren't really involved at all. We were told by the unions and
management that the bonus would have to be introduced to make the
service work - be more competitive against privatisation. It wasn't the staff
who requested the bonus. Management put it forward and the union
representatives made an agreement. It was pretty obvious that we had no
choice really.' (Domestic assistant Hospital B: #70)
'We didn't have much of a choice. At the end of the six month trial period we
all had a vote but we more or less had to take it even if we didn't want it. It
was made clear to us that staffing levels wouldn't be improved.' (Domestic
assistant Hospital A: #16)
'I was in favour of the bonus and voted for it. Well, they threatened us with
privatisation if we didn't vote for it...We were always threatened with
privatisation and none of us wanted that but it's coming anyway.' (Domestic
assistant Hospital B: #67)
'The staff didn't request the bonus. It was brought to them...We were all
given a vote and I was in favour of it at the time. But I had just started and
it's the type of thing they don't explain to you. In fact there were quite a lot of
2 Of the staff who had been employed before the bonus officially commenced and who
expressed an opinion on the matter, 80% (36 of 45) indicated that the reason why they
'supported' the bonus was because they would have to do the extra work anyway because
of the cuts and threat of privatisation.
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us who had just started and who voted 'yes'. I'm the only one left now...'
(Domestic assistant Hospital A: #26)
In total, 56% (32 of 57) of this group indicated that they had no real involvement in the
process, either because they were not at all involved in the request and negotiation
proceedure for the bonus (42% - 24 of 57), or the scheme was 'fated' and they had no
choice over the matter (14% - 8 Of 57). Only 39% (22 of 57) indicated that they had
participated in the proceedings, either by attending a meeting (9% - of 57), or having the
opportunity to vote on the issue (30% -17 of 57). Three (5%) of the respondents were shop
stewards at the time and considered themselves to have been very involved in the process.
Reflecting the increased emphasis on achieving greater efficiency and 'value for money',
what was previously the 'Work Study Unit' responsible to the Senior Administrator was, as
mentioned, renamed in April 1987 the 'Management Efficiency Unit' (MEU), and became
responsible to the Treasurer in the Finance Section. This Unit has been responsible for
carrying out the efficiency studies and for recommending measures to 'improve' work
organisation and methods. As a result of the transfer of responsibility, any budget
reductions implied by changes in staffing levels and work content proposed by the MEU
were to be immediately put into effect by the Finance Section. Thus, the hospital concerned
would have its operating budget cut according to MEU proposals as soon as the scheme
had been officially accepted by the staff. In practice, however, due to financial pressures,
the domestic services' operating budgets were cut at the beginning of the six month trial
period, even before the staff had officially accepted the scheme. Thus, hospital
management and administration are compelled to introduce the findings of the Unit because
their budget has already been cut by Finance. Previously, the operating budget was left
intact and any 'savings' achieved were recouped at the end of the financial year in which
the scheme had been introduced.
The efficiency studies undertaken by the MEU for domestic services consist of two parts.
The first part concentrates on the utilisation of labour and includes identification of work
content, review of cleaning frequencies and subsequent rationalisation of staff rota systems.
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The second part concentrates on cleaning equipment and materials. Since labour accounts
for 96.5% of dometic services costs (SCOTMEG 1988), more emphasis is given to, and
greater cost reductions are achieved from, changes in labour utilisation. According to one of
the Senior Project Leaders interviewed, proposed changes in cleaning equipment and
materials, such as introducing new machinery and carpeting large floor areas, are a 'waste
of paper', though they may achieve some savings in the end. In contrast, the majority of the
changes and cost reductions relate to staffing levels.
Domestic efficiency exercises
In the early 1980's, a process of rationalisation and standardisation was carried out by
domestic mangagers under the instruction of the Common Services Agency (CSA)
responsible for hospital services in Scotland. A formalised set of cleaning frequencies and
treatments for different types of areas and rooms within hospitals was collated, produced
and issued to all hospitals in Scotland as guidance for service delivery. The national
standard cleaning frequencies and treatments are adjusted to reflect variations required by
each hospital according to domestic managerial discretion. Lothian Health Board decided
to adopt these guidelines as the basis for determining the policy on efficiency exercises.
With the introduction of a bonus incentive payment scheme, the MEU quantifies the existing
cleaning frequencies and treatments in the hospital concerned (the adjusted national
standard frequencies and treatments) in relation to the total hours worked to achieve the
work (whole time equivalent (WTE) staff in post) over a prescribed period of observation.
Part of this quantifying procedure involves Performance Level Rating according to the scale
produced by the British Standard Insititute (BSI). That is, a sample of individual workers
throughout the hospital is observed by 'trained' management efficiency personnel over a set
period of time and the workers' level of work performance, or 'pedormance effort', is
assessed according to the BSI scale, which ranges from 0 -100%. A performance effort up
to and including a scaling of 75% translates to non-incentive work effort conditions.
Therefore, any performance scaling of 75% or below does not qualify for a bonus payment.
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A work performance scaling of between 75% and 100% BSI is equal to a bonus reward that
ranges from 0 - 33.3%. Thus, the maximum bonus payable is 33.3%.
The most common performance target is 86.25% BSI which equals a 15% bonus. A 20%
bonus requires a performance rate of 90% BSI and this is also fairly common. Management
and MEU personnel indicate that a performance rate of more than 90% is generally
unobtainable in the long term and is therefore not recommended as a permanent target
performance requirement.
'To pay for a 30% bonus, there must be extensive absences, with remainingworkers covering the absences and doing extra work. For workers to
receive a 30% bonus they must be working very hard to get all the work
completed. A 30% bonus is ideally only used in periods wfiere there is high
absence due to sickness and workers pitch in to get all the work done at
these times. But some managers prefer to operate with lots of absences to
give the remaining workers a larger bonus. This is an abuse of the system
because the workers have to do a lot of extra work, in less time and could
not possibly operate at a 30% bonus level constantly. Nevertheless,
managers should aim to run under the whole time equivalent target staffing
level - underspent - just to give themselves a margin of error in their own
target operating budget.' (Domestic Services Manager Advisor)
Bonus level target decisions are made by domestic management 'in consultation with staff
and proposed to the Unit as the basis for their work content recommendations. Allowances
are built in for absence for holidays (an 18.5% allowance is added for areas of the hospital
which have to be serviced on public holidays and, for areas not covered on public holidays,
a 14.65% allowance is added). Bonuses are not payable for periods of sickness. For rest
periods a 15% rest allowance is added to the basic time. The information relating to
cleaning frequencies and treatments, together with floor plans of the hospital, is
computerised and the time required to perform the work at a specified performance rate,
allowing for required rest periods and an estimated level of absences for holidays, is
quantified. Thus each cleaning activity is allotted a specified time for completion on the
basis that the workers concerned perform the work at a specified pace.
Domestics who work in hospital wards also assume a number of non-cleaning duties which
are related to patient care. This work is calculated manually through direct observation
studies by MEU personnel. Non-cleaning duties pertain to the preparation and serving of
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meals, serving of beverages throughout the day, filling water carafes for individual patients,
collection of meal trays, washing and drying and putting away of dishes, and so on.
Domestic staff involvement in these tasks varies from hospital to hospital and in different
wards; responsibility for the mix of duties is shared between domestic, auxiliary and nursing
staff depending on the particular hospital or ward. Where these activities are officially
undertaken by domestic staff, the time to perform them is quantified and added to the basic
computerised time allotted for the cleaning treatments and frequencies.
In order for domestics to keep up the pace and standard of work required by the
'performance target' and bonus scheme, more supervisory and managerial work is required.
Consequently, the workload and numbers of supervisors is included in the quantification of
cleaning frequencies and treatments and in the costing of the work content. Needless to
say, while the intention is to reduce the overall hours worked by basic domestics, the overall
hours worked by supervisors and managers is increased.
At Hospital A, it was agreed that a variable bonus would be introduced. That is, the bonus
level varied from week to week, depending on work performance. The bonus level ranged
from ff% to 27%, and averaged f6% during the period between its introduction and the
time of the study. At Hospital B it was agreed that a fixed bonus of 15% would be
introduced. Thus, as long as the level of work performance averaged around 15%, the
workers received a 15% bonus payment each week. The work performance rate is
'monitored' by domestic management and is the ratio of time allowed to time taken to
complete the work. In this way, the actual hours worked are compared to the target hours
allowed in order to ascertain the performance rate and bonus level. Though bonuses are
paid with the weekly pay, they were calculated on a four-weekly moving average to level out
fluctuations.
The MEU was charged with the task of identifying and introducing reduced hours and costs
of cleaning, particularly in non-clinical areas and during weekends. Their proposals
regarding cleaning frequencies and staff rotas generally involved substantial reductions in
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weekend work and in employing people during 'unsocial' hours (ie. before 6am or after
8pm), in an attempt to avoid paying enhanced rates of pay. Most of the staff working a rota
shift at both hospitals (as opposed to a set days shift, e.g. Monday to Friday) worked five
weekends out of six. The reduction in weekend work required under the bonus scheme
entailed switching from a six-week rota to a four-week rota. Thus those still employed on the
rota worked only three weekends out of four as a result of the efficiency initiative. The
change from the six to the four-week rota resulted in a 4.7% drop in individual basic weekly
earnings for those affected. The MEU also recommended employing staff part-time in order
to avoid National Insurance and superannuation contributions. It was also argued that 'from
an efficiency point of view' it was better to employ a larger number of people for fewer hours
because they work 'more efficiently' and steadily than when employed for longer periods.
The Scottish Management Efficiency Group commissioned a review of domestic work in
1985 in order to propose specific recommendations to be enacted by all domestic services,
to achieve 'greater efficiency, effectiveness and economy in the provision of this important
service' (SCOTMEG 1987). In its analysis of domestic staff rota systems, the study
concluded the the most economical system is the '5 and 2' rota. This rota employs one
group of workers Monday to Friday and another group at weekends. In addition, it was
recommended that work be rescheduled to allow more tasks to be performed Monday to
Friday, 'thus necessitating only minimum cover at weekends for essential duities, e.g.
sanitary areas, spot cleaning, mopping and impregnated mopping' (SCOTMEG 1987). The
review found that replacement of existing rotas which entail more weekend work with the '5
and 2' rota and minimum cover at weekends yielded potential financial savings of
approximatedly 12.5%. The review also recommended that work in unsocial hours and the
'night shift' be eliminated where possible.
As with the Management Efficiency Unit's proposals regarding the implementation of the
efficiency exercises in the current study, the SCOTMEG review also suggested that
additional supervisors might be needed in order to implement the proposed changes.
123
*
Moreover, it was not considered feasible to include domestic supervisory staff in the '5 and
2' rota 'due to the need to maintain continuity of supervision of staff (1987). The trend
toward increasing the ratio of managerial to operational staff is in fact underlined by
employment statistics for domestic services staff in both the Lothian Health Board and
Scotland as a whole. Between March 1982 and March 1987 operational staffing levels in
domestic services in Scotland as a whole were reduced by 14.7% WTE. At the same time,
managerial staffing levels increased by 17% WTE. As Table 4.7 indicates, the trend in
Lothian itself is similar: during the same period there was a 12.7% reduction in WTE
operational staffing levels while managerial staffing levels increased by 24.8% WTE.
Table 4.7 Domestic services staff employment (WTE): Scotland and Lothian,
1982-1987
31 March 1982 31 March 1983 31 March 1987
(a) oa (alii) irn CaKU (bUi)
Scotland 11,970.1 174.4 11,873.1 (-0.8) 174.3(-0.1) 10,215.7(-14.7) 204.0(+17.0)
Lothian 1.823.5 33.5 1.821.4(0.11 28.sr-14.91 1.592.6M2.71 41 8f+24.8%1
Notes: (a) Operational Staff (b) Managerial Staff (i) % change over March 1982 figures
Source: Compiled from Table 2 Domestic services staff: whole time equivalent in Hansard
Written answers to Questions 3 May 1988 col. 380
Effects on employment conditions
A major concern evident in the present study was the impact of changes in hours available
for employment, and 'flexibility' required of the workers, on patterns of recruitment and
labour turnover. This concern was expressed both by management and workers. While the
bonus scheme has afforded management much more flexibility in relation to staff
deployment and workers are obliged to accept the extra 'cover work' and duties entailed,
recruitment is a big problem. This is underlined by one of the domestic managers:
'We are, and have been for the past few years, understaffed in all areas. We
have real problems in recruiting enough staff. It's going to become more
and more difficult to recruit enough domestics. For one thing, the bonus
does mean that the workers have to work a lot harder and they don't often
cope. So we've introduced disciplinary procedures in which the supervisors
closely monitor problem workers. Often, the worker hands their notice in
because they can't work to the bonus level. Now people know - or they find
out when they start- that you have to do a day's work and you just can't take
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days off here and there for no good reason. Also, the wages are pathetic.
We advertise everywhere - job centres, papers, bulletins, word of mouth -
but in the same places there are ads for similar jobs with the local authority
or the university. The pay is much better for the same type of work in nicer
surroundings. A lot of domestics are the sole supporters of their family - I
don't know how some of them manage.' (Domestic manager Hospital B)
In the past, most domestics who were 'relief workers' (working in any area of the hospital to
cover for absences and shortages) were 'reliefs' for only a short period. Within a few
months of employment, most domestics were placed in their 'own' ward or area of the
hospital. It becarri^jpparent from the interviews that domestic workers with responsibility for
their 'own' ward took great care to keep their wards clean and properly scrubbed, and were
fiercely proud of their work. With the introduction of the bonus, this practice was upset; this
resulted, on the part of the workers, in a great deal of opposition to and resentment about
the disruption caused by the constant movement of workers within the hospital to 'cover'
when an area was short of workers.
Before the bonus scheme was introduced in the two hospitals studied, there were at least
three workers for each ward, two of whom were full-timers. The bonus scheme entailed a
substantial reduction in the numbers of staff employed on, and work hours committed to, any
ward. After the bonus, there was only one full-timer and one part-timer (sometimes two) per
ward. As a result, one worker would have to scrub down the ward alone and be responsible
for cleaning duties in other wards and areas of the hospital as well. Workers employed on
the rota shift who continued to work at weekends and full-time workers generally,
experienced the greatest burden of work. Though the hospitals only provided skeletal staff
coverage at the weekend when the work load was supposed to be cut to the bare minimum,
much heavy work continued to be performed by very few workers.
Eighty-three percent (48 of 58) of the respondents who compared employment conditions
before and after the bonus, indicated that the bonus had brought about changes in their
work content and method. Of the 10 respondents who indicated that there had been no
change, 7 worked part-time from Monday to Friday when the service was better staffed; of
the remaining 3, 2 were supervisors. In total, 59% (34 of 58) indicated (in response to the
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open-ended question as to what, if any, changes the bonus had made on their work) that the
changes involved considerably more work, and had led to a more widespread problem of
shortstaffing and concomitantly, more coverwork. Twenty-four percent (14 of 58) of the
respondents, in responding to this question claimed that they did not have sufficient time to
complete their cleaning duties. Importantly, 29% (17 of 58) of respondents also suggested
that the reductions in staffing levels had resulted in lowered standards of cleanliness and
service provision.
The following comments about the conditions of employment under the bonus scheme were
typical:
'At weekends, one woman alone has to move all the beds and things and
scrub one side of the ward. This work used to be done by two people. I
thought there would be changes but not to the extent of doing the scrubbing
single handed - everyone feels this. As it is now, one ward is scrubbed
down every 3 weeks - each ward is scrubbed in 3 sections- one section per
week. The ward should be scrubbed once a week from Monday to Friday
when more staff are employed. Now parts of the ward are always very dirty.'
(Domestic assistant Hospital B #72)
'It used to take two people to scrub one side of the ward. Now they expect
one person to do it ana do it efficiently. The bonus is supposed to cut out
the middleman but it's very heavy going now compared to before. They've
cut numbers down and all the heavy work is done at the weekend. The idea
of a skeletal service at weekends hasn't panned out and us full-timers/rota
workers have to do more work and heavy work at weekends.' (Domestic
assistant Hospital B #67)
'At weekends they won't allow more than one person on the ward. There
used to be two. Also they now expect one person to cover at least two
wards. You're always running back and forward - it's hard on the legs and
feet. Very tiring. They expect too much' (Domestic assistant Hospital A #26)
'Gradually it seems to be more and more work coming in. It's the same
hours and same pay but more work for the time we have. They're getting
their money's worth. There's more pressure and I think you can notice it on
quite a few people. I didn't notice it at first, but gradually the change is
happening.' (Domestic assistant Hospital A #30)
As these quotes indicate, the workers felt that they were expected to take on a very heavy
workload and felt under tremendous pressure. The responses to two sets of questions
about satisfaction with the standards and pace of work both at the time of the interview and
before the bonus commenced, indicated a significant decrease in the level of job
satisfaction after the bonus for the respondents concerned. That is, 48% (28 of 56) of this
group of workers indicated that before the bonus began, they were 'very satisfied' with the
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standards and pace of work; 41% (24) were 'fairly satisfied' and only 10% (6) were
'dissatisfied'. The responses from this group of workers indicated, however, that at the time
of the interview, only 22% (13) of the respondents were 'very satisfied', 50% (29) were 'fairly
satisfied, and 28% (16) were 'dissatisfied' with the standards and pace of work. Thus there
was a signficant shift both from 'very satisfied' to 'fairly satisfied (p<0.05, Phi=0.23), and from
'satisfied' to 'dissatisfied' (p<0.02, Phi=0.22)3 .
For those respondents employed after the bonus (n=18), only 22% (4 of 18) were 'very
satisfied' with the standards and pace of work at the time of the interview, 44% (8) were
'fairly satisfied' and 33% (6) were dissatisfied. Thus in total, 29% (22 of 76) of the sample of
interviewed respondents were dissatisfied with the standards and pace of work under the
bonus scheme. This compares to 22% (17 of 76) who were 'very satisfied' and 49% who
were 'fairly satisfied'4. Clearly, however, the vast majority of the respondents were under no
illusions about the purpose of the incentive bonus payment scheme; 80% (59 of 74)
reported that the main purpose of the bonus scheme was to effect financial savings for the
health board, and only 8% believed that the purpose of the bonus was to improve workers'
earnings. Significantly, 56% (9 of 16) of the respondents who commenced employment
after the bonus scheme began did not understand what the bonus was all about.
3 As a point of commentary on these findings, I should add that many workers expressed
that the deterioration in work standards and staffing levels, and the increasing amount of
coverwork required, had begun prior to the official commencement of the bonus. This is
reflected in many of the responses which indicated that there had been no change in
circumstances after the bonus scheme started. As indicated earlier, when selecting the
sample, I was not fully aware how artificial this date was, and the sample was in part
selected on the basis of employment before or after the official date of commencement of the
bonus. In order to achieve a more balanced proportion of respondents employed before and
after the bonus, the official date of commencement of the bonus is, nevertheless, used for
comparison purposes in analysing the interview material. Thus, the findings probably
understate the changes brought about by the introduction of the bonus scheme.
4 The satisfaction rates regarding the pace and standards of work at the time of the
interview were not significantly different for full- and part-timers. But full-timers were, on the
whole, less satisfied than part-timers: 17.5% (5 of 29) of full-timers compared to 25.5% (12
of 47) of part-timers were 'satisfied'; 44.8% (13 of 29) of full-timers compared to 51.1% (24
of 47) of part-timers were 'fairly satisfied'; 31.0% (9 of 29) of full-timers compared to 14.9%
(7 of 47) of part-timers were 'a little dissatisfied'; and 6.9% (2 of 29) of full-timers compared
to 8.5% (4. of 47) of part-timers were 'very dissatisfied'.
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Having 'agreed' for the bonus scheme to be officially in operation, the staff had, however,
sold away their rights of refusal to perform the extra work and covering required.
'They expect too much and you can't refuse to do the work now if you're
asked to do it. Before, you could refuse to do the covering for another
person if she was off or covering somewhere else.' (Domestic assistant
Hospital A #54)
Neither were the workers entirely satisfied that the work was being accomplished as it
should.
'There's a set time to do things now. Rotas are not as versatile. There's so
much on them now that regardless of how well any task gets done, you have
to move on to the next task.' (Domestic assistant Hospital A #73)
'There are new work lists. But unless you have the staff to do the work, you
can make up as many lists as you want but you can still only do the bare
essentials. Short-staffing has become more of a problem.' (Domestic
supervisor Hospital B #57)
'It's difficult for people to accept change. If someone's been scrubbing the
same corridor for twenty years one way and some young MEU man comes
in and suddenly tells you you're doing it wrong and he's never cleaned a
floor in his life - then there's obvious resentment. And older women find it
particularly difficult to change their routine.' (NUPE Branch Secretary
Hospital B)
'The main annoyance is having to move around the hospital to cover when
an area is short of workers. Wards have been kept by individuals and
generally the same people are in a ward or area for years. They take great
pride in keeping their ward up to scratch.' (COHSE Branch Secretary
Hospital A)
Opposition to the bonus scheme, however, did not just come from domestic workers
themselves, but also from the medical staff. As the bonus scheme alters the work content
and routine - in particular, defining more rigidly the timetables for cleaning duties and
patient related duties - nurses and doctors are also affected.
'The idea of the bonus is to provide a better service, a more efficient and
improved service. But because we've been so short-staffed, standards are
not kept at the level we would wish. Nurses are down our throats because
of falling standards, especially in the medical unit. They ask: "Why is it the
standards have fallen when the bonus was supposed to improve the
situation?" All we can say is that it's supposed to but we're very shortstaffed.
The medical unit is where we've moved all the poor workers - who show a
willingness to work and try hard when under disciplinary action - rather than
dismiss them if they can't hack the requirements of the bonus in the area
they were in. We find it difficult to get enough workers, let alone good
workers.' (Domestic manager B)
Furthermore, under bonus conditions, the domestics are more clearly not under the control
of the ward sisters.
(
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'Ward Sisters like to think they are in charge of everyone in the ward -
including the domestics. Obviously, if it's rest time or it's the doctors rounds
or a patient is on a drip, the domestic wouldn't perform cleaning duties as on
the task sheet timetable. But otherwise, the nurses have no business telling
domestics when and where to clean and making their tea and coffee and
running errands for them and the patients.' (Domestic manager B)
According to many of the domestics who had a long service history with the hospitals, the
bonus meant that they were no longer supposed to do many of the patient related duties that
they had previously. In particular, they were no longer allowed to interact with the patients
as they had done before, including responding to and anticipating patient requests (such as
for items from the hospital shop), helping patients to the toilet if the nurse or auxiliary nurse
was not available, or getting patients a cup of tea. Not only did domestic ward staff object to
being moved around from ward to ward because they felt that the work in 'their own' ward
was not completed properly, they strongly disliked the imposed detachment from informal
patient-related activities. A common reason given for their interest in domestic work was
because it involved working and interacting with people. The bonus scheme meant that
very little time was left for what had been an important and rewarding aspect of the 'service'
for these workers.
The account provided by the domestics interviewed stands in sharp contrast to the
conclusion reached in the SCOTMEG review document:
'It may be argued that domestic staff working for only short periods in wards
lack interest and incentive and that therefore a significant ingredient of
patient-related care might be considered to be missing. There was,
however, no real evidence available to the Group which supported such an
argument' (1988:3.2).
The domestic managers also indicated that staff motivation and morale were very low:
'The motivation and morale among the workers is not good. The bonus has
certainly made the problem worse. And it hasn't been helped by the
reorganisation of the health board into units which affects managerial staff.
It's unsettling because there are lots of rumours - how can you expect staff to
be content when managerial staff are unsettled? Even so, resistance to the
bonus is riot as bad as it would have been if we were fully staffed. The
situation with the bonus now is somewhat artificial because we are so short-
staffed. Therefore, there's a lot of overtime available and though people lost
weekend work with the bonus, in terms of their basic weekly hours, they can
in fact work a lot of overtime at weekends because there are not enough
staff to do the work. Consequently, workers aren't missing out on earnings
in the way they would if the bonus scheme was working properly with the
correct complement of whole-time-equivalents in post.' (Domestic manager)
129
Undoubtedly, uncertainty over the future of their own jobs was a factor in the low morale of
domestic staff. Of the total sample interviewed, 48% (36 of 75) indicated that they were
dissatisfied with the security of their job; more than half of these (20 of 36) were 'very
dissatisfied' . There was, moreover, a significant difference between the levels of
satisfaction with job security reported by those respondents employed before compared to
after the bonus5, and by full- and part-time workers6. The large majority, (76%, or 13 of 17)
of those respondents employed after the bonus officially commenced were satisfied with the
security of their jobs; only 24% (4 of 17) were dissatisfied. On the other hand, the majority
of respondents who had been employed before the bonus commenced, (55%, or 32 of 58)
reported that they were dissatisfied with the security of their jobs; more than half of these
respondents (18 of 32) were 'very dissatisfied'. Full-timers were much more likely to be
dissatisfied with the security of their job than part-timers: 61% (14 of 23) of full-timers were
'very dissatisfied' compared to only 13% (6 of 46) of part-timers; and only 4.3% (1 of 23) of
full-timers were 'very satisfied', compared to 20% (9 of 46) of part-timers7.
Summary
The evidence presented in this section suggests that the efficiency initiatives pursued by the
Lothian Health Board, particularly the two hospitals studied, have altered the form and
quality of domestic service provision. The pursuit of cost-cutting exercises, resulting in the
strategy of rigidly quantifying the time permitted for each activity performed by domestics
through work study measurement techniques, has attempted to streamline 'domestic
operations' to the point of taking the 'sen/ice' aspect out of this job. With the reduced staffing
levels required by the efficiency exercises and the increased problems of staff shortages,
5 When comparing those 'satisfied' to 'dissatisfied': Chi 5.29, p <0.05, Phi=0.26 (Pirie-
Hamden correction of Chi).
6 When comparing those 'satisfied' to 'dissatisfied'; Chi 4.25, p <0.05, Phi=0.25.
7 Chi 9.6, p <0.01, Phi=0.57
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not only did domestic workers have to assume a more onerous workload, many also had
considerably less time in which to complete the duties specified on their work sheets.
According to many respondents, the intensification of the work had a detrimental affect both
on the workers themselves and the general quality of service provided to patients.
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5. Changing Employment Experiences: Efficiency
Initiatives and their Effects on Working Patterns
Introduction
The impact of efficiency exercises on domestic ancillary working patterns is considered in
greater detail in this chapter. The research suggests that with the restructuring of domestic
employment, in particular, the increased reliance on part-time work, the profile of the
workforce has changed significantly. We shall see that the changing distribution of workers
employed prior to and after the introduction of the efficiency initiatives underlines the
cenlrality of social processes in the structuring of employment. The observed change in the
profile of the workforce, and the variations in the employment experiences of the workers,
suggest that there are coherent processes relating workers' social circumstances to
employment experiences. In arguing that there is a significant social patterning of
employment, the study undermines conventional conceptions of the relationship between
wages and employment, which generally assume that wages are 'economically' determined
and largely, if riot exclusively, reflect 'job-market' critieria. Further, while gender appears to
be a salient factor in the distribution of jobs at the aggregate level - domestic ancillary
workers are almost entirely female - the female workforce itself is highly differentiated.
There are, then, important variations in the social circumstances of female workers which
structure their employment experiences.
Restructuring Employment Opportunities
Despite the collective bargaining structure entailing nationally negotiated rates of pay and
conditions of employment, and despite the high degree of unionisation nationally (the
estimated level is 80%), ancillary workers, especially those in the lower grades, have been
a very low paid group. Women represent 67% of the entire ancillary workforce and are
concentrated in the bottom two pay grades. More than half of the female workforce works
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part-time. Trade unions representing ancillary workers suggest that nearly 80% of female
workers earn less than 'official' poverty levels (that is, Supplementary Benefit levels), and
thus live in conditions of poverty (Ancillary Staffs' Council Trade Unions' Side, 1986 Claim
for Improved Pay and Conditions of Service). Female ancillary workers, in particular
domestic employees employed in the bottom grade, are, then, typically associated with the
prevalence of low pay and conditions of poverty.
The implications of the 'efficiency exercises' undertaken in response to resource constraints
and government pressure to tender ancillary services to private contractors, are of
considerable concern, particularly in regard to these workers' wages. Surveys indicate that
the tendering process does further reduce the terms, conditions, and security of employment
for those employed. For example, NUPE conducted a limited survey of private contractors'
pay and conditions (May 1985), and identified a number of disturbing. In particular, their
information suggests that private contractors use part-timers excessively, with extremely
awkward shifts and shorter working hours (under 16 hours per week). There is virtually no
provision for maternity leave, pensions or sick pay; and discrepancies exist between
proposed wage levels and conditions in the tender documents and actual rates for staff in
post.
NUPE also conducted a similar survey of contracts that were put out to tender but which
were retained in-house. What both surveys highlight is that whether or not the contract is
retained in-house, the effect on the jobs is very similar. In both in-house and private
contracts, the initial phase of putting contracts out to tender resulted in the removal of full-
time positions and reduction of part-time hours to lower the wages below the level requiring
National Insurance contributions and Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) entitlement and massive
rates of staff turnover. Although the Fair Wages Resolution has been rescinded, many
health authorities retain fair wages clauses in their tender specifications. Nevertheless,
wages (for in-house and contract employees) are greatly reduced due to the overall
reduction in hours worked. Thus hourly wage rates are not the primary cause for concern.
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Rather, what is at issue is the consequence of the alteration of hours for take-home pay and
ultimately the workers' 'social wage'.
The data from my own study confirm these trends. Finance, management efficiency and
domestic managerial personnel were quite explicit about the reasons for introducing more
part-time work at shorter hours and altering the shifts worked. The standard cleaning
frequencies introduced with the bonus entailed a dramatic reduction in weekend work, to
avoid enhanced pay rates, a shift from full-time or high part-time employment to employing
people for 20-25 hours per week Monday to Friday. Employing people part-time is argued
improve work performance by concentrating activity in a 4-5 hour period rather than over 8
hours. From the point of view of management, as the worker does not tire as easily over the
shorter period, s/he will work at a more consistent and intense pace. In addition, employing
more people for shorter periods of time purportedly allows management to employ people at
times of the day/week when they are needed most. This flexibility purportedly gives
management greater control over labour costs which, from management's point of view, is
the primary reason for employing people part-time. It was indicated by finance personnel
that employing one worker 40 hours per week cost approximately £300 more per annum
than employing two workers for 20 hours per week each1. These savings are achieved by
reduced or non-existent National Insurance contributions and superannuation costs.
The case study material bears out that a reduction in weekly hours worked by individual
employees has been effected by the introduction of efficiency exercises. The unions
(COHSE and NUPE) involved in negotiating the introduction of the bonus schemes with
management were successful in safeguarding the existing weekly hours of the majority of
staff in post. There were changes, however, in shifts worked, reducing the amount of
1. This does not take into account the increased costs incurred as a result of escalating
labour turnover.
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weekend work for those who continued to be employed on the rota2. That is, instead of
working six out of seven weekends, the typical rota subsequently involved working three
weekends out of four. Many more workers than previously were employed set days from
Monday to Friday. Though management wanted to concentrate staff on this shift, staff in
post were not forced to change from the rota but had the choice of opting for the set days
shift. Apart from the reduction in weekend work, then, staff in post before the introduction of
the bonus were spared the brunt of the changes in shifts and basic hours worked. On the
other hand, it was the new recruits as the bonus was being introduced who experienced the
force of the revised hours and shifts.
As Table 5.1 indicates, new recruits are working significantly fewer hours per week than
their predecessors and this is particularly marked for those employed after the adoption of
the full bonus schemes. Employees who left prior to the introduction of the bonus worked an
average (mean) of 27 hours per week. This compares to the average of 18 hours per week
worked by an employee who started after the bonus was introduced. These figures suggest
that employees recruited after the bonus work only two-thirds of the weekly hours worked by
employees who left before the bonus was introduced. .
2 Importantly, the unions were able to protect the hours and shifts of twelve workers who
had worked a set 5 day shift always over the weekend. These workers had worked at the
hospital for many years and were older female memebers of staff who were either single or
widowed.
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Table 5.1 Hospital A: Average weekly hours worked before and after bonus,
by leavers and starters3
leavers Starters %StarVleft
Before Bonus 25.7 23.0 89.7%
After Bonus 22.8 18.2 80.0%
Total 24A ma 85,8%
The official reduction in hours required by the bonus is 16% at Hospital A and at least 14%
at Hospital B. It is difficult to translate these figures into actual numbers of individual jobs
lost, partly because the reduction is offset by employing more individuals for fewer hours, I
do not have sufficient data to allow me to calculate this figure exactly. However, at Hospital
A, given the existing ratio of numbers of staff in post to WTE numbers, the WTE reduction
entailed an approximate loss of 26 jobs which represents 16% of the estimated total staff in
post for the reference period. However, it must also be highlighted that both hospitals have
not been able to employ enough people to fill the established WTE staffing requirements
considered necessary to carry out the work properly. For the hospitals, this has remained a
serious problem; for the staff in post, it has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it
provides a limited amount of over-time hours available, which boosts take-home pay; on the
other hand, it means that the work is intensified. With the introduction of the bonus, the
intensification is more exaggerated as workers are required to cover more work as part of
3 For a fuller account of the procedure for determining the period in which the bonus was
introduced, the reader is referred back to the discussion on instrumentation and data
analysis (Chapter 4, 'Research Design'). The information collected for the group of leavers
and starters at Hospital A (N=247) relates to a period of 8 months before and 8 months after
the official commencement of the bonus scheme. That is, these persons either started or left
their employment in the months in which the bonus was being negotiated or after the bonus
had been officially introduced. In comparing leavers and starters, the date when the full
bonus officially began is that which is used to distinguish those employed and departed
'before' and 'after' the bonus. The information that was obtained on labour turnover really
only relates to a period in which employment conditions and practices associated with the
efficiency initiative prevailed. Therefore, even though I am able to identify changes in
staffing levels and hours worked by staff over the period considered, it is likely that these
findings underestimate the extent of the changes. Had I been able to collect information
relating to staffing levels and hours worked prior to the period in which the bonus was being
'requested', negotiated, and studied by the MEU, it is likely that the changes would be more
striking.
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their normal work schedule, which is compounded by the fact that there are not enough
people to fill the reduced staffing requirements entailed in the bonus scheme. The effects
on the service provided, as outlined in the previous section, has been highly deleterious.
Ancillary service employment: national trends
Ancillary and domestic ancillary employment trends in Scotland and Great Britain as a
whole confirm the developing employment pattern suggested by the case studiy material.
As Table 5.2 indicates, during the period 1979 to 1986, NHS ancillary services in Great
Britain experienced a loss in WTE numbers of 24.6%. In Scotland, the equivalent loss was
9.8%.
Table 5.2 NHS ancillary employment (WTE): Great Britain, 1979-86
Numbers at % Change Over
lear 30 September Previous Year
1979 211,100
1982 209,700 - 0.7
1984 189,600 - 9.6
1986 159,200 -16.0
Change 1979/1986 -51,900 -24.6
(Source: Hansard Monday 28th March 1988, vol. 130 No. 124, col.325)
The trend in Great Britain of more extensive employment losses than in Scotland, is
because of more tendering exercises have taken place and proportionately more contracts
have gone to private contractors in the south of England . The DHSS collects no statistics
relating to the numbers employed by these private contractors. However, the tendering
process itself, regardless of the eventual outcome, entails a substantial reduction in WTE
numbers.
Taking a closer look at the Scottish scene provides an interesting insight into the changing
employment pattern. Ancillary services have been experiencing losses since 1977. During
the period 1977-1987, there was a 9.4% reduction in WTE numbers, and for the period
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1979-1987, WTE losses amounted to 11.7%. WTE losses for domestic ancillary services
during the period 1979-1987 were 13.5%, and for 1983-1987, 13%.
Table 5.3 NHS ancillary employment by sex: Scotland, 1979-1986.










BASELINE 1979 6838 27499
NUMBER 1986 2553 22131
(Source: Compiled from ISD Scottish Health Statistics 1979-1986/7 Table 9.2(g))
As Table 5.3 indicates, ancillary jobs employing both men and women have been affected
by policies to reduce overall numbers employed. Women are located in jobs where this
trend has had a slightly greater impact. Table 5.4 presents a different picture, however, in
focusing on domestic employment.
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Table 5.4 NHS domestic ancillary employment by sex : Scotland, 1979-1986









Change 1979/1986 -17.0 -2.9
Baseline 1979 259 16775
Number 1935 215 16290
1 Numbers entailed are fairly small - the total in 1986 was 215.
(Source: Compiled from ISD Scottish Health Statistics 1979-1986/7 Table 9.2(g))
Though the actual numbers involved for male employment are fairly small (male employees
only represented 1.5% and 1.3% of all domestic ancillary employees nationally in 1979 and
1986 respectively), in domestic ancillary employment male employees have experienced a
much greater relative loss than their female counterparts. Also, the below-average job loss
experienced by female domestic employees compared to all female ancillary employees is
interesting. The changing pattern of full and part-time employment for ancillary and
domestic staff, provided in Tables 5.5 and .5.6, indicates how this lower relative job loss
affecting female domestic employees has been achieved.
<
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Table 5.5 NHS ancillary employment, full/part-time: Scotland, 1979-1986
Percentage Change Over Previous Year
Year Full-Time Part-Time Chanae
1980 -1.9 +1.5 -0.2
1981 -0.1 +3.2 +1.6
1982 -1.4 +3.2 +0.9
1983 -3.0 +0.8 -1.0
1984 -6.6 +0.3 -3.0
1985 -5.3 +1.0 -1.9
1986 -10.3 +3.1 -1.2
Chanae 1979/1986 -21.6 +12.8 -4.8
Baseline 1979 17573 16764 34337
Number 1986 13780 18904 32664
(Source: Compiled from ISD Scottish Health Statistics 1979-1986/7 Table 9.2(g))
There have been losses in full-time employment positions over the period concerned, in
particular since 1983. In domestic services, the losses have been more pronounced since
1980. At the same time, part-time employment has been steadily increasing for all ancillary
workers, including domestics. In the early 1980's, part-time employment was increasing at a
faster rate than the reduction in full-time positions, and thus the net effect was an increase in
the number of ancillary and domestic jobs. Since 1983, however, increases in the number
of part-time jobs have failed to compensate for the number of full-time jobs lost, and thus the
effect has been an overall reduction in total numbers of ancillary and domestic jobs.
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Table 5.6 Domestic ancillary employment, full/part-time: Scotland, 1979-
1986
Percentage Change Over Previous Year
YEAR FULL-TIME PART-TIME CHANGE
1980 -2.8 +1.9 +0.6
1981 -2.1 +3.6 +2.0
1982 -4.0 +2.8 +1.0
1983 -6.1 +0.4 -1.2
1984 -12.8 +0.4 -2.7
1985 -11.5 +0.8 -1.8
1986 -22.2 +2.3 -1.0
Chanae 1979/1986 -41.8 +11.8 -3.1
Baseline 1979 4752 12282 17034
Number 1985 2768 13737 16505
(Source: Compiled from ISD Scottish Health Statistics 1979-1986/7 Table 9.2(g))
Total ancillary WTE losses during the period 1979-1986 amounted to 9.8%. As Table 5.5
indicates, there has been a smaller percentage loss in actual numbers of jobs, but the loss
is important nonetheless. Domestic services have experienced a 10.4% WTE employment
reduction over this same period. As Table 5.6 illustrates, the actual number of jobs was only
reduced by 3.1%. Thus, since 1979 the employment patterns suggested by domestic
services and ancillary services as a whole, are a substantial reduction in full-time jobs,
which appear to have to been offset by the growing number of part-time jobs. Moreoever,
since 1983 there has been a reduction in overall hours worked. Though domestic services,
until 1986, experienced smaller relative total job losses than ancillary services as a whole,
domestic services experienced a greater relative reduction in overall hours worked. Thus,
there has been a larger relative increase in the numbers of part-timers employed in
domestic services than in other ancillary services.
Changes in public service employment as a whole are generally reflected in the trends
outlined above for ancillary employment in the NHS. The employment statistics compiled by
141
Rubery and Tarling (1989) suggest that between 1978 and 1984, public services
experienced a net loss in female full-time equivalent positions, after a period of rapidly
expanding part-time and full-time employment for women from 1971. Though total public
service employment declined from 1978, Rubery and Tarling suggest that this loss was only
marginal compared to the losses sustained by manufacturing and other industries. The
relative stability of public service employment, then, is considered to be beneficial; it
safeguards employment. Nonetheless, women accounted for 85% of the job losses
incurred in the public sector which they argue could 'herald the beginning of a major loss for
women in the public sector as a result of the government's policy of privatisation' (1989:
116).
The pattern of full-time job losses and reliance on part-time employment in public services
associated with the privatisation agenda is a trend which weakens security of employment.
This process of 'employment casualisation', as it is referred to, is generally described and
explained as a problem of female employment. Thus Coyle argues
'As in other labour-intensive work, women get these jobs because they can
be paid lower wages than men...This means that cleaners' pay rates are
being set at a special rate (effectively a woman's rate) and this is making the
application of the Equal Pay Act even more difficult than it is already' (1986:
224-225).
Health service domestic ancillary employment is predominantly, though not exclusively,
carried out by women. Coyle's argument, however, refers not just to health service cleaning
but to cleaning jobs generally. In this context in particular, the form of explanation adopted
is somewhat weak, given that 25% of cleaners (industry-wide) are male. Moreover, though
full-time male cleaners on average work more hours and have higher earnings than female
full-time cleaners, relative to other manual employees, male cleaners earn only 76.9% of the
average male wage while female cleaners earn 91.7% of the average female wage (NES
1984). (Incidentally, contracting-out policies have had a significant impact on local authority
street cleansing and refuse collection services which largely employ male workers.)
(
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It is true that the initial impact of privatisation policies has not been evenly distributed in
terms of gender. Women are located in jobs where privatisation has had a far heavier toll.
At the same time, it is important to further understandings of the differential impact of these
policies and the patterning of social inequality more generally, with categories that fully and
coherently encompass the diverse range of social practices and experiences.
Explanations of employment inequalities which use gender as an unspecified theoretical
category are highly problematic. Divisions within the female and male labour forces need to
be addressed, as they represent important processes which structure employment
experiences. That is, 'women' and 'men' do not represent two mutually exclusive groups in
which mem bers within each group are equally placed. Thus, it is not sufficient to describe
or explain the impact of privatisation policies on 'women' as an undifferentiated,
homogeneous group; as if 'sexual divisions' fully encompass, or are necessarily the
primary factors determining, processes structuring employment practices and inequalities.
The gendered division of labour is clearly a powerful construct, but is insufficient in terms of
providing an inclusive explanation of the range of domestic life and employment
experiences evidenced by women and men.
The evidence which has accumulated regarding tendering exercises and measures aimed
at increasing 'efficiency' in domestic ancillary services clearly suggests that the
circumstances of the jobs concerned have deteriorated (NUPE 1985, 1986; Coyle 1986;
Radical Health Statistics Group 1987; Hunt 1987; Cousins 1988). This is also borne out by
my own study. There is, however, an important distinction which must be drawn between
the circumstances of the job and those of the incumbents. In many studies, it appears to be
assumed that the workforce is a constant, while the circumstances of the job change (cf.
Coyle 1986; Cousins 1988) - in spite of increasing evidence which suggests that labour
turnover is dramatically increasing as a result of the restructuring of ancillary employment.
As Cousins notes in her study of contracting-out NHS ancillary services,
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'Workers who were previously predisposed to accept low wages when the
iob offered security of employment, accommodation and non-pecuniary
benefits such as a contribution to patient care, were no longer willing to
accept the new terms and conditions' (1988: 224).
Cousins goes on to suggest that gender divisions explain the increasingly peripheral status
of ancillary workers under privatisation. Thus, it is argued that contracting out
'has reinforced pre-existing gender relations by specifying work, which is
seen to be appropriate for women, as even more low waged, insecure and
dispensible' (1988:225).
While it is undoubtedly the case that gender divisions persist under privatisation, the form of
explanation adopted dislocates gender relations from more general social processes
(Siltanen, forthcoming). Despite recognising that the problem of labour recruitment and
retention exists, as some workers (including many female workers) are not prepared to
accept the terms and conditions of employment available in domestic ancillary work as a
result of the changes brought about by contracting out the service, Cousins persists in
arguing that gender accounts for the 'emerging segmentation of the labour force'. This is an
unsatisfactory explanation inasmuch as it provides an inadequate description and
explanation of the emerging forms of labour force differentiation which occur within, and not
just across, gender distinctions.
The increasing significance of divisions within the female labour force is indicated by
evidence from Rubery and Tarling's (1989: 121) study of women's employment in Britain
during the period 1971-1985/6. Their study points to divisions between full-time and part-
time workers, divisions between workers in union-regulated and unregulated employment,
and divisions between adult and young workers. The deterioration in youth to adult pay is
argued to be of particular significance: between 1979 and 1985/6, girls' (under 18) non-
manual and manual average earnings declined by 6.5 and 7 per cent compared to females
over 18 (1989: 120). Reductions in female full-time wages have largely been borne by
young workers, a trend, it is argued, which will be exacerbated by the 1986 Wages Act
which removes people under 21 from the scope of wages councils' legal minimum wage
regulations.
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It is true that the majority of ancillary workers are women, reflecting an aggregate pattern of
gendered employment distributions. As Siltanen (forthcoming) argues, however, the
aggregate pattern of gender inequaltiy exists within a broader schema of social organisation
and inequality that also stratifies women's employment. Though the domestic ancillary
workforce examined in this study is predominantly female, gender divisions fail to fully
explain the changing distribution of domestic ancillary jobs observed. The transformation in
the domestic ancillary workforce profile, which has resulted from the restructuring of
domestic ancillary employment brought about by the efficiency initiatives, is striking. But the
findings of the research suggest that rather than gender processes, the relations between
household circumstances and employment provide a clearer understanding of the way in
which employment is structured.
The difficulties in recruiting and retaining workers was an important theme in the present
study. The domestic managers indicated that approximately 50-60% of the people
presenting themselves for job interviews were
'unsuitable - unemployable...We contacted the job centre about the type of
people they were referring to us - untidy and dirty. Hospital cleaning is an
important job and an indicator of how well people will clean and how
important cleanliness is to them is reflected in their presentation and
personal hygiene' (Domestic Manager Hospital A).
The actual rate of turnover was felt to be high, particularly for certain shifts and for 'relief
workers'. Relief workers are those who have not worked long enough to be placed
permanently in a particular ward or area of the hospital, and whose place of work changes
constantly. The introduction of new cleaning frequencies and work schedules entails
phasing out the tradition of allocating domestics their 'own ward', as workers are required to
be more 'flexible' and cover any area of the hospital where they may be needed. In effect,
an increasing proportion of the workforce remain 'relief workers', an ominous prospect for
problems of staff retention.
The 'problem' turnover rates were those that occurred in the first 4 weeks of employment. If
a worker stayed for 3 months, then the liklihood of her/him staying for at least 6 months, if not
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much longer, was felt to be reasonable in terms of staff turnover. The shift that was identified
as the most problematic was the evening shift (generally from 5.00 to 8.30 pm, with some
variation at either end); this shift, largely staffed by married women with young children, was
particularly difficult to fill.
Moreover, the location of the hospitals was regarded as an increasingly important factor
contributing to the difficulty in recruiting staff, particularly for the part-time shifts which, as a
result of the measures to effect 'efficiency savings', were fast becoming the only source of
domestic employment. The 'catchment' areas of the hospitals were not considered to be
optimal for the kinds of workers who would be looking for domestic work, or alternatively
whom management considered to be appropriate for the job. The hospitals were located in
areas largely inhabited by higher-income families in owner-occupied housing or by students
and young people in privately rented accomodation. Traditionally, the majority of the staff
had travelled from outlying council estate areas (within a 15 mile radius) by public transport.
Hence, the disadvantages of working part-time, especially less than 20 hours per week,
often outweighed the advantages, given the time spent travelling and the travel costs in
relation to wages obtained. This was particularly the case for married women with children,
where both time away from home and the relative amount of money gained through part-
time employment are carefully balanced.
At Hospital A (where I obtained information relating to labour turnover over a period of
almost 16 months), 128 staff left. This may be compared to an average of 143 staff in post
over the same period. These figures, summarised in Table 5.7, relate to the year in which
the bonus was introduced. The managers suggested that though they could not quantify the
turnover rates, they did perceive the problem to be increasing. This degree of labour
turnover has, however, facilitated the introduction of the bonus and other efficiency
exercises - both now and in the past. Redundancies are unnecessary because leavers are
simply not replaced.
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Table 5.7 Hospital A: Labour turnover
(Week ending 6/4/86 - 31/5/87)
Mean SIP Total Total
Per Week Lefl Slad % Start/Left
Individual SIP 1 143 128 119 93.0
WTE 2 1QZ Z2 65
1 SIP Staff in post
2 WTE Whole Time Equivalents
As Table 5.7 indicates, only 93% of leavers were replaced. The WTE figures are revealing
on this point too, indicating that even fewer work hours are being replaced. Overall, there
has been a loss of almost 20% of total hours worked in this period. Of the leavers, 42% had
been employed for less than eleven months (representing 38% of the average numbers of
staff in post during the period.) The mean length of service of these leavers was 12.5
weeks, ranging from 1-42 weeks. In contrast, the average length of service for all staff in
post at the time of the study was six years. At Hospital B, I did not have access to as much
data, but I was able to ascertain that there were 370 new recruits during the year in which
the bonus was introduced. This compares to an estimated average of 449 staff in post over
the 12 month period. Given that the hospital was reducing the number of people employed
over this period, the number of leavers was undoubtedly greater than 370. Thus the two
hospitals would appear to have similar labour turnover profiles.
Reshaping the Workforce Profile
Though I am unable to provide an exact measurement of the changing rates of labour
turnover in my study, it does appear that they are increasing. A related but perhaps more
critical issue, however, and one which has not been adequately addressed in other studies
concerning the impact of privatisation on employment, relates to the repercussions of the
process in which jobs are restructured on the profile of the workforce itself. That is, rather
than assuming that the impact of the alterations to employment is uniformly encountered by
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'the female workforce', the pattern of divisions within the female workforce and the
differential effect of employment changes on workers is considered to be a highly salient
issue. In considering the effects of the changing full- and part-time employment
opportunities on the profile of the domestic workforce, it is important to recognise that the
intensification of the work process, together with the downward pressure on wages effected
by the reduction in hours worked, is reflected in a profile of domestic workers which has
changed significantly.
For the combined domestic ancillary workforce (N=204), I was able to collect information
relating to sex, age, age at recruitment in current job, length of service, marital status, basic
weekly hours, shift worked, and residence locality. In exploring the relationship between the
changing employment structure and profile of the workforce, a comparison was made of the
workers employed before and after the period in which the bonus was introduced4. As was
noted in Chapter 4 regarding the research design, because the domestic ancillary workforce
at each of the two hospitals in the study are very similar, and because the effects of the
bonus have had a similar impact on the working conditions and general workforce profile, I
have for the most part presented the analysis as it pertains to the total combined domestic
ancillary workforce. It is important, however, to consider the differences between the
workforces where they exist because the aggregate patterns observed for the combined
workforce may distort actual social practices and experiences, by obscuring salient
relationships or, alternatively, creating associations which are without basis. This is indeed
4 For a fuller account of the procedure for determining the period in which the bonus was
introduced, the reader is referred back to the discussion on instrumentation and data
analysis (Chapter 4, 'Research Design). The information obtained for the main sample of
workers in domestic employment at the time of the study (N=204) permits an appropriate
distinction of employment practices 'before' and 'after' the bonus because I have access to
relevant information was obtained for the entire sample population of employees. Thus,
workers categorised as employed 'before the bonus' are those who were employed before
the start of the calendar year in which the bonus was introduced, and workers categorised
as employed 'after the bonus' are those who were employed in the calendar year that the
bonus was actually introduced (ie. in the months before, in addition to those after, the official
date of the commencement of the bonus). In other words, those categorised as employed
'after the bonus' were employed over an 18-month period before and including the time of
the study. Those employed 'before the bonus' were employed prior to 18 months before the
time of the study.
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the case when the issue of gender divisions within the domestic ancillary workforce is
addressed. Thus, before proceeding with a discussion on the effects of the efficiency
initiatives on the profile of the domestic ancillary workforce population, I will deal with the
issue of gender divisions in some detail. The issue of gendered employment practices is
important both because the two hospitals contrasted sharply regarding male employment,
and because this issue is the substance of my investigation.
Gender divisions within domestic ancillary employment
Domestic ancillary workers are almost exclusively female. In 1986, the year before the
study, only 1.3% of the domestic ancillary workforce in Scotland were male. Eight of the 204
workers in the current study were male, representing 3.9% of the combined domestic
ancillary workforce. While this figure is very small, the proportion of males in this study is
bigger than that evidenced for the national domestic ancillary workforce. Also, there was a
slight, but not statistically significant, increase in the proportion of males recruited after the
bonus (4 of 75, or 5.3%) compared to those recruited before (4 of 129, or 3.1%).
In comparing the full- and part-time employment of male and female workers before and
after the bonus for the combined domestic ancillary workforce, it would appear that the trend
toward employing part-timers is an entirely female rather than male phenomenon. As will
become apparent, however, it is incorrect to simply assume that the differences in
employment patterns observed for the domestic ancillary workforce accurately reflects
processes of gender differentiation in employment practices. Table 5.8 below shows the
distribution of full- and part-time hours by sex before and after the bonus for the combined
domestic ancillary workforce. Due to the very small number of male cases, I am not able to
use either Chi as a measure of significance or Fisher's Exact test in directly comparing
female and male recruitment patterns. It would appear to be the case, however, that the
pattern of recruitment into full- and part-time jobs for female and male employees, is quite
different.
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Table 5.8 Hours worked by sex before and afterbonus
Before Bonus After Bonus
Female Male Female Male
Hours No.(%) No.(%) No.f%) No.(%)
35+ 43(34) 3(75) 5(7) 3(75)
<=20 82(60) K25) 66f93) 1(25)
Total 125(100) 4(100) 71(100) 4(100)
The change in full- and part-time employment for women and men before and after the
bonus can, however, be indirectly compared. As Table 5.9 indicates, the ratio of female
part-timers to full-timers employed before the bonus was 2:1, but after the bonus the ratio
was 13:1, an increase that was significant and moderately strong. On the other hand, the
ratio of males employed full- and part-time before and after the bonus did not change. Only
one of the four (25%) male workers recruited before and after the bonus was employed part-
time.
Table 5.9 Hours worked before and after bonus by sex
Female5 Male6
Before Bonus After Bonus Before Bonus After Bonus
Hours No.(%) No.(%) N<2i%) Nq,(%)
35+ 43(34) 5(7) 3(75) 3(75)
<22 82(66) 66(92) 1X25) 1(25)
Total 125(100) 71(100) 4(100) 4(100)
While ostensibly male employees appear to have a different and more privileged
experience than female employees regarding the full-time basic weekly hours they have
managed to secure, the type of shift worked by these male recruits is quite different - much
less desirable - than that worked by female full-timers. Moreover, significant differences
5 Chi 18.33, p<0.001, Phi=0.31
6 Fisher's Exact=0.57 - not statistically significant.
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emerged between the two hospitals regarding the employment of male workers, which
suggests that gender divisions at the individual level - discriminatory practices against the
female workers employed - are not really evident. First, concerning the type of shift worked,
all of the male full-timers worked a split-shift from 7:00 am to 12 noon and again from 5:00 to
8:00 pm; none of the female full-timers employed after the bonus worked a split-shift, and
only one of the female full-timers employed before the bonus worked a split-shift. I
interviewed five of the six male full-timers and the female full-timer working the split-shift.
The split-shift was strongly disliked by all because it entailed both starting the working day
very early and not completely finishing until the late evening; it also doubled the cost of
transportation to and from work (bus fares) if employees went home between shifts. It was,
however, the only form of full-time employment that was open to them. Second, and more
important, the two hospitals had very different patterns of male employment. At Hospital A,
only 2 of 142 employees were male; males constituted only 1.4% of the entire workforce at
this hospital. This figure is very close to that observed for domestic ancillary employment
nationally. At Hospital B, however, 6 of the 62 workers employed in the unit (10%) were
males, a considerably larger proportion than that observed at the national level.
Table 5.10 Sex by employment location7





As Table 5.10 illustrates, the difference between the two hospitals regarding the number of
males employed is significant. Furthermore, the difference between the two hospitals
regarding the distribution of full-and part-time hours for male employees is both signficant
and substantial, as indicated in Table 5.11.
7 Chi 7.82, p<0.01, Phi=0.20 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi)
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Table 5.11 Hours worked by employment location for male recruits8





At Hospital A, then, both of the male workers (one recruited before and one after the bonus)
were employed part-time, whereas all the male workers considered at Hospital B (3
recruited before and 3 after the bonus) were employed full-time. While the number of males
employed at Hospital A was very small, they were not more favourably treated than female
workers. Indeed, their marital status, age and time of employment, rather than gender,
better explains their working hours obtained. Most of the workers over 55 years in this study
were employed part-time; the male recruited before the bonus was 63 years of age at the
time of the study. The male recruited after the bonus was previously married, aged 30 years
and, like all the other (female) recruits after the bonus who were single or previously married
and aged 26-30 years, was employed part-time.
At Hospital B, a much larger proportion of the domestic workforce studied was male (10%),
and all of the males recruited, both before and after the bonus, were employed full-time.
Table 5.12, which compares hours worked by sex at Hospital B, indicates that the higher
level of male to female full-time employment is significant, with the relationship between
hours worked and sex being moderately strong.
8 Fisher's Exact=0.036, Phi=0.83
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This interpretation is only partially correct, however, and is misleading in that it does not go
far enough. Again, when the pattern of employment is further dissaggregated and analysed
not simply in terms of gender differences, but in terms of marital status and age, for example,
a more complex social arrangement is evidenced. Table 5.13 provides quite a different
picture of the distribution of full-and part-time employment between female and male recruits
than that suggested by Table 5.12.
Table 5.13 Hours worked by sex and by marital status at Hospital B
Single10 Previously Married11 Married 12
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Hours No. No. No. No. No. No.
35+ 5 4 2 1 10 1
<30 2 0 4 0 33 0
Total 7 4 6 1 43 1
The above table indicates that there is no significant relationship between gender and hours
worked for single, previously married and married recruits respectively. The disaggregation
of data with such small numbers poses difficulties in establishing relationships with
9 Chi 6.42, p<0.01, Phi=0.4 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi)
10 Fisher's Exact=0.38 - not statistically signficant, Phi=0.02
11 Fisher's Exact=0.43 - not statistically significant, Phi=0.06
12 Could not perform statistical test of significance, Phi =0.00
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statistical significance. Even so, in the pattern observed for single employees, for example,
it may be argued that gender is of no particular signficance in determining the full- and part-
time hours worked. This is further substantiated by the fact that of the two single recruits
working part-time, one was 58 years old and, as indicated above, older workers in this study
predominantly work part-time. Age, rather than gender, then, would appear to be a more
accurate indicator of employment arrangements for the single recruits; it is also an
important factor determining the hours worked by previously married and married recruits.
The mean (and median) age of married and previously married female full-time workers was
44 and 48 years respectively. In contrast, the age of part-time workers was spread over a
larger range than full-timers, but can be divided into two groups of younger and older
workers. Thus, of the previously married part-time workers, one was aged 63 years and the
mean age of the other three was 40 years. Of the married part-time recruits, the mean age
of workers aged under 50 years was 35 years and the mean age of those aged 50 and over
was 55 years. As Table 5.14 shows, for ever-married female workers, full-timers are
predominantly in their 40's, while part-timers are predominantly either under 40 years of age
or 50 years and over. The relationship between age and hours worked for these workers is
significant and moderately strong.
Table 5.14 Hours worked by age for ever-married female workers at Hospital
A13
40-49 Other Total
Hours No.(%) No.(%) No.(%)
Full-Time 8(62) 5(38) 13(100)
Part-Time 10(29) 25(71) 35(100)
The relationship between age and hours worked evidenced here underlines the relations
between social circumstances and employment; in particular, the way in which employment
is structured by opportunity and need. In the absence of more detailed information for the
Chi 4.37, p<0.05, Phi=0.3 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi)
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domestic ancillary workforce, age and marital status serve as 'proxy' measures of domestic
responsibilities. As other, large-scale studies of women's employment have shown (Rimmer
and Popay 1981; Joshi 1984; Martin and Roberts 1984), age and marital status are strong
indicators of employment activity rates, as they reflect other life cycle factors. But factors
such as the presence of dependent children, the age of the youngest child, generation
cohort, presence of a spouse, income of spouse, and so on are much more closely
associated with employment activity rates for ever-married women than is age. The pattern
of employment observed for the ever-married female workers considered here is similar to
that found in the larger surveys of women's employment. For example, the Women and
Employment Survey (Martin and Roberts 1984:17) found that the proportion of part-time
workers increased with age among the younger age groups, peaking among women in their
early thirties who were most likely to be caring for young children. The mid-thirties
represented a transition period in which the proportion of women working part-time
decreased with age until they reached their late forties.
The main point to be drawn from this examination of apparent gender differences within
domestic ancillary employment is that as a theoretical construct, 'gender or sexual division'
does not have meaning across all areas of social experience. Rather, as Siltanen (1986)
argues, gender division is a special case of a more general structuring of employment in
relation to domestic responsibilities. Domestic circumstances are important in structuring
employment for women and men, though the relationship is perhaps more complex for
women. This argument will be more fully developed in the research presented below.
Domestic ancillary workers before and after the bonus
The age profile of cleaners (both in the NHS and those employed in private industries and
services) indicates that this group has historically been older than the national comparator
age group generally used, that is, manual unskilled workers in all industries and services;
this was established by the NBPI in 1971. A more recent study of cleaners in the civil
service conducted by the Low Pay Unit (1981), indicated that the great majority of cleaners
were part-time workers between the ages of thirty-five and fifty-nine, and married with family
responsibilities; young workers were found to be a rarity. In fact, Dex (1984) suggests that
young women and childless women rarely experience part-time work at all; that part-time
work in Britain is much more prevalent among women who have had children. (Unlike in
the U.S or Canada, there have been relatively few young workers - male or female - working
part-time in Britain. This pattern is, however, changing and is reflected in the pattern of
recruitment of domestic ancillary employees presented here.)
Though NHS domestics have typically worked longer hours than other cleaners, the
efficiency exericises have resulted in shorter hours worked by those recruited after the
bonus. This applies for both 'leavers' and 'starters' (N=247; examined in Tables 5.1 and
5.7) and for the combined domestic ancillary workforce in post (N=204) at the time of the
study14. The reduction in hours worked by new recruits was found to be highly significant,
particularly in light of the trend away from employing full-timers (defined as working 35
hours per week or more) to employing workers for less than 25 hours per week (p.<0.001).
Table 5.15 Hours worked before and after Bonus15
Before Bonus After Bonus Total
JdSMS N0.(%) NQ,(%)
35+ 47(36%) 8(11%) 55
<25 49(38%) 43(57%) 22
Total 96(74%) 51(68%) 147
As Table 5.15 indicates, before the bonus was introduced 36% of employees worked full-
time; in contrast, only 11% of those employed after the bonus worked full-time. The
reduction in numbers employed full-time after the bonus is counteracted by the employment
14 There are no significant gender distinctions for the results reported in this section that
are not already fully discussed in the section 'Gender divisions within domestic ancillary
employment.
15 Chi 15.75, p.<0.001, Phi =0.33
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of proportionately more workers for less than 25 hours per week. After the bonus, 57% of
recruits worked less than 25 hours per week, compared to 38% of recruits before the bonus.
It might be thought that the significant increase in numbers employed part-time translates to
an equivalent increase in the numbers of married women employed. This, however, is not
the case. As Table 5.16 shows, for those recruited before the bonus, the relationship
between marital status and hours worked (full- or part-time) was significant (p<.0.001),
though the relationship was only moderate (Phi 0.32) - a notable proportion of married
employees worked full-time (26%) and an even larger proportion of single employees (40%)
worked part-time before the bonus. For those recruited after the bonus, however, the
relationship between marital status and hours worked is no longer significant.
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Table 5.16 Marital status16 by hours worked before and after bonus










After the bonus was introduced, 33% of those who worked 30 hours per week or less were
single/previously married whereas before the bonus, these workers comprised only 12% of
employees who worked 30 hours per week or less. The change in hours worked by single
recruits (as opposed to previously married or married recruits) after the bonus compared to
before is more dramatic, however, than these figures suggest. While the majority (56%) of
married recruits after the bonus continue to work 30 hours per week or less, this proportion
is relatively unchanged from that existing before the bonus (53%). In focusing on single
workers alone, on the other hand, it is clear that there has been a marked reversal in the
pattern of full and part-time employment undertaken by single recruits. Only 40% (8 of 19) of
single employees recruited before the bonus worked part-time, compared to 90% (17 of 19)
of single employees recruited after the bonus. Not only do the vast majority of single
16 The information on marital status that was available for the entire sample distinguished
between married, single and the divorced or widowed (the latter two groups I refer to as
'previously married'). This information does not, however, distinguish those who may be
single parents who have never married or those individuals who are co-habiting. In this and
other tables, I have combined the 'previously married' (n=26) with the 'single'; the
distribution of shifts and hours worked by the previously married, though somewhat different
to that of single workers, corresponds more closely to these workers than to married
workers. As might be expected, the majority of 'single' workers are under 30 and the
majority of 'previously married' workers are older. Where differences between single and
previously married workers occur these are reported.
17 Chi 12.81, p<0.001, Phi 0.32
18 Chi 0.46, p>0.05 - not statistically significant (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi).
18 No shift entailed working between 30 and 35 basic weekly hours. Though the NHS
definition of full-time is 40 hours per week for domestic ancillary workers, for this study,
unless otherwise indicated, I have defined full-time as 35 hours per week or more, and part-
time as 30 hours per week or less.
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workers recruited after the bonus work part-time, the proportion of single workers (compared
to married or previously married) employed after the bonus (25%, or 19 of 75) is almost
double that existing before the bonus (15%, or 19 of 129).
There has, however, been another more striking change in the profile of domestic recruits.
As Figure 5.1 illustrates, there has been a noticeable downward shift in the age at which
workers are recruited after, compared to before, the bonus. Before the bonus, the
recruitment age of 50% of the workers was 38 years and under; after the bonus, the
recruitment age of 50% of the workers was 28 years and under. Perhaps more remarkable
is the fact that before the bonus the recruitment age of 25% of the workers was 29 years and
under; the equivalent recruitment age after the bonus was 21 years and under. None of the
workers employed before the bonus were recruited at age 17 years whereas after the
bonus, though the number is very small, 5% of recruits were aged 17 years. At the other
end of the age spectrum, 6% of recruits before the bonus were aged 56-60; after the bonus,
there were only 2% of recruits in this age group.
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Figure 5.1 Age at recruitment In current job before and after bonus
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Examining the age profile of recruits from a slightly different perspective, Figure 5.2 provides
an interesting illustration of the distribution of recruits in different age groups before and
after the bonus. The distribution of recruits before the bonus was fairly evenly spread across
all age bands, though recruitment was highest for those aged 36-45 years and lowest for
those aged under 20 or over 55 years. In contrast, after the bonus, the distribution of recruits
was skewed toward the 20-30 age band, especially those aged 20-25 years20. The majority
20 For obvious reasons, age at recruitment rather than current age is used to consider the
changing age profile of the domestic workforce. Having analysed the profile of those
'leavers' for whom I had information relating to age and length of service, the higher ratio of
younger recruits employed after the bonus (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) cannot be attributed to
higher labour turnover for younger workers. The mean age of those who left during the
period in which the study was being conducted (2 months) was 30 years. Half of these
leavers (9) were 'army wives' (mean age 28 years), and the reason they were leaving was
because their husbands were being posted eleswhere. Not only were there relatively more
leavers during this time, compared to other times of the year, but moreover, these 'army
wives' were somewhat younger than the other leavers. The mean age of the remaining 9
leavers, excluding the 'army wives', was 32 years (range 19-47 years, with 4 of the 9 in their
early-tomid thirties). While the leavers in this particular two month period are not
necessarily representative (because of the presence of so many army wives), as the




of recruits after the bonus (57%) were located in the 17-30 age band. Before the bonus, the
largest proportion of recruits (74%) were over 30 years of age. Thus the proportion of
recruits aged 30 and under more than doubled, from 26% to 57% of recruits, while the
recruitment of workers aged over 30 years fell by almost one-half. There was only one age
band, that of recruits aged 31-36, which was relatively unchanged after compared to before
the bonus, with 14% of recruits before and 16% after the bonus aged 31-36 years. Thus it
appears that the restructuring of domestic work has not only altered the hours worked by
married and single or previously married recruits, but has also altered the age profile of the
domestic workforce, as evidenced by the sharp increase in the proportion of younger
workers aged 17-30 and the drop in the recruitment of older workers aged over 35 years.
The change in the distribution of recruits aged 30 years and under, compared to those aged
over 30 years before and after the bonus is, in fact, significant and, as Table 5.17 shows,
moderately strong.
workers considered in the analysis of trends before and after the bonus is, I would argue,
representative. From my information, then, workers aged 30 years and under do not have a
higher rate of labour turnover than older workers. If anything, the highest rate of labour
turnover is for workers in their early thirties, many of whom were employed on the evening
shift which, as identified by management, was the most difficult to fill, and where the greatest
amount of labour turnover occured. I have also compared the length of service of younger
and older recruits for the 18-month period after the bonus was introduced; these findings
indicate that the mean length of service of younger workers, particularly those 25 years and
under, is noticeably longer than that of older workers. The mean length of service of recruits
aged 30 years and under (n=45) is 7.1 months while that for workers aged over 30 (ri=30) is
5.8 months. Recruits aged 25 and under (n=29) have a mean length of service of 7.5
months which compares that of 6 months for workers aged 26-30 (n=16). These figures
would suggest, then, that younger workers are no more likely to leave their job sooner than
older workers.
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Table 5.17 Age at recruitment In current job before and after bonus21
Before Bonus After Bonus




As Table 5.18 indicates, the decrease in the proportion of recruits aged 41-50 years after the
bonus, compared to the increase in recruits aged 30 years and unde, is more substantial
than the change observed in Table 5.17 which compared the younger age band and all
workers aged over 30 years.
Table 5.18 Age at recruitment before and after bonus22
Before Bonus After Bonus Total
Age Group No.(%) Nq.(%)
17-30 34(26%) 37(29%) 71
58(45%) Z18%) 65_
Total 92(71%)23 44(37%)24 136
Considering the change in weekly hours worked by different age bands, Table 5.18 shows
that for the younger age band, there was a significant decrease in the recruitment of full-time
workers (defined as working 35 hours per week or more) and an increase in the recruitment
of part-time workers (working 30 hours per week or less) after the bonus. This is not the
case for the older age band (36-50 year-olds), where the change in numbers employed full-
and part-time before and after the bonus was not found to be statistically significant.
21 Chi 19.4, p.<0.001, Phi =0.32
22 Chi 26.5, p <0.001, Phi =0.44.
23 Per cent of total sample population employed before bonus (n=129)
24 Per cent of total sample population employed after bonus (n=75)
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Table 5.19 Weekly hours worked by age group before and after bonus
Age Group Age Group
17-30 36-50
Before Bonus After Bonus Before Bonus After Bonus
Hours No.f%) No.(%) No.f%) No.(%)
35+ 15(44%) 4(9%) 21(36%) 3(21%)
<30 19(56%1 39(91%) 37(64%) 11(79%
Total 34(100%) 43(100%)25 58(100%) 14(100%)26
30+ 22(65%) 15(35%) 41(71%) 6(43%)
<30 12(35%) 28(65%) 17(29%) 8(57%)
Total 34(100%) 43(100%)27 58(100%) 14(100%)28
For both age bands, however, there was a significant decrease in the recruitment of
employees working 30 or more hours per week after the bonus, and a corresponding
increase in the recruitment of employees working less than 30 hours per week. Ttie impact
of the efficiency measures on employment terms and conditions appears to have
discouraged potential employees aged between 36 and 50 years from engaging in
domestic employment. For the small number in this age group who did take up domestic
employment, a much larger relative proportion worked less than 30 hours per week after the
bonus (57%), than before the bonus (29%). The efficiency measures have also resulted in
more younger workers being recruited and have had a striking impact on the hours worked
by the younger age band (17-30 year olds). In contrast to employees recruited before the
bonus, where 44% worked 35 hours or more per week, very few new recruits in this age
group (only 9%) were employed full-time. Similarly, only 35% of those in this age group
25 Chi 6.76, p.<0.001, Phi =0.4 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi).
26 Chi 1.10, p.>0.05 - not statistically significant (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi).
27 Chi 6.76, p.<0.01, Phi =0.3
28 Chi 3.84, p.<0.05, Phi =0.23 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi).
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employed before the bonus worked less than 30 hours whereas 65% of those employed
after the bonus worked fewer than 30 hours per week.
The pattern of recruiting proportionately more younger workers can be understood in terms
of the differences in relation to household maintenance of these recruits compared to older
single and married recruits. Information obtained from the interviews affords a better insight
into the social circumstances of these workers. For example, the accommodation
arrangements of workers 30 years and under, compared to workers over 30 years of age,
may be contrasted. Of the interview respondents aged 30 years and under, 50% (15 of 30)
were non-householder; that is, nearly half of these respondents were lodgers or boarders,
the majority with relatives, though two lived in the staff residencies at the hospital (which
provided subsidised accommodation). The large majority of these non-householders were
single: 87% (13 of 15) of the single respondents in this age range, compared to 14% (2 of
14) of married respondents were non-householders. There was only one previously
married respondent in this age bracket and this person was a non-householder. Thus, only
13% (2 of 15) of the single respondents in this age group were householders (both of whom
rented their accommodation). As Table 5.20 indicates, the housing responsibilities of the
interview respondents who were over 30 years of age is very different from that found for the
younger age group. This difference is both significant and substantial (p<0.001, Phi=0.6).
Table 5.20 Age of Interview respondents by housing responsibilities29
Age Householder Non-Householder Total
<30 15 15 30
23Q 45 1 46
Total 50 16 76
Only one of the respondents interviewed in the older age group (n=47) was a non-
householder, and this person was single. Almost the entire sample of respondents aged
29 Chi 30.0, p<0.001, Phi=0.63 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi). There was 1 missing
case.
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over 30 years, who were predominantly married (77%, or 36 of 47) or previously married
(19%, or 9 of 47), were householders: 26% (12 of 46) owned their own homes, but the
majority (74%, or 34 of 46) lived in rented housing. Furthermore, 26% (12 of 47) of these
respondents received 'dig money' from a boarder/logder who was a relative, usually a
son/son-in-law and/or daughter/daughter-in-law.
The relationship between marital status and housing responsibilities was found to be
stronger still30. Of the sample of single interview respondents (n=17), only 29% (5) were
householders, while 71% (12) were non-householders. On the other hand, of the sample of
married/previously married interview respondents (n=58), only 5% (3) were non-
householders while the vast majority, (95%, or 55 of 58), were householders. It is clear,
then, that the pattern of recruitment of younger and single workers into the part-time hours
available for domestic employment and the diminishing proportion of older workers
recruited reflects salient aspects of household maintenance responsibilities. Setting aside,
for the moment, the issue of the desirability of young single workers continuing to live at
home and remaining partially dependent on their parents, or the workers' aspirations toward
a more independent living situation, these respondents were not burdened with the
immediate financial pressures to independently (or even jointly) maintain a household.
Using the distinction between full-wage and component-wage jobs outlined by Siltanen
(1986), it is suggested that the changing pattern of recruitment in domestic ancillary work
evidenced in this study can be explained in terms of the changing job-type and household
maintenance responsibilities of recruits. Domestic ancillary employment has essentially
always provided what are best described as 'component-wage jobs', which do not enable
the incumbent to be independently financially responsible for the maintainance of a
household (1986: 110). But, as a result of the changing employment opportunities, the
component-wage jobs now available to new recruits in domestic employment are drawing a
30 Chi 42.1, p<0.001, Phi=0.75
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larger proportion of younger workers with considerably fewer financial responsibilities, and
a smaller proportion of workers with fuller finanacial responsibilities.
The structuring of employment in terms of the social circumstances of incumbents, as
reflected in household maintenance responsibilities, is further evidenced in the recruitment
pattern of workers aged over 35 years. There has been no significant change in the ratio of
married and single/previously married respondents before and after the bonus, when
comparing workers aged 30 years and under and those over 30 years (Table 5.21). At the
same time, the increase in the proportion of younger workers (ages 17-30) after the bonus
is significant (and moderately strong) for married and single/previously married workers
alike (Table 5.22). But a closer examination of recruits aged over 35 years, and particularly
those over 50 years, reveals a different pattern.
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31 Chi 0.00, p.>0.99, -not statistically significant
32 Chi 0.07, p>0.80, not statistically signficant
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Table 5.22 Age at recruitment by marital status before and after bonus
Single/Previously Married33 Married34
Before Bonus After Bonus Before Bonus After Bonus
Age Group No/%) No(%) No(%) No(%)
17-30 13(35) 18(67) 20(22) 24(50)
31 + 24(65) CO CO CO 72(78) 24150)
Total 37(100) 27(100) 92(100) 48(100)
Table 5.23 Marital status before and after bonus by recruitment age group
Age Group35 Age Group36
36-50 51 +
Before Bonus After Bonus BeforeE Bonus After Bonus
Marital Status No. (%) No.(%) No.(%) No.(%)
Married 44(76%) 13(93%) 13(72%) 1(17%)
Single/PM 14(24%) 1(7%) 5(28%) 5(83%)
Total 58(100%) 14(100%) 18(100%) 6(100%)
Though the recruitment of workers aged over 35 years after the bonus declined for all
workers (married , single and previously married), as Table 5.23 indicates, there was a
larger (but not statistically significant) drop in the proportion of single/previously married
recruits aged 36-50 years, compared to married recruits. After the bonus there was only 1
previously married respondent employed in this age band, with married workers making up
an even larger proportion after the bonus (93%) than before (76%). In contrast, for recruits
aged over 50 years, there was a significant and substantial increase in the proportion of
33 Chi 9.44, p<0.01, Phi=0.49 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi)
34 Chi 10.74, p<0.001, Phi=0.34
35 Chi 1.98, p >010, Phi =0.17 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi).
36 Chi 5.62, p<0.02, Phi 0.=49 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi).
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single/previously married workers, and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of
married recruits. Thus whereas before the bonus, single/previously married recruits
represented only 28% of those recruits aged over 50 years, after the bonus, they
represented 83% of this age band.
This pattern may be explained in terms of the hours typically worked by recruits in these age
bands. For example, the virtual absence of single and previously married recruits in the 36-
50 age group recruited after the bonus maybe explained by the lack of full-time employment
opportunities. Of the 14 'single/previously married' employees recruited in this age group
before the bonus, 11 were previously married and 3 were single. All 3 single respondents
worked full-time and 6 (55%) of the previously married respondents worked full-time. Thus,
64% of the single and previously married recruits had worked full-time before the bonus,
compared to only 7% after the bonus.
On the other hand, before the bonus the mean hours worked by married recruits aged 50
and over compared to single/previously married recruits was considerably greater: 29 basic
hours per week compared to 22 basic hours per week respectively. This differential, with
married recruits in this age band working more hours than single/previously married
recruits, is maintained in the pattern of recruitment after the bonus. It appears that
single/previously married recruits have not been discouraged from pursuing domestic
employment because of the reduced hours available for employment, whereas potential
married recruits have. Thus, with the reduced opportunities for full-time work, potential
recruits aged 36-50 who are single or previously married, the majority of whom would have
worked full-time, seem to have been discouraged from engaging in domestic employment.
In contrast, older recruits (those aged over 50), the majority of whom have worked fairly
short part-time hours, appear not to have been discouraged.
Why do single/previously married recruits aged over 50 years work considerably fewer
hours than their counterparts aged 36-50? Age itself appears to be an important factor
affecting the hours worked. For example, of the single/previously married workers aged 36-
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50 when recruited before the bonus, the mean (current) age of the full-timers was 48 years,
while that of the part-timers was 56 years. Information obtained from the sample of interview
respondents is again useful in further exploring and understanding the patterns observed.
Of the 18 respondents who were aged over 50 at the time of the interview, 7 (39%) indicated
having experienced difficulty in finding their current job, and cited their age as the main
adverse factor affecting their ability to secure employment. Four of these respondents stated
that it was the only job they could find (including the one male respondent in this age
range). These respondents ranged in age from 53 to 63 years; their mean age was 58
years. A sizeable minority of workers aged over 50 years, then, had very limited
employment opportunities.
While age clearly appears to be an important factor restricting the employment opportunities
of respondents in the older age group, the interviews also revealed other important aspects
of respondents' social circumstances which affected their employment situations. Of the six
single/previously married respondents aged over 50 years (1 single, 5 previously married),
two volunteered the information that they were in receipt of some form of welfare benefit
(housing benefit and pension), which they wished to safeguard and therefore had to keep
their weekly earnings (and therefore hours worked) within a certain limit. Three indicated
that there was no full-time work available and that in any case, at their age they were too
tired to take on any more hours. One of the respondents, who was divorced, reported that
she incurred no substantial housing costs (only annual rates), as the house she lived in was
part of the divorce settlement and was entirely paid for. This respondent indicated that she
did not need to work any more hours as her part-time earnings were sufficient for her needs.
None of these respondents had any dependent children living at home.
Of the 12 married respondents in this same age range, 10 worked part-time and had
partners who were working; 2 worked full-time (and over-time) and had partners who were
unemployed. Three of these married respondents had dependent children living at home.
In total, 6 of this group worked over-time (2 with unemployed partners, and 2 who wanted
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full-time work but could not find it). Of the remaining 6 who did not work any over-time, 2
cited ill-health as the main reason why they worked part-time and why they did not work any
over-time; the other 4 indicated that the hours they worked were enough - and that they
would be too tired to work over-time.
The social circumstances of the married and single/previously married respondents in this
age group clearly differ, and affect the range of hours worked. As we have seen, five of the
12 married respondents aged over 50 were either supporting dependent children or
dependent partners, which would explain the longer hours worked (and 'full-wage' sought)
by these respondents. In contrast, 3 of the 6 single/previously married respondents in this
age range had additional sources of income and did not wish to work longer hours. The
pattern of full- and part-time employment observed for the domestic ancillary workforce in
this age range (n=25) is more fully explicable given the information obtained from those
interviewed (n=18).
The pattern observed, in which both married and single/previously married workers aged
36-50 appear to have rejected the part-time employment opportunities in domestic
employment while single/previously married workers aged over 50 have not, may appear
contradictory or conflicting. As the information relating to hours worked and the more
detailed material concerning the workers' social circumstances (available from the
interviews) suggests, however, the relationship between employment patterns and the
circumstances of workers and/or potential workers can be consistently explained.
Interestingly, the one age group that was relatively unaffected by the restructuring of
employment opportunities in domestic employment consisted of recruits aged 31-35 years.
Both those recruited before and after the bonus were either married (the vast majority), or
previously married. Similarly, the hours typically worked by these recruits remained
unchanged after the bonus. That is, 53% (10 of 19) of recruits aged 31-35 employed before
the bonus worked 25 hours per week or less; after the bonus the proportion working 25
hours per week or less was 50% (6 of 12). Unlike the pattern evidenced for any other age
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group, not only did the proportion of recruits in this age group remain steady, but so did the
average hours worked: the mean hours worked by these recruits before and after the bonus
was 26 hours per week. As the Women and Employment Survey (Martin and Roberts 1984)
found, the proportion of part- to full-time workers peaked for ever-married women in their
early thirties; these women were the most likely to be caring for young children. This
appears to be the case for the domestic workers considered in the current study. That ever-
married recruits in this age group typically seek part-time hours might explain the stability of
the pattern of employment of these workers. In the next chapter, a more detailed
investigation of the circumstances of domestic workers with dependent children will be
presented.
Privatisation follow-up study
In the intial stage of designing the study, I considered the possibility of incorporating a
follow-up component which would provide relevant information relating to the employment
outcomes for those who left their NHS domestic jobs. Given time and financial constraints,
however, it was decided that this follow-up component could not be undertaken. After I had
completed the main study, however, all Scottish health boards received directives from the
Scottish Home and Health Department to tender a certain percentage of their ancillary
services. Consequently, both of the hospitals studied were forced to tender their domestic
services (among other services), and the domestic services of one of the hospitals
concerned (Hospital B) was in fact contracted-out to a commercial contractor. I therefore
seized the opportunity to conduct a simple follow-up study to investigate the employment
outcomes for the workers that had been included in the main study for Hospital B. Though
the conlracting-out of the service was a setback for the workers, unions and managerial staff
who had been involved in industrial action to try and prevent the tendering of the service,
the situation did provide me with a valuable opportunity to examine the impact of the
contracting-out process on the employment opportunities and outcomes for the workers
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concerned. The findings of this follow-up study, albeit involving a very small sample of
workers, confirm some of the main findings of the research presented in this chapter.
I endeavoured to contact, by telephone or letter, 57 of the 62 workers from the domestic
ancillary workforce at Hospital B, and obtained responses from 20 of the workers. Of these,
10 were employed by the incoming private contractor, 1 was ill but intended taking up a job
with the private contractor when she recovered, and 9 had left their jobs as NHS domestics
either before or at the time of the transfer of the service. Of the 9 workers who were not
employed by the private contractor, 6 did not want to work for the contractor (though they
had been given applications for a job), 2 had left before the applications had been sent out,
and 1 was refused a job with the private company.
The profiles of the two groups of workers - those who were employed by the private
contractor and those who were not - are different in a number of important respects. Of the
II workers affiliated with the private contractor, 10 were married and 1 was widowed. Of the
9 workers not employed by the private contractor, 2 were single, 1 was divorced and 6 were
married. In terms of marital status, then, the profiles of the two groups are somewhat
different, with the group not employed by the private contractor having a larger proportion of
single/previously married workers. A more striking contrast between the two groups exists
with respect to the hours that had been worked as NHS domestics. As Table 5.24 indicates,
there is a noticeable, if not significant, difference between the hours that had been worked
by those who were subsequently employed by the private contractor and those who were
not.
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Almost all of the workers subsequently recruited by the private contractor had worked less
than 25 hours per week as employees of the NHS. In contrast, more than half of the workers
who did not take up employment with the private contractor worked 25 hours per week or
more: 3 of the 5 employees concerned had worked 40 hours per week. Further, of the 9
private contractor recruits who had worked less than 25 hours per week in the NHS, 5 (55%)
had worked less than 18 hours per week in the NHS, 6 recruits continued to work 20 hours
per week or less with the private contractor, 4 were able to secure full-time hours, and 1 had
not yet commenced employment with the contractor. Of the 4 private contractor recruits who
were able to obtain full-time work, 2 had worked full-time with the NHS.
Of the 9 workers not employed by the private contractor, 6 had jobs to go to immediately
upon leaving their job as domestics in the hospital (2 of these were redeployed within the
hospital), 3 were initially unemployed (2 of these subsequently found employment - within
two months). Only one had not found a job by the time that she had to leave her
employment with the NHS, which coincided with the time that she was contacted for the
follow-up study. This worker had been offered a job with the private contractor but refused
because the pay was insufficient. It is also worth noting that this person had worked for
almost 14 years with the hospital as a domestic and was thus entitled to a substantial
amount of redundancy money. Of the 8 workers who found employment other than with the
private contractor, 5 obtained full-time work (3 had been employed full-time as domestics, 2
37 Chi 2.96, p<0.08 but p>0.05, Phi=0.39 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi)
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had been employed part-time) and 3 found part-time employment; all of these had worked
part-time as NHS domestics.
These findings indicate that the hours obtained in the new jobs, by recruits of the private
contractor compared to those employed elsewhere, again are very different. This difference,
illustrated in Table 5.25, is in fact both significant and substantial. The pattern of
employment observed within the NHS is reflected in the employment arrangements
obtained after the workers left their NHS jobs.






In terms of the weekly hours and thus weekly rates of pay obtained, at least, it is heartening
to find that of the 18 workers who found employment immediately upon leaving their NHS
job 5 (28%) workers actually improved their employment situation. Interestingly, 4 of these
(female) workers were in their forties (mean age of 46 years), and the other worker was
aged 30 years. All were married. In addition, the 5 workers who had worked full-time in the
NHS were subsequently able to secure full-time positions. Two of these workers were
single (1 female, 1 male) and 3 were married. The mean age of the married recruits was 39
years. Thus, 9 of 18 (50%) workers were able to obtain full-time positions after losing their
NHS jobs, with 1 other substantially improving her part-time hours. Of the 8 workers who
were employed for less than 30 hours per week after losing their NHS jobs, 6 were married
and 2 were previously married. As Table 5.26 suggests, the age of these workers stands in
contrast to the age of the ever-married workers working 30 or more hours per week.
38 Chi 4.33, p<0.05, Phi=0.48 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi)
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Of the 8 workers who worked less than 30 hours per week, only one was in her forties; 4
were under 35 years (mean age 31 years), and 3 were over 50 (mean age 54 years). All but
one of the women in her forties worked 30 or more hours per week (4 worked full-time and 1
worked 30 hours). This pattern of employment is similar to that observed for the domestic
workforce of ever-married workers at Hospital B (n=48, see table 5.14 ). As will be
explained further in the next chapter, this trend largely reflects the constraints of
responsibilities for children. That is, if ever-married women in their forties have dependent
children, these children will tend to be older whereas, for example, women with dependent
children in their late twenties or early thirties typically have at least one very young child.
The younger the child, the greater the constraints to employment because of child care
responsibilities. The hours worked by ever-married women over the age of 50, on the other
hand, reflect both age and generational effects. Belonging to the older generation appears
to lower employment participation rates and to reduce the hours worked by those who
engage in paid employment, compared to ever-married women under the age of 50
(controlling for the youngest child's age) (Joshi 1984:5).
The employment trends observed in the follow-up study confirm the findings of the main
study. In the absence of more detailed information, age, marital status and hours worked
together are good indicators of the domestic responsibilities of incumbents. By being able
39 Chi 4.13, p<0.05, Phi=0.52 (Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi)
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to investigate the employment outcomes of the enforced redundancies from the NHS, the
findings support the argument that domestic responsibilities - social factors - clearly
influence who will seek full- and component-wage jobs. While the sample in the follow-up
study is very small, it seems clear that the processes structuring employment can be
consistently explained. As with the efficiency initiatives undertaken within the NHS, private
contractors extensively rely on part-time employment. Those employed by the private
contractor and those not, differed significantly with respect to the hours worked, age and
marital status. Irrespective of employer, however, age was strongly associated with
employment hours obtained for ever-married women - women in their forties predominantly
secured full-time employment. Only 27% (3 of 11) of the ever-married workers employed by
the private contractor were in their forties, compared to 57% (5 of7) of those not employed
by the private contractor. This pattern, in which women in their forties chose not to continue
in employment as domestics with the private contractor while other workers did stay on,
reflects the general trend observed for the domestic ancillary workforce considered above.
The efficiency initiatives - both the incentive bonus payment schemes and privatisation -
have restructured the conditions and general employment opportunities of domestic
ancillary work. As a result, the workforce profile has changed considerably.
Summary
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that with the changing circumstances of
domestic ancillary employment, the profile of the domestic workforce does not remain static,
but also changes. This development underlines the relations between social circumstances
and employment. An important change to domestic ancillary employment brought about by
the efficiency exercises entailed a signficant reduction in weekly hours (and hence, wages)
available to new recruits. The hours of existing staff in post, on the other hand, were largely
protected (although those who worked the rota did have their weekly hours cut by about 5%
because the number of weekends worked was reduced from 5 out of 6 to 3 out of 4). While
the hours available to new recruits decreased, important changes were evidenced in the
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profile of workers recruited to domestic employment under the conditions created by the
efficiency initiatives, compared to the profile of workers employed before this period.
As the information presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 above suggest, the age of domestic
recruits has not only dropped, with younger recruits making up a much larger proportion of
the workforce population, there has been a reversal in the proportion of 17-30 year olds
compared to recruits aged 41-50. At the same time, the recruitment of workers over 50 has
also declined significantly, while the recruitment of workers aged 31-35 has remained
stable. Reflecting the increased proportion of younger recruits, the proportion of single
recruits has almost doubled, while the proportion of married and previously married recruits
has decreased.
It is the incoming younger cohort which has absorbed the decline in hours available for
domestic employment in the most dramatic way. While the average hours worked by those
aged 36 and over who were recruited after the bonus did decline (and the hours of recruits
aged 31-35 after the bonus remained stable), the most substantial change in the pattern of
full- and part-time hours worked by recruits before and after the bonus was that found for
recruits aged 30 years and under. As the information obtained from the interviews suggests,
for those single respondents in this age group, the great majority were non-householders.
These respondents were not burdened with the immediate financial pressures to
independently (or even jointly) maintain a household. Thus, the changing pattern of
recruitment in domestic ancillary work evidenced in this study can be explained in terms of
the changing job-type and household maintenance responsibilities of recruits. In greatly
reducing the availability of full-time employment, the cost-cutting exercises have resulted in
the employment of a larger proportion of younger workers with considerably fewer finacial
responsibilities, and a smaller proportion of workers with fuller financial responsibilities.
The findings presented here underline the importance of considering both the changing
circumstances of the job itself and the impact this has on the composition of the labour force.
Clearly, it is misleading to assume that the workforce composition is fixed and that the
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impact of the changing terms and conditions of work is uniformly encountered by all
workers. More specifically, as the present research shows, gender is not the only salient
factor specifying the changing pattern of domestic ancillary employment. Rather, household
maintenance responsibilities, as reflected, for example, in the age and marital status of the
workers, holds far more explanatory power in terms of understanding the way in which
employment is structured.
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6. Market Performance, Low Pay and Social
Circumstances
Introduction
Low pay, measured in terms of an individual's position within a national earnings league, is
concentrated among particular groups within the general population. Women, young
people, older manual workers and ethnic minorities are all more heavily represented at the
bottom of the earnings hierarchy. In this chapter, after briefly reviewing conventional market
explanations of low pay, alternative explanations, which are associated with arguments
favouring measures, to combat the problem of low pay such as a national minimum wage
and pay equity legislation, will be considered in more detail. As MacLennan et at. (1983)
indicate, in order to be able to take decisive action against low pay, we must have a clear
understanding of its real causes. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to examine the nature
and extent of low pay among domestic ancillary workers, and in light of this, to consider the
likely impact of minimum wage legislation.
Definitions of Low Pay
Traditionally, trade unions have considered anyone earning less than two-thirds of the
average male manual wage to be low paid. Other common low pay thresholds come close
to the target specified by the Trade Union Congress (TUC); the Low Pay Unit's benchmark
is two-thirds of median male earnings, and that of the Council of Europe is 68% of full-time
mean earnings. As Pond and Winyard (1983) argue, these benchmark levels would seem
to be supported both by Townsend's (1979) study of poverty in the U.K. - families of workers
earning less than two-thirds of male manual earnings were found to be suffering severe
poverty and deprivation - and by the threshold put forward by the Royal Commission on the
Distribution of Income and Wealth (RCDI&W Cmnd 7175 1978) - that low pay be defined as
those earning less than the lowest decile of male manual workers. The NBPI also defined
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low pay as earnings falling within the lowest decile, which produces a figure roughly equal
to two-thirds the average for all manual men. Further support for these thresholds is argued
to come from the benchmark represented by the 'official poverty line'; that is, the
supplementary benefit minimum subsistence income level specified by Parliament. As
Table 6.1 illustrates, the various definitions of low pay are roughly coincidental1.
Table 6.1 Definitions of low pay 1986/7t
E per week
Low Pay Unit (two-thirds median male earnings)tt 123.40
Council of Europe (68% full-time mean earnings) 125.60
TUC (two-thirds mean male manual earnings) 116.27
Supplementary benefit (earnings equivalent)ttt 119.22
Family Income Supplement (eligibility limit)ttt 111.25
t Based on April 1986 earnings data and July 1986 benefit levels
tt For a basic 38 hour week. Taken as £3.25 per hour pro-rata
ttt Two adult, two child household (one child aged 11-15, and one aged under 11)
Source: Low Pay Unit Low Pay Review, no. 29 Spring 1987: Department of
Employment, New Earnings Survey, 1986.
Pond and Winyard indicate that the definition of low pay obtained from these thresholds
apply to any adult worker working a standard 38 hour week, excluding overtime. Thus the
basic (gross) earnings 'should be sufficient without overtime or shift work to provide for a
socially acceptable standard of living' (1983: 9). For part-time workers, the LPU's
benchmark implies a pro-rata hourly rate of £3.25. As Smail argues, while comparison with
official subsistence levels gives some support for the general acceptability of the LPU, TUC,
and Council of Europe's definitions of low pay, comparisons with benefits are unsatisfactory.
1 Interestingly, the rank order of the various low pay thresholds has changed considerably over the
period 1982/3-1986/7. In 1982/3, the supplementary benefit earnings equivalent for the prescribed
family type was higher than any of the other measures: £104.31 per week, compared to the LPU's of
£92.70 and £92.82 for the Council of Europe. The change undoubtedly reflects the real decline in the
value of supplementary benefits during this period.
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As benefit levels themselves are widely regarded as inadequate, the LPU's threshold would
leave many households below the supplementary benefit poverty line (LRU 1987).
Additionally, the generalisations about household composition which underly the various
low pay definitions are questionable. (This will be discussed in more detail below)
Nevertheless, it is on the basis of these thresholds that the extent of low pay in Britain is
calculated.
Low pay in Great Britain
According to the LRU, an estimated 8.8 million workers, that is, 43.2% of the adult workforce,
were being paid low wages for the basic hours they worked in 1986. Nearly 6 million of the
low paid (67%) were women, and 3 million (43%) were part-time workers (1987: 5-6). As
Table 6.2 suggests, even if overtime pay is included, the proportion of full-time workers on
adult rates of pay earning low wages was only reduced from 32.2% to 26.8%. Low pay was
particularly pronounced for women manual workers, with 20% earning less than £80 for a
basic working week in 1986: 10% of all female full-time workers earned less than this
amount and 50% of all female part-time workers earned below £2.40 an hour. Of the ten
lowest-paid jobs for full-time employees, cleaning ranks very close to the bottom, witfi 87.6%
of full-time cleaners earning under £123 per week (1987: 7-8).
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Table 6.2 Estimated numbers and proportions of adult employees earning
low wagest, April 1986
Male full-time workers on adult rates tt
Including overtime pay Excluding overtime pay
% Million % Million
Manual 19.9 1.14 30.9 1.78
Non-manual 9.5 0.44 10.8 0.50
All 15.3 1.59 21.9 2.28
Female full-time workers on adult rates tt
Manual 73.2 0.92 79.0 0.99
Non-manual 42.6 1.66 44.4 1.73
All 50.0 2.57 52.8 2.71
All full-time workers on adult rates tt 26.8 4.16




All Workers 43.2 8.78
t Under £123 a week, £3.23 an hour
ft Trainees excluded. Proportions derived from 'adult rates not affected by absence' and
applied to total number on adult rates. Rounding errors may exist.
Source: LPU Low Pay Review, no. 29, Spring 1987: NES 1986 Part B, Tables 35,36,39;
Hansard, 29 January 1987, col. 346; DE Gazette.
The problem of poverty for those in work has been more extensive in Scotland, where a
disproportionate share of Britain's low paid workers is found. In 1983, while 9.7% of all
employees in Britain were located in Scotland, this compares to 11.3% of all low paid
workers (Twine 1983: 5). Further, within Scotland too, there have been large regional
variations in the incidence of low pay: the major urban centres - Strathclyde, Lothian,
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Tayside and Grampian - contained more than 75% of all the low paid. Lothian, having the
second-highest concentration of low paid workers, had 18.5% of the male and 15.8% of the
female (16.6% of the total) low paid employees in Scotland (1983: 8-10).
Using the LPU's threshold of low pay, virtually all of the workers considered in the current
study are low paid: the basic hourly rate of pay at the time of the study ranged from £2.03 to
£2.10 for basic-grade domestics, and from £2.50 to £2.55 for domestic supervisors
(depending on length of service.) In addition to the bonus (averaging 15% on basic weekly
hours worked), enhanced rates of pay at 1.5 to 2 times the basic rate exist for hours worked
on 'rest days', 'days off, weekends and overtime. And as suggested in Chapter 4, many
workers, both full- and part-time, work overtime on a regular basis; specifically, 38.2% of
the total interview sample, including 66.0% of the full-timers and 27.7% of the part-timers2.
Excluding overtime earnings, 89.7% of full-time workers had (gross) eanings of less than
£119.22, the supplementary benefit threshold for a two-couple, two-child family. Similarly,
89.7% earned less than the LPU's threshold (£123.40) and that of the Council of Europe
(£125.60); 82.8% earned less than £116.27 (the TUC threshold) and 31.0% earned less
than £111.25 (the FIS threshold). All of the part-time workers (working less than 35 basic
hours per week) earned less than £100 per week, the highest weekly part-time wage was
£97.21.
With overtime pay included, the proportion of full-time workers earning less than the FIS
eligibility limit was 20.7%; 34.5% earned less than the TUC threshold; 41.4% earned less
than both the supplementary benefit cut-off (for the prescribed family type) and the LPU's
threshold of £123.40; and 44.8% earned less than the Council of Europe's threshold. Thus,
without overtime pay, only 10.3% of full-time workers earned more than £123, the cut off
2 Thirty-six percent (27) of all the respondents worked 40 hours, 22% (or 17) worked between 30 and
40 hours, 9% (or 7) worked between 24 and 30 hours and, 33% (or 25) worked under 24 hours per
week. Shift worked - 40% (30) worked a 'full day', 21% (16) worked 'morning part-time', 8% (6)
worked afternoon part-time and, 32% (24) worked the 'backshift'.
used by the LPU, increasing to 55.2% if overtime earnings are included. Only 4.2% of part-
timers earned more than the FIS threshold of £111.25 with overtime earnings; none earned
more than the LPU threshold. For full-time workers, it would seem that though the
proportion earning low basic wages is higher than the national figure presented in Table 6.2
(89.7%, compared to 79%), the proportion earning low wages when regular overtime pay is
included is considerably lower than the national figure (44.8%, compared to 73.2%).
Explanations for Low Pay
The uneven distribution of wages is commonly argued to reflect differences in natural ability,
skill, experience, education and training - factors which are assumed to directly determine
individual productivity. Orthodox economic explanations of low pay emphasise the
importance of particular individual worker characteristics such as skill and investment in
training and education, and advance theoretical justification for the notion that people are
paid what they are worth (wages are equal to the marginal product of labour). Thurow
asserts, 'If an individual's income is too low, his productivity is too low. His income can be
increased only if his productivity can be increased' (1969: 26). This notion is perhaps
nowhere more explicitly advocated than by the Thatcher government: 'We are a low pay
economy because we are a low output economy and have low productivity growth' (John
Wakeham, Treasury Minister, Hansard, 18 March 1983, vol. 39, col. 454). In asserting that
wages are determined by the productivity of workers, the government also alleges that
unemployment stems from workers pricing themselves out of jobs, that low levels of
productivity necessitate a further lowering of wages.
As suggested in Chapter 1, this reasoning has, in fact, informed successive government
wage policies and measures adopted to combat low pay. In keeping with traditional
economic analyses, the measures recommended by the NBPI to improve the position of low
paid workers in the public sector are also based on the assumption that low pay is a
problem of low productivity. Consequently, from the mid-1960s onwards, productivity
185
bargaining, particularly in the form of incentive bonus payment schemes, has been
increasingly advocated and adopted within the health service and other public sector
industries and services. Similarly, although the Clegg Commission on pay comparability
ostensibly represented a move away from the position adopted by the NBPI, described by
Clegg as 'tireless advocates of relating pay to productivity' (Cmnd 7995 1979: 6), the pay
awards recommended were actually directed at reinstating wage differentials on the
grounds that these were warranted by differences in job characteristics (eg. skill and
responsibility). Consequently, despite the trade unions' requests that public sector pay be
indexed to two-thirds average manual earnings in order to improve the pay of the lowest
paid workers, the Clegg commission recommended pay awards ranging from 3.8% for the
lowest paid and lowest grade of NHS ancillary workers, to 16.9% for the highest grade
(Cmnd 7641 1980). Thus the existing wage disparities between low paying jobs (held
mainly by women) and higher paying jobs were perpetuated. In rejecting unions' requests
for wage indexation and that non-unionised firms be excluded from comparisons, the
commission responded that the issue as to whether absolute wage levels were fair was not
its concern; rather, wage disparities arising from, for example, differential trade union
strength and organisation, was 'an inevitable feature of economic life and must be accepted
by the service' (Cmnd 7641 1979: 24 ,emphasis added).
There is, however, little evidence to support the assumption that 'workers are paid their
worth': that wages, and therefore low pay, are the result of inexorable (economic) 'market
forces'. Orthodox assumptions of the (long-run) equilibrating functions of the market, which
purportedly ensure that wages are equal to the marginal product of labour, have been
critically examined in Chapter 2. The persistence of 'short-run' disequilibrium associated
with such factors as gender, generation and ethnicity, where the returns to otherwise
equivalent labour (in terms of quality and quantity) are not equalised, challenges the
popular assumption that low wages reflect object differences in workers' education, training,
and skill and, therefore, productivity. Though women's low pay is often attributed to their
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lack of training and low skill levels, research to date indicates that this is not the case3.
Clearly, there is a strong association between education and earnings, but non-market
factors, such as gender, affect income in ways which are not consistent with those of a
market for labour. Further, if the 'priced out' hypothesis is correct, that is, if workers are paid
more than their 'market value', government policies to increase the relative pay of female
workers should reduce their employment prospects. Conversely, if women's labour is in
great demand, their wages should rise 'naturally' in relation to men's. Rubery and Tarling
(1989) point out, however, that despite the increasing demands for women's labour, their
earnings remained at 60% of men's until the 1970s. Similarly, the introduction of equal pay
legislation in the early 1970s might have been expected to provide the conditions for a
signficant decline in the rate of female employment relative to men, but in contradiction of
market predictions, there has been no inverse relationship between wage and employment
rates (Neuburger 1984: 10-15). It is clear, then, that though wage differentials are widely
explained by reference to 'market forces', the main effect of orthodox economic theory has
been to justify the status quo rather than provide an explanation of employment and wage
structuring.
Problems in defining' low pay'
As Pond and Winyard argue, '[a] proper explanation of low pay requires a more convincing
account than that provided by traditional economic theory' (1983: 17). In deciding what
must be done about the problem of low pay, an understanding of its causes is essential.
There are, however, considerable difficulties in defining 'low pay' which, as MacLennan et
at (1983: 2) suggest, perhaps explains why the issue has not received greater political
attention. For example, should low pay defined be in terms of the type of work done, or in
terms of what others are paid in the job, or in terms of providing an adequate standard of
3 cf. Doeringer and Piore 1971; Piore 1973, 1978; Edwards Reich and Gorden 1973; Cain 1976;
Phelps Brown 1977; Rubery 1978; Layard et al. 1978; Rubery and Wilkinson 1981; Wilkinson 1981;
Atkinson 1982; Craig efa/1982, 1984, 1985; Stewart et al 1985; Rubery and Tarling 1989.
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living for the wage-earner and her/his dependents? Twine (1983: 2) argues that low pay be
defined in terms of the 'general inequality of labour market reward', rather than family need,
on the grounds that low pay defined in terms of failure to meet family need reinforces the
notion that low pay among women is of secondary concern. That is, a definition based on
family need conjures up images of a 'family wage' which focuses attention on 'heads of
households', who are conventionally taken as male4, Thus Twine contends that:
'To give men and women equal attention we must consider low pay in
terms of the general inequality of labour market reward rather than family
need. Like unemployment, low pay is a problem of industry, not the family.
Thus, the perspective taken here is one that focuses on the reward attached
to particular positions in the labour market, rather than the characteristics of
individuals who may occupy those positions at a moment in time. (1983: 2)
The tendency to regard women's earnings as 'pin money' has, with successive
governments, been widespread. For example, when first considering whether or not Britain
should institute a national minimum wage, the Labour government suggested that part-time
workers (identified as largely female workers) might be justifiably excluded from a national
minimum wage on the grounds that their livelihood did not depend on their own income:
'...there is a case for arguing that a national minimum should only extend to
workers whose livelihood depended upon employment and not to those
who did some work casually or for "pin money", and many part-time workers
might be in this category. (1969: 33).
Similarly, the present goverment has asserted that
'The great majority of low paid workers are young people or married
women whose income supplements the earnings of other workers in the
household. Very few poor people would be helped by a national minimum
wage' (Employment Minister, Michael Alison, Hansard 1983).
Though Twine argues forcefully against a definition of low pay based on family need, the
LPU's position is not so clear-cut. By setting the LPU threshold at 66% male median
earnings, the Unit aims to ameliorate relative inequalities in earnings, irrespective of the
domestic circumstances of the wage earner. At the same time, while the LPU views low pay
4 As Twine was writing for the Low Pay Unit in this publication, it is somewhat ironic that in a
publication concurrent with Twine's, the Low Pay Unit itself formulated the supplementary benefit
threshold on the basis of 'two child families...a married couple, husband only working' (Pond and
Winyard 1983: 9).
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as a relative problem, the threshold obtained is in part substantiated by drawing a
comparison with supplementary benefit levels which, though inadequate, do take into
consideration family responsibilities. Thus when defining low pay and setting the low pay
threshold, the LPU does not simply consider the level of individual earnings in terms of a
national earnings league but supplements this information by calculating how well this
threshold would allow the wage earner to support a family of four5. The call for a national
minimum wage, then, is not just inspired by the desire to effect some measure of earnings
redistribution to improve the position of the low paid, but is also intended to provide the
wage earner an income which could support an 'average family' at a socially acceptable
level. There is, then, some recognition of the need to address the issue of 'family
responsibilities', though these are conceived in a very generalised way and given a
peripheral position.
There exists a tension regarding the need to incorporate into the analysis of the problem of
low pay a consideration of the social circumstances of the individuals concerned, but a
reluctance to radically depart from conventional approaches which rest on the assumption
that employment ('labour market') processes are independent of other (non-market)
processes. This ambiguity is reflected in the provided explanation of low pay, but in drawing
on the labour-market segmentation approach, it could be argued that the LPU moves even
further away from a position which might challenge the residual conceptualisation of social
influences. It is argued that a 'proper explanation' (Pond and Winyard 1983: 17) of low pay
can be found in considering the role of the industrial structure in determining job and pay
structures. That is, in explaining differential rewards for workers, unaccounted for by
productivity differences, it is argued that the emphasis should be on the question of 'who
pays' (demand factors) rather than 'who earns' (supply factors) low wages (MacLennan et al
5 Refer to the section on 'domestic responsibilities and employment experiences: earnings and low
pay' below for a more detailed discussion of the use of Supplementary Benefit levels in establishing
the low pay threshold.
(
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1983: 16), because'low pay is a problem of industry, not the family'(Twine 1983: 2). Thus
the higher incidence of low pay is explained by the concentration of certain groups of
workers in jobs and industries that pay low wages. The argument is succinctly put by
MacLennan et al:
'An understanding of the factors that underpin the problem of low pay is
important in deciding what action must be taken to deal with the problem. If
the orthodox theories of wage determination are correct, with their
emphasis on individual productivity, then trade unions and government
cannot intervene to raise wages directly without risking an increase in
unemployment...But if low pay is due to economic industrial factors...direct
intervention is not only possible without the dire consequences often
predicted, it is essentiaf (1983: 21, emphasis added).
I am not convinced, however, that this approach will provide an adequate understanding of
the problem of low pay. The emphasis on industrial structure as a basic cause of inequality
in jobs and rewards provided by labour market segmentation theory has been an important
development in challenging the orthodox preoccupation with individual productivity. But in
framing the issue in the manner described, the LPU subscribes to and perpetuates the
artificial separation of economic and social processes. Government policy and activities are
still perceived to 'intervene' in 'market' processes, rather than understood as constitutive of
processes of resource distribution in society. In conceptualising government action as
'intervening' in the processes of wage determination, the LPU seriously weakens its
argument for more equitable wage policies and a more equitable distribution of resources.
Further, even though the Unit is highly critical of and sets out to challenge 'market' analyses
of the problem of low pay, their own explanation does not break free from market-based
understandings. That is, rather than taking issue with the economistic conceptualisation of
'supply' and 'demand' factors, the question of 'labour supply', narrowly defined in terms of
'market-based' characteristics of workers (skill and productivity), is undisputed. Thus even
though the Unit rejects the argument that labour supply consists of low productivity and low
skilled workers, it does not challenge the market assumption that there is a single price for
the same quantity and quality of labour; rather, in keeping with labour market segmentation
theory, it suggests that in the long term demand-side factors impede the actualisation of an
equality of exchange for certain groups of workers.
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There is, then, an underlying acceptance of the market assumption that the same quantity
and quality of labour deserves the same 'reward' or wage. Support for equal pay legislation
attests to this. As Grubb and Lazerson (1984: 248-249) argue, the wide acceptance of
'equal pay for equal work' reflects a fundamental compliance with orthodox market
economics that returns to employment (should) reward productivity. Similarly, the agenda
for comparable worth rests on the assumption that
'jobs ought to be paid according to their intrinsic worth, as measured by
such factors as skill required, responsibility entailed, and effort involved,
and that the wage levels of jobs of "comparable worth", that is, equal worth
or equal value, ought to be equal' (Hartmann et al 1985: 3).
Though it is generally recognised that skill definitions are socially constructed, the call for
equal pay legislation in large part emmanates from the acceptance of the idea that pay
should reflect 'objective' measures of job content and, in so doing, will remedy wage
discrimination based on sex or other non-market factors. But if the source of the problem is
external to the 'market', it has to be questioned whether a 'solution' which attempts to
impose 'market' relationships does in fact adequately address the issue. That is, social
processes external to the 'market' are simultaneously the source of, and basis for solving,
the problem. As Stewart et al argue, this is, in fact, a fundamental contradiction, a negation,
of 'market operation' (1985: 282).
While recognising that the problem of gender and wage inequality is real, we need to move
beyond the restrictive parameters set by market understandings of the problem, toward an
understanding of resource distribution in other than market terms. The argument that
gendered wage differentials primarily reflect unequal rewards to equal labour power
reinforces the artificial separation of economic and social factors in explanations of the
structuring of social resources, and perpetuates the dichotomisation of the spheres of family
and work. Understandings and explanations of social practice, of the relations of domestic
circumstances to employment, must be analysed as components of a single process, where
social relations are constitutive of this process. The tendency, however, has been to
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assume the analytical independence of 'society' and 'economy', of family and work. This
has circumscribed our understanding of the problem of resource distribution and
inequalities to the extent that if issues of 'need' and 'dependencies' (domestic
circumstances) are taken into account, they are considered as peripheral to 'economic'
labour market processes. Further, it is precisely the assumption that rewards are attached to
particualr positions in the 'labour market', independent of the processes allocating people to
positions6, which is predicated upon the analytic separtion of 'social' and 'economic'
processes, and which inhibits understandings of the realations of family and work. The call
from feminist analysis, to consider the 'supply side', is not to focus on individual
characteristics as prescribed by market economics but rather to consider the social
circumstances and institutional conditions of women's labour force participation. To provide
an analysis which considers the domestic circumstances and needs of individuals is not to
provide an analysis which falls back onto economistic explanations that individualise the
problems; rather, the intention is to provide an analysis which recognises the fact that
employment experiences and returns to employment are socially determined, and are not
the outcome of immutable economic market forces.
Relations Between Social Circumstances and Employment
The attempt to re-establish, and reluctance to fully relinquish, 'market' explanations of the
structuring of employment stems from the perceived need for coherence. It is suggested
here, however, that the contradiction between 'market' understandings and social practice
does not reflect a lack of coherence in patterns of social experience but is generated by the
lack of theoretical integrity. Thus, the relationship between social circumstances and
employment is meaningful and patterns of social experience are consistent, but the system
of resource distribution and processes maintaining income inequalities cannot be explained
6 This assumption is explicit in the quote from Twine (1983: 2) above.
192
in 'market' terms. Arguments for a national minimum wage and pay equity legislation derive
from concerns to redress the unequal distribution of wages; I question, however, whether
these strategies are based on an adequate understanding of the processes maintaining
income inequalities - if they are not, their implementation will be of limited value. As we
have seen in Chapter 5, the effects of efficiency initiatives and the process of tendering
public services is primarily a threat to the workers' weekly and social wage, not hourly wage
rate. Further, the findings of this study suggest that both parents' employment hours are
constrained by child care responsibilities where these are necessary. How effective, then, is
minimum wage legislation in terms of improving the income of these workers? 7
Chapter 5 has investigated the effects of changing domestic ancillary employment
opportunities on the profile of the workforce, and suggests that with the decrease in the
availability of income-generating hours, more younger recruits are being employed, many of
whom are still partially dependent on their parents. In the remainder of this chapter, the
relation between respondents' social circumstances and employment experiences will be
further investigated. Domestic ancillary workers are poorly placed in relation to processes
structuring the distribution of social resources; this is reflected in their relatively
disadvantaged educational and employment histories, and in their own and their families'
claims to resources. After exploring the social backgrounds of the interviewed sample of
ancillary workers within the general structure of social inequality, the distribution of earnings
will be considered in relation to the workers' domestic circumstances, and the potential
effectiveness of minimum wage will be examined.
Educational and occupational background
The principle measures of social background used here are educational experience,
previous employment, father's occupation and mother's occupation. As suggested above,
7 This question will be considered in the discussion following.
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the social location of domestic employees is disadvantaged. This is particularly evident
when educational experience is considered. The vast majority of interview respondents had
left school by the time they reached the minimum school leaving age. Reflecting rises in the
statutory minimum school leaving age, the average age at which respondents left school
was inversely related to the age of the respondent Thus the average school leaving age of
respondents aged 50 years and older at the time of the interview was fourteen and half
years, rising to fifteen years ten months for respondents aged under 30.
As Table 6.3 indicates, 52% of the respondents received no school leaving qualifications at
all. The likelihood of having no school leaving qualification was greatest for workers aged
over 30 years: 37.5% of respondents aged under 30 had no qualifications, compared to
62.5% of respondents over the age of 30. Of those with school leaving qualifications, 16%
had a lower or higher school leaving certificate, 13.3% had at least one CSE, 16% had at
least one 'O' grade or 'O' level and only 5.2% (1 person) had Highers. Though there were
only three respondents under the age of 20 in the interview sample, all had received either
CSEs or 'O'grades/'O'levels, whereas 37.5% of respondents aged 20-29 had obtained no
school leaving qualifications.
Of those who received a school leaving qualification above the level of the lower/higher
leaving certificate, 6.0% (2) received 2, 30.3% (10) received 3, 18.2% (6) received four and
9.1% (3) received 5 or more qualifications. While a quarter of the respondents pursued
some form of further education and training, only half of these completed and received the
qualification pursued (sitting guilds, secretarial, o'levels, hotel management, catering/cook).
The one person wtio obtained Highers (male) and went to university, did not complete his
university education and received no other qualifications.
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Table 6.3 Obtained school leaving qualifications, by age group






<= 19 33.3(1) 66.7(2)
20-29 37.5(9) 4.2(1) 33.3(8) 25.0(6)
30-39 60.0(9) 13.3(2) 26.7(4)
40-49 53.3(8) 33.3(5) 6.7(1) 6.7(1)
50+ 68.4(13) 21.0(4) 5.2(1)
All aaes 52-0(39) 16-0(12) 13.3(10) 16,0(12) 1,3(1) 1.3(1)
Looking at the jobs held by respondents over their working lives8, it would appear that the
range of occupations held by any individual is quite limited. Using the OPCS classification
scheme, the correlation between the first job held after leaving school and the 'penultimate
job'9 is signficant. The correlation between the 'exit job' (the job left in order to have
children) and the permanaent re-entry job, though not significant at the 5% level, has a
significance value of 0.0564. Interestingly, the correlation between the respondent's father's
occupation (held at the time the respondent left school) and the respondent's current job is
also signficant10. Using the Cambridge scale, the correlation between the respondent's
parents' jobs (held at the time the respondent left school) is signficant11. Thus it would
8 Respondents who had no children were asked about their first job upon leaving school, their
penultimate job, and their current job(s). Respondents who had children were asked about their first
job upon leaving school; their 'exit job' - the job they had left in order to have their first child, or upon
marriage if they did not return to work before having their first child; (if applicable) their temporary re¬
entry job; their permanent re-entry job; their penultimate job; and their current job(s). Individual jobs
were classified according to the Cambridge Scale (Stewart et at. 1985: Table 2.6) and the OPCS unit
groups (1970).
9 Correlation = 0.438, Slope = 0.564, Significance = 0.00005.
10 Correlation = 0.363, Slope = 0.937, Signficance = 0.0018.
11 Correlation = 0.278, Slope = 0.418, Signficance = 0.041. The correlation between the father's job
and the respondent's current job has a significance value of 0.094; that between the father's job and
the respondent's penultimate job has a signficance value of 0.082.
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appear that the types of jobs held by the respondents are fairly homogenous, and in the
case of the first job held after leaving school in particular, there is a great deal of similarity
between the respondent's father's job and their own.
The similarity in the social location of respondents is further borne out in an examination of
the proportional distribution of the respondents' parents' jobs in terms of their rank order
within an occupational scale. On the basis of the Cambridge Scale, respondents' fathers
were employed in the following occupational categories: 56.1% (37) unskilled manual;
33.3% (22) skilled manual; 4.5% (3) non-manual; 4.6% (3) managerial; and 1.5% (1)
professional. In terms of the mother's occupations, 66.7% (30) were employed in unskilled
manual, 8.9% (4) were employed in skilled manual, and 24.4% (11) were employed in non-
manual occupations. Thus, the majority of domestic assistants come from families where
both parents worked (59% of the sample), primarily in unskilled manual jobs.
Work histories
Work histories provide important information regarding the distribution of people to jobs over
their lifetime. And when workers' domestic circumstances and emloyment situation are
considered simulataneously, the longitudinal data obtained provides a much better source
of information than cross-sectional data for understanding the structuring of employment
experiences12. Work history data is particularly informative when considering patterns of
women's employment and has become an important tool in analysing the effects of time
spent caring for dependents, primarily children, on women's employment careers.
The pattern of not-working periods, time spent not working, and main reasons for not
working for the different age groups presented in Tables 6.4 to 6.6 generally reflect those
observed in larger-scale surveys of women's employment. Only 7% of the sample of female
12 Work history information obtained in this study is retrospective.
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respondents experienced no interruptions13 in their working careers while 44% had only
one period of not working, and 13% had 4 or more interruptions14. As Table 6.4 indicates,
respondents aged 30-39 were the most likely to have had just one not working period: 60%,
compared to 46% of respondents aged 40 years and over. In contrast, only 38% of female
respondents aged under 30 and 39% of female respondents aged 50 and over had only
one interruption. Table 6.5, which records the main reasons for not working for different age
groups, shows that unemployment accounts for a much larger proportion of the total time
spent not working for those aged under 30, compared to older workers. Given that older
workers are more likely to have had children, this pattern might be expected. But as Table
6. 6 shows, for workers aged under 30, more than one-quarter of the total time spent not
working during the first interruption to employment was a result of unemployment, whereas
for older workers, less fhan 1% of the time spent not working during this interruption wasd
due to unemployment, the remainder almost entirely a result of child care responsibilities.
Unemployment is also a signficant factor for workers aged 50 and over (Table 6.5 ), as
10.5% of their total time spent not working was due to unemployment. The proportion of
time spent unemployed for the latter age group was four times greater than that experienced
by workers aged between 30 and 50 years. As Table 6.6 suggests, periods of
13 Interruptions, or 'not working periods' of less than 4 weeks, were excluded from the analysis.
14 Male respondents' (n=6) work histories contrasted those of female respondents in a number of
ways. While 7% of female respondents had no interruptions, all of the male respondents had
experienced at least one period out of employment, almost exclusively because of unemployment:
98.8% of the time spent not working for male respondents was due to unemployment, the remaining
1.2% of the time was accounted for by having a 'break' from employment (after being made
redundant). Male respondents had, on average, experienced a greater number of interruptions to
employment than female respondents; the mean number of periods not working for males was 2.7
compared to 1.84 for female respondents. On the other hand, the mean time spent not working for
male respondents (31 months) was considerably less than that for female respondents (55 months).
This pattern is not entirely sustained, however, if the time spent not working is analysed by age group;
the mean time spent out of work for male respondents aged 20-29 (n=3) is 40.3 months compared to
30 months for female respondents; on the other hand, the mean time spent not working for the
remaing male respondents, all of whom were aged 40 and over, was 21.7 months, compared to 75.4
months for female respondents in the same age range.
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unemployment for the older age group were mostly subsequent to the first period of not
working, which was mainly accounted for by child care/family responsibilities15.
Notably, there were important differences in the work histories of respondents recruited
before and after the bonus. As with the domestic ancillary workforce in both hospitals,the
difference in the recruitment age of respondents employed after compared to before the
bonus was signficiant and substantial16. Eighty percent of respondents recruited after the
bonus were aged under 40 years while 52% of respondents recruited before the bonus
were in this age group. Further, respondents recruited after the bonus have, on average,
more employment interruptions; the mean number of employment interruptions for
respondents recruited after the bonus was 2.1 compared to 1.8 for those recruited before the
bonus. Respondents recruited after the bonus are also more likely to have had a greater
number of jobs during their employment careers; the mean number of jobs held by
respondents recruited after the bonus was 5.3 compared to 4.6 for those recruited before the
bonus. Only 14% of respondents recruited before the bonus had experienced
unemployment as their first employment interruption compared to 33% of respondents
recruited after the bonus. More striking is the difference in the mean length of the first period
of unemployment: respondents recruited before the bonus had been unemployed for an
average of 6 months in the first period, compared to 11 months for respondents recruited
after the bonus.
15 The pattern of leaving employment upon marriage, rather than during the first pregnancy, was not
extensive but was greatest for workers aged 50 and over.
16 Chi 7.04, p<0.01, Phi=0.34
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Table 6.4 Number of employment Interruptions for female respondents, by
age group
Age at Interview
16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+ All Ages
No. of Interruotions %(No.1 %(No.1 %(No.1 %(No.1 %(No.1 %(No.1
0 67(2) 5(1) 8(1) 6(1) 7(5)
1 33(1) 38(8) 60(9) 46(6) 39(7) 44(31)
2 33(7) 20(3) 15(2) 33(6) 26(18)
3 14(3) 7(1) 23(3) 10(7)
4+ 10(21 13(21 8(11 22(41 13(91
Total% 100 100 100 100 100 100
No. 3 21 15 13 18 70
Mean No. 0.33 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.84
Mean time spent
not working (months) 6 30 56 80 72 55
Table 6.5 Time spent not working for various reasons as a proportion of all
the time not working for female respondents, by age group
Age at Interview
Main reason 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+
for not workina % % % % %
Looking for work 100 45.6 5.3 0.3 10.5
Illness 2.9




Total 100 100 100 100 100
No, 1 20 15 12 17
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Table 6.6 Time spent not working for various reasons as a proportion of total
time not working during first interruption for female respondents,by age
group
Age at Interview
Main reason 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+
for not working %(No.1 %(No.1 %(No.1 %(No.) %(No.)
Looking for work 100(1) 27.5(10) 0.6(2) 0.2(1) 0.8(1)
Kids/pregnant 67.2(8) 99.4(13) 99.8(11) 95.8(14)
Other 5.3f2) 3.5(3)
Total% 100 100 100 100 100
No. 1 20 15 12 18
As can been seen from Table 6.5 , 89% of the time spent not working (in paid employment),
for those aged 30 years and over, was due to respondents' child care responsibilities. The
mean length of time spent not working because of child care responsibilities for workers
aged 30 and over was 66 months (or 5 and a half years), ranging from 56 months (4 years 8
months) for workers aged 30-39, to 71 months (just under 6 years) for those aged 40-49.
What is the effect of time spent looking after children and out of paid employment? Analysis
of the WES by Martin and Roberts (1984) and by Dex (1984) suggest that downward
occupational mobility is markedly intensified by domestic commitments, though it is not
confined to women with such commitments.
Bearing in mind that the types of occupations held by respondents in the present study do
not vary greatly, it would appear that for those female respondents who have had children,
roughly a third experienced downward occupational mobility upon their return to
employment. At the same time, a third of returners experienced upward mobility. Table 6.7
records the direction of change in occupational mobility, for two transitions, different age
groups of workers who have had children: mobility between the job left to have the first child
and the permanent re-entry job; and mobility between the penultimate job and the current
job. This table suggests that downward mobility is particularly marked for younger workers
(those aged under 40) in the transition from exit job to permanent re-entry job, with the
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pattern reversed regarding the transition from penultimate job to current job, where older
workers (those 40 and over) are more likely to experience downward mobility. For the
majority of respondents (70.6%), however, the move between the previous and current jobs
entailed no change in occupational standing; the overall change observed in the move from
exit job to permanent re-entry job also indicates no change because the proportion
experiencing downward mobility is effectively cancelled out by the proportion experiencing
upward mobility. The even distribution of upward, downward and level mobility observed in
the move from the exit job to the permanent re-entry job is somewhat different than that
found in the WES (Martin and Roberts 1984; 147), which found that 37% experienced
downward mobility (which is very similar to that found in the current study), 49%
experienced no change, and 14% experienced upward mobility. In the present study, a
much larger proportion experienced upward mobility (33.3%), and a smaller proportion
experienced no change (31.3%)17. The effects of time spent caring for dependent children
on subsequent earnings was not analysed in this study. But in Joshi's (1984: 21 and 'note
to readers') analysis of the WES, the measure of wage18 downgrading among those women
who had children and were currently working was only 5%.
17 Almost all of the workers worked full-time in their exit job - 94.2% (49), compared to 5.8% (3) who
worked part-time. The proportion returning to full-time work after having children was 35.3% (18),
compared to 64.7% (33) who returned to part-time employment. These figures parallel those found in
the WES (Martin and Roberts 1984: 147), where 31.7% of women returned to full-time work and
68.3% returned to part-time work.
18 The measure was based on hourly earnings.
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6.7 Occupational mobility of female respondents who have had children, by
age groupf




















No change 31.3(16) 70.6(36)
Decrease 35.3(18) 23.5(12)
t Occupations are classified on the basis of the Cambridge Scale (from Stewart et al. 1985 Social
Stratification and Occupations Table 2.6)
tt 'Exit job' refers to the job the respondent left in order to have her first child, or upon marriage if she
did not return to work before having her first child.
In sum, half of the respondents had either not had any or had only one period of not working
throughout their employment careers.; 77% had 2 or fewer periods out of employment.
Unemployment accounted for a substantial proportion of the time spent not working for
workers aged under 30, and younger workers were more likely to have experienced
unemployment than older workers. However, child care accounted for the largest amount of
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time spent not working (71.8%) for those who had children. As has been found in other
surveys, the mean duration of employment before the birth of the first child increases the
older the worker19. Older workers were also more likely to have had the longest initial job
interruption due to child care responsibilities. Bearing in mind the fact that the types of jobs
undertaken by the respondents over their employment careers was fairly restricted, the
transition between exit job and permanent re-entry job did entail downward mobility for a
third of the respondents affected. This was offset, however, by an equal proportion who
experienced upward mobility. Unlike the evidence from the WES, where the sample of
respondents was representative of the female population and where a much smaller
proportion (14%) experienced upward mobility in this transition, the evidence here, for the
total sample of female workers who have had children, does not indicate a general
deterioration in occupational position. At the same time, while 94.2% of the respondents
worked full-time in their exit job, upon returning to employment after having children, the
majority (64.7%) worked part-time; although a minority, the proportion returning full-time
(35.3%) is not insignificant. As will be discussed below, the distribution of full and part-time
hours is strongly associated with child care and household maintenance responsibilities.
Domestic responsibilities and employment experiences: respondents with children
Forty-three percent (33) of the interviewees had financially dependent children20; of this
group, 15% (5) were single parents. In keeping with findings from larger-scale surveys, the
hours and shift worked by female respondents with dependent children vary according to
the number and age of dependent children; respondents with two or more children were
19 The mean duration of employment before the birth of the first child was: 4 years 6 months for
workers aged 20-29; 5 years 3 months for workers aged 30-39; 5 years 5 months for workers aged
40-49; and 8 years 2 months for workers aged 50 years and older.
20 'Dependent' as defined by the respondent. Thus a small proportion of these are children who
continue to live at home and either work (part-time or in low paid jobs, or are in YTS positions) or claim
benefit on their own behalf. These dependents could thus be described as 'partially dependent'. As
Chapter 5 suggests, a large number of single respondents do 'board' at home or with relatives. Of the
remaining respondents who had no dependent children (57% of the interviewed sample), 37% (16)
weresingle; 51% (22) had a partner; and 11.6% (5) were divorced.
C
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more likely to work a part-time shift than those who had only one dependent child21; and
the hours worked increased with the age of the youngest child. Table 6.8 , which provides a
breakdown of the hours worked by the age of the youngest child for female workers,
indicates that the relationship between hours worked and age of the youngest child is
significant and strong22. That is, the younger the age of the youngest child, the fewer the
basic weekly hours worked by their mothers: respondents with children under 5 years
predominantly worked less than 24 hours; respondents with children between the ages of 5
and 10 years mainly worked between 24 and 30 hours (although the hours worked were a
little more diverse); and respondents with children over 11 years predominatly worked 40
hours23. There is, then, a clearly patterned distribution of hours worked which is strongly
associated with the age of the youngest child.
21 The relationship between shift worked, that is, 'full-time' or 'part-time', and number of dependent
children is both significant and moderately strong: p < 0.03 with Yate's correction, p < 0.01 without
Yate's correction, Phi = 0.43. The relationship between hours worked and number of dependent
children is also significant, but less strong: Pearson correlation = -0.293, p = 0.01, Phi 0.37.
22 Pearson correlation: 0.7043, p< 0.001, Gamma-0.92.
22 The breakdown of weekly basic hours provided here corresponds closely to the three main shifts
worked: full-time day shift, part-time day shift, and the back shift. Although I could not apply the Chi
statistic to compare shift worked and age of youngest child (more than 25% of the cells had expected
frequencies of less than 5), the gamma statistic (-0.883) confirmed that the strength of the relationship
between shift worked and age of the youngest child was also strong.
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Table 6.8 Hours worked by age of youngest child for female respondents
Age of Youngest Child
Under 5 5-10 11 +
Hours Worked NO, (%) mm No.f%)
40 9(75)
lolal





1. Single parent who works 24-30 hours per week.
2. Of the two respondents, one has a partner who is unemployed.
3. Two respondents have extra caring responsibilities for elderly relatives and one respondent has
another part-time job.
4. The respondent has extra caring responsibilities.
As the notes to Table 6.8 suggest, there are clear explanations as to why certain
respondents did not fit the general pattern observed. The respondent indicated in note '1'
was a single parent who worked more than 24 hours in order to be eligible for Family
Income Supplement. None of the single parents in the interviewed sample worked less
than 24 hours24. Of the three respondents indicated in note '3', two had extra caring
responsibilities for elderly relatives and one had another part-time job, which explained why
they did not work as many hours as the remainder of respondents with children in the same
age group. The respondent indicated in note '4', who worked considerably fewer hours
than the other respondents with their youngest child over age 11, had extra caring
responsibilities for an elderly relative and, before assuming this caring, had another part-
time job. Of the respondents indicated in note '2', the partner of one was unemployed,
which may explain the reduced hours worked.
24 This single parent in fact worked between 24 arid 30 hours. There were only two respondents (of
10) who worked such hours which explains the rather, large 24 to less than 40 hour band used - the
majority of respondents in this band worked between 30 and 40 hours.
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The majority of respondents with two or more dependents worked part-time - 84% (16 of 19),
compared to 16% (3 of 19) who worked full-time. While there is an inverse relationship
between the basic weekly hours worked and the number of dependent children, a large
number (52.6% or 10 of 19) of respondents with two or more dependent children worked
over-time. In contrast to respondents with only one dependent, the main reason given for
working over-time for the vast majority (90%) of those with more than one dependent was
that they needed the money, whereas the main reason given for the majority (75%) of those
with one dependent was that they wanted to help 'cover' when the shift was shortstaffed25.
There is, then, a significant difference between the two groups in terms of their reasons for
doing over-time.
It may appear contradictory that the majority of respondents with more than one dependent
worked part-time, and that half of these then worked over-time. While there is very little full-
time work available, this does not explain the pattern observed; only 3 of the 10
respondents with more than one dependent child who worked over-time wanted to work full-
time. When asked what hours they would preferred to work, 79% (15 of 19) of respondents
with more than one dependent child indicated that they wanted to work part-time.
Obviously, however, a substantial proportion of these workers did work more part-time hours
because the financial returns from their basic weekly hours were insufficient. It was the
arrangement of hours worked during the day - the timing of shifts - which was a key factor for
the workers' that is, over-time was generally obtained by working additional hours on 'days
off (eg. weekends) rather than by working additional hours on normal working days. The
majority of part-timers worked set days, Monday to Friday; over-time therefore involved
working one or two part-time days at the weekend. Thus, it could be suggested that for
some, the reason for working part-time has more to do with the time of the shift rather than
25 The relationship between main reason for working over-time (for nomey or to help cover) and
number of dependent children was significant and substantial: Fisher's Exact Test < 0.01, Phi = 0.66.
(
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the number of hours worked. This explanation is strengthened when the child care
arrangements for workers with dependent children is considered.
There was only one respondent who had a child in a day care programme, and this was a
special social work scheme provided free of charge. The remaining respondents with
dependent children of pre-school and school age generally relied on their partners, friends,
mothers/-in law or parents, or a combination of these above, to look after their children when
they were at work. Interestingly, shift worked was not only a good predictor of the age of the
youngest child, but also an indicator of who looked after the children while the mother
worked. Almost all of the respondents with a child under 5 years of age and with a partner
(89% - 8 out of 9), worked the 'back shift' (and worked less than 24 hours per week)
allowing theri partners to assume responsibility for child care during this time. (The 'back
shift' is worked in the evenings, generally starting late afternoon and finishing mid-evening,
with some variation at either end). As Table 6.9 suggests, the relationship between child
care arrangements (for children who require supervision) and shift worked for those with a
partner is signficant and substantial26. That is, in 64% (9 of 14) of families where both
parents were present and child care arrangements were necessary, the (male) partner was
primarily responsible for taking care of the children while the respondent was working. In
89% (8 of 9) of the cases where the father was responsible for child care when the
respondent was at work, the respondent worked the back shift. In contrast, the relationship
between hours worked and child care arrangements was not statistically signficant,
emphasising the importance of the timing of the shift in determining the hours worked by
respondents with dependent children27. Four out of the 5 single parents interviewed
26 Fisher's exact test= 0.022, phi = 0.689
27 When child care arrangements are analysed by the respondent's basic hours worked, that is less
than 24 hours per week or 24 hours per week and over, the figures in the left hand column of the Table
6.9 remain unchanged; of those respondents whose partners looked after their children, 8 worked
less than 24 hours per week and only 1 worked longer hours. The right hand column of Table 6.9,
however, changes substantially; of those whose partners did not look after their children while they
were at work, 3 worked less than 24 hours per week and 2 worked longer hours.
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needed to arrange child care; this was provided by a combination of friend and/or mother;
all 4 of these respondents worked more than 24 hours per week and did not work a back
shift.





Day shift 1(11) 4(80)
Back shift 8(89) 1(20)
Ioia! 9(100) 5(100)
When respondents with children were asked why they worked part-time, of the 8 who
worked the evening backshift, 4 reported that they needed work which coincided witli their
partner's availability for child care - in order to look after the children, their the partner had to
return home before the respondent could leave for work. Of the other four respondents
concerned, one indicated that there was no child care available during the day, and the
other three indicated 'family reasons'; which suggests that given that their partners also
looked after the children while the respondents were at work, they also needed to
coordinate their working schedules. Moreover, in 7 of the 8 cases, the age of the youngest
child was under 5; that is, there was at least one child at home who had not yet started
school - possible child care arrangements would again seem to be the most the likely factor
influencing respondents' employment patterns. This explanation is strengthened by the fact
that there were only two other respondents with pre-school age children who did not work
the backshift. One of these was a single parent, who for financial reasons needed to work
more hours than could be provided by the back shift, and who also had no partner available
to assume child care responsibilities. The other respondent had free day care provided for
her child by the social work department. Consequently, she did not work the backshift,
although she only worked less than 24 hours. Her partner was unemployed (and had been
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lor a fairly long time), and the family was in receipt of some supplementary benefit (which
was likely influential in limiting the hours/pay she sought).
Of those respondents with dependent children who worked full-time (9), in each case the
youngest child was 11 years or older (4 were 16 years old), and therefore the children were
either at school for most of the time that the respondents worked, or did not require
supervision. Child care arrangements, if needed at all (in only 2 of the 9 cases), were
consequently less obtrusive. The overall pattern suggested by the above tables regarding
the relationship between the age of the youngest child and the hours/shift worked by the
respondents, is one which suggests a general movement toward increased (full-time) hours
and daytime work generally (away from 'unsocial hours'), the older the youngest child. Of
the 9 respondents with dependent children (aged 11 and over) and currently working full
time, 5 had previously worked their jobs as hospital domestics on a part-time basis (their
average length of service was just above 8 years). The other 4 respondents who started
their jobs as full-timers had worked for a relatively shorter period of time (their average
length of service was just above 2 years); at the time of starting their jobs, their youngest
child would still have been over 11 years of age.
In sum, it would appear that for those families who have dependent children who are young
enough to require supervision, if there is a male partner present, in the majority of instances
this partner assumes responsibility for looking after the children when the respondent is
working. Respondents whose partners look after their children while they are at work almost
exclusively work the back shift, and work between 15 and 24 basic weekly hours. Many of
them also work over-time, but at the weekends (primarily Sundays) when their partner is
also available for child care. On the other hand, for respondents with older dependent
children - those who require little or no supervision - the majority work full-time. As Table
6.8 illustrates, there appears to be a general movement toward increased hours as the age
of the youngest child increases. Interestingly, this pattern is observed not just cross-
sectionally but also longitudinally within the current job; workers who have older dependent
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children and who have been employed for a number of years have progressed from part-
time employment to full-time employment within the same job.
Domestic responsibilities and employment experiences: earnings and low pay
In specifying a supplementary benefit level with which to compare their low pay threshold,
the LPU takes a family of four as the basis of its calculations. Thus, in 1986 a 'typical' family
of four would have needed a gross income of £119.22 to be left with the same net income
that they would receive on Supplementary Benefit (SB), which closely compares to the LPU
threshold of £123.40, calculated on the basis of two-thirds median male earnings. (Forty-
one percent of full-time workers in the present study feel below these thresholds, with over¬
time included.) There are a number of problems, however, with this definition of low pay.
First of all, the generalised assumptions about family and employment situations are highly
problematic. It is assumed that the household consists of a two-couple, two-child family
(one child aged 11-16 and one aged under 11), with one parent working, typically the male
(Pond and Winyard 1983: 9). In 1985, 14% of families were headed by a lone parent, the
vast majority being lone mothers (Family Policy Studies Centre, 1986). Further, the
proportion of economically active mothers with dependent children was 53% in 1984, rising
to 64% for married women with dependent children over the age of 5 years (General
Household Survey, 1984: Table 6.6). Women's earnings are also a very important
component of the families' income: in one out of eleven (9%) households the wife is the
main breadwinner, in that her earnings are greater than her husband's; where the wife's
earnings are equal to or exceed her husband's on a regular basis, the proportion rises to
one in seven (Equal Opportunities Commission, 1983). Clearly, the majority of families do
not conform to the household type assumed.
In the current study, none of the families conformed to the 'typical' family outlined above
asjiall of the female respondents were working (as were both of the married male
respondents' partners). Moreover, only 9% (3 of 33) of families with dependent children
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consisted of a two parent two child (one ageed under 11 and one aged 11-16) family. While
two parents were present in 85% of the households with dependent children, in 10.7% (3 of
28) of these households the woman's wage was the sole source of earned income for the
family. Apart from those households where the male partner was unemployed, 7% of the
respondent's (female) earnings equalled or exceeded that of her partner. Also, 15% (5 of
33) of families with dependent children were headed by single mothers. Thus, 24.2% (8 of
33) of families with dependent children were supported by a woman's income alone.
The evidence both from this study and national surveys suggests that the short-hand
summarisation of the 'typical family', where both parents are present but only one of the
them (generally the father) is assumed to be working, is in fact quite atypical. As Twine
(1983) argues, one person's earnings are often insufficient to bring the family's income
above the 'official poverty line'. The Central Policy Review Staff has estimated that the
numbers in poverty would be four times as high if it were not for the contribution of (married)
women's earnings to family income (MacLennan et al 1983: 6). In terms of relative
earnings, and adjusting for household size, 41% of households with children headed by
lone parents are in the bottom 20% band of disposable income, compared to 18% of
households with children headed by a couple (FPSC 1988: 12).
Women's employment participation is clearly affected by domestic responsibilities. The age
of the youngest child is an important factor influencing the weekly hours worked, and hence
the weekly wage obtained. As Figure 6.1 suggests, there appears to be a general tendency
for earnings to increase the older the age of the youngest child for respondents, their
working partners, and their joint income28. The lower relative earnings of female
respondents with dependent children is because of the reduced hours worked due to child
28 The correlation is signficant and strongly positive for respondents' earnings (Pearson correlation =
0.6281, p <0.001); the relationship is positive but not statistically significant for respondents' partners
(Pearson correlation = 0.2416, p =0.305); the relationship is moderately positive but not statistically
signficant for their joint earnings (Pearson correlation = 0.3308, p = 0.154).
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care responsibilities. As Table 6.5 above suggests, however, there are a few
have responsibilities for elder care and this also affects the hours worked.



























30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100110120130 140 150 160170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240
Net Earnings (£)
t There were only 3 cases in this band and in two of these, the information on the partners' income
was missing. Earnings for the remaining case are given in brackets.
It is true that respondents with younger children are likely to be younger themselves and that
earnings typically increase with age30. But, as we have seen, parents with pre-school age
children in this study share child care responsibilities on a daily basis. This limits the
number of hours available for paid employment for both women and men, but in different
ways. Although the men work full-time, they are not able to work over-time to boost their
earnings which, as Rimmer and Popay's (1982) study suggests, has been a distinctive and
29 The 'respondents' are female, and the 'partners' are male.
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important source of income-generating hours for young families. And women'semployment
hours are restricted by the need to look after their children while their husbands work.
Table 6.10 presents net earnings as a proportion of supplementary benefit requirements for
the respondents (by 'marital status'), their partners (where applicable), and the joint
earnings of the couple. Rather than using the Supplementary Benefit (SB) threshold
calculated by the LPU, the actual rather than imputed requirements for respondents, taking
into consideration their household and family circumstances, was calculated30; 100% of SB
requirements represents the 'official poverty line', though as Townsend's (1979) study
suggests, earnings below 140% of SB requirements would indicate that there is
considerable poverty and deprivation. It is also the case that the value of supplementary
benfits has deteriorated, both in real terms and relative to average earnings. For these
reasons, both the 100% and the 140% thresholds will be used to define and discuss the
nature and extent of low pay among the domestic ancillary respondents. Figure 6.2
provides a summary of the information contained in Table 6.10. As can be seen, of all the
respondents, 54% of the respondents earned less than their SB requirements. All of these
were respondents with dependent children: 14.3% of respondents who had a partner
earned less than or equal to 50% of their SB requirements; 75.5% earned less than or
equal to 100% of their requirements; and though none of the single parents earned less
than or equal to 50% of their SB requirements, 80% earned less than 100%. In addition,
30 On the basis of 1987/8 rates, the respondent's Supplementary Benefit requirements were
calculated as follows: Basic Rate1 + travel costs2 + housing costs3 + earnings
disregard4
1 Couple: £49.35; Single person: £30.40; Child0-10: £10.40; Childl 1-15: £15.60; Child16-
17: £18.75
2 Weekly 3 Weekly: rent/rates; mortgage; board costs. The average (median)
rent/rate costs: £26.31; mortgage: £25.15; board costs: £20.00
4 Earnings disregard: £4; £12 (single parents)
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20.7% of respondents' partners earned less than or equal to the official poverty line, but no
couples earned less than this threshold, nor did any of the single respondents.
Table 6.10 Net earnings as a proportion of supplementary benefit
requirements31
<50% <100% <110% <120% <130% <140% <150% <200% >200%
%(Np.) %(Np.) %(No.) %fNo.t %(Np,) %(Np.) %(Np.) %(Np.)
1. 14.3(7) 75.5(37) 79.6(39) 87.8(43) 91.8(45) 91.8(45) 95.9(47) 100(49)
2. 80.0(4) 80.0(4) 80.0(4) 80.0(4) 80.0(4) 100(5)
3. 20.7(6) 34.5(10) 55.2(16) 69.0(20) 82.8(24) 86.2(25) 96.6(28) 3.4(1)
4. 25.0(5) 25.0(5) 40.0(8) 50.0(10) 55.0(11) 80.0(16) 20.0(4)
5. 3.3(1) 6.6(2) 6.6(2) 6.6(2) 23..3(6) 56.7(17) 43.3(13)
1. Female respondent with partner - individual net earnings
2. Female single parent respondent - individual net earnings
3. Partner of female respondent - individual net earnings
4. Single respondent - individual net earnings
5. Couple (female respondent and partner) - joint net earnings
31 'Respondents with partners' are all female, 'partners' are all male, and 'single persons' are male
and female respondents.
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If we consider the threshold represented by 140% of SB requirements, 91.8% of
respondents with a partner earned less than or equal to this amount, compared to 80% of
single parents' earnings; 82.8% of respondents' partners' earnings, 50% of single
respondents' earnings, and only 6.6% of couples' joint earnings. None of the respondents
with partners earned more than 200% of their SB requirements, nor did any of the single
parents. Only 3.4% of respondents' partners earned more than 200% of their SB
requirements, compared to 20% of single respondents, and 43.3% of couples (on the basis
of their combined income). Fifty-six percent of respondents with partners had dependent
32 'Respondents with partners' are female, 'partners' are male, and 'single persons' are male and
female respondents.
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children, and to the extent that their own earnings, and those of their partners, fell below the
basic SB requirement threshold, it was due to the presence of these children. A much larger
proportion of respondents' earnings, compared to their partners', fell below the basic SB
threshold: 75.5%, compared to 20.7%. Even though the basic hourly wage rate of the
respondents was generally lower than that of their partners, their lower weekly wage
resulted more from their weekly hours worked than from their basic hourly wage rate. This is
further emphasised when the respondents' incomes, on the basis of the consolidated
minimum hourly wage rate of £3.25 proposed by the LPU, are calculated and compared to
their SB requirements.
Figure 6.3 Actual and mputed 'minimum wage' earnings of respondents, as a
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Earnings a3 a percentage of Supplementary Benefit Requirements
A. Actual earnings as a percentage of SB requirements for all interview respondents, not
including their partners' or joint incomes.
B. 'Minimum wage' earnings as a percentage of SB requirements for all interview
respondents, not including their partners', or joint income. Instead of the normal basic
hourly pay, bonus pay, and over-time earnings, the income of each respondent is calculated
on the basis of the consolidated minimum hourly wage rate of £3.25 suggested by the LPU;
this sum is then multiplied by the respondent's normal basic weekly hours to produce the
weekly wage they would earn on the basis of the minimum wage target. This hypothetical
weekly wage is then compared to the respondent's SB requirements.
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Figure 6.3 displays the respondents' actual (A) and hypothetical 'minimum wage' (B) gross
earnings as a percentage of SB requirements33. As diagram A indicates, on the basis of
their actual income, 9.5% of all respondents earned less than or equal to 50% of their SB
requirements, while 55.4% earned less than or equal to 100% of their SB requirements.
Altogether, 79.7% of respondents earn less than 140% of their SB requirements; 94.6%
earned less than or equal to 200%; and only 5.4% earned more than 200% of their SB
requirements, all of whom were single34. Diagram B illustrates the potential minimum wage
earnings of respondents if they were to receive the hourly basic minimum of £3.25
recommended by the LPU. The LPU suggests that the minimum wage (weekly and pro-rata
part-time hourly earnings) should provide a 'socially acceptable standard of living' for the
wage earner (and any dependents), without the worker having to work over-time or shifts.
The question remains, how well does this minimum provide for the respondents in this
study?
Diagram B of Figure 6.3 indicates that while the higher basic wage would considerably
improve the position of some of the respondents, a large proportion of workers would still
receive wages which are insufficient to maintain themselves and dependents at a 'socially
acceptable standard'. That is, 4% of respondents still only earn, at most, 50% of their SB
requirements; 33.8% earn less than or equal to the SB threshold; and 58.1% have
earnings that do not exceed 140% of their SB requirements. Though the proportion earning
more than 200% of the SB threshold increased from 5.4% to 20.3%, all of these were single
33 See note for diagram 'A' of Figure 6.3 for an explanation of the 'minimum wage' calculation.
34 The calculations for Figure 6.3 are based on gross rather than net earnings. There is, then, a very
slight discrepancy between the figures presented in Table 6.10 and those presented in diagram A of
Figure 6.3. In basing the calculations on gross rather than net earnings, the figures provided in Figure
6.3 slightly overestimate the respondents' actual and potential earnings as a proportion of their SB
requirements; that is, the figures underestimate the proportion of respondents whose earnings fall
within each of the percentage bands given. Thus, for example, the proportion of respondents with
earnings of more than 200% of their SB requirements is 3.4% according to Table 6.10, while Figure
6.3 indicates that 5.4% earn more than this threshold. There is, therefore, some inconsistency
between the figures in diagram A of Figure 6.3 and those in Table 6.10 but the calculations and figures
presented in diagrams A and B of Figure 6.3 are themselves consistently produced.
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respondents who earned more than 140% of the SB threshold on the basis of their actual
earnings. Those whose 'minimum wage' earnings (Diagram B of Figure 6.3) remained
below 100% of their SB requirements all had dependent children; those whose minimum
wage earnings fell below 140% of their SB requirements included all those with dependent
children (33), plus those respondents who had a partner (10), in addition to one divorcee
(without any dependent children). Thus the consolidated minimum wage is successful in
increasing the earnings of single respondents with no dependents above 140% of their SB
requirements, but it would appear that an hourly minimum wage of £3.25 is not very effective
in terms of providing a sufficient independent source of income for workers who have
dependents, given the basic hours worked.
Even if the (full-time) weekly minimum wage of £123.40 is adopted, on the basis of this
wage alone, 8.7% of respondents with partners would earn less than 100% of their SB
requirements, and more than half of those with partners (56.5%) would earn less than 140%
of their SB requirements. Though none of the single parents would earn less than or equal
to 100% of their SB requirements, 80% (4 of 5) still would have earnings less than 140% of
the SB threshold. Given that the vast majority of respondents' partners of the respondents
worked full-time, we can compare their earnings to the LPU full-time minimum wage of
£123.40, and the extent to which this provides an income above either 100% or 140% of
their SB requirements. From the third row of Table 6.10 , which records respondents'
partners' income as a proportion of SB, it can be seen that the full-time weekly minimum
wage proposed by the LP&U would reduce the proportion of partners earning less than
100% of their SB requirements, from 20.7% to 8.7%, but only reduce the proportion earning
less than 140% from 82.8% to 56.5%. This suggests not only that a sizeable minority of
male partners earn very low wages - below the £123.40 minimum threshold - but that many
are earning wages which are insufficient to independently support their family at a level
which would bring them out of conditions of poverty.
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The minimum wage suggested by the LPU, whether used as an hourly or weekly rate,
though effecting some improvement in the position of individual earners, is clearly
insufficient in providing an adequate income for individuals with financial dependents35. It
is interesting to find from Table 6.10 that the combined incomes of respondents and their
partners bring all of the families concerned above the SB threshold, and 93.4% of the
families above the 140% threshold. Almost half the couples (43. 3%) had combined
earnings which brought their household income to a level above 200% of their SB
requirements. This is not to imply that these combined wages are sufficient, or to be
complacent about the level of individual wages36, but the pattern suggests that for those
whose claims on social resources are relatively disadvantaged, there is a general
patterning of the relations of domestic circumstances and employment experiences,
structured in terms of financial need and household maintenance responsibilities. That is,
family income is consistent (though not necessarily sufficient) with family responsibilities. In
this sense, a 'living wage' system is clearly operational, not in terms of a 'male' wage
adequate to support a dependent wife and children, but where both incomes are
indispensable37.
35 It may be argued that combined, child benefit and a national minimum wage could bring families
out of poverty; as long as the weekly benefit rate was sufficient, I would agree. But, for the same
reason that there has been little government support for a national minimum wage, there is weakening
support for, and a real decline in the value of, child benefit. Because of their explicit objective to
provide a certain level of income, minimum wage and child benefit provisions are perceived to be
brought about by political interventions in the market processes of resource distribution.
36 It is debatable as to whether the threshold of 140% of SB requirements is adequate, or 'socially
acceptable', not to mention 100% of SB requirements. State benefits (excluding child benefit) were
received in almost a third (30.3%) of the respondents' households; in half of these cases (or 17% of
the total interviewed sample) Housing Benefit.was received by the household.
37 As with the findings of the WES (Martin and Roberts 1984), the majority of respondents with
partners in the present study perceived their income to be absolutely essential: 42% indicated that
they would not be able to manage at all without their earnings; 32% indicated that they would have to
'give up' a great deal; 4% indicated that they would have to 'give up' a lesser amount; and 21%
indicated that the loss of their income would make no substantial difference. The distribution of
income within the household is an important issue. It is argued that even if adequate, the 'family
wage' is often unevenly distributed within the family, to the detriment of women and children (Millar
and Glendinning 1989). An important indicator of a more equal distribution of income within the
household is whether the female partner is aware of how much her partner earns. Compared to the
findings of the WES, where roughly two-thirds of the wives could give a figure for their husband's
earnings, 82% (41 of 50) of respondents with partners in the current study knew their partner's
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If the minimum wage proposed is to operate as an hourly minimum wage, with the intention
of providing a socially acceptable standard of living for individual wage earners (female or
male) and their dependents on the basis of this one income, it will fall far short of its
objective, whether or not wage earners are employed on a part- or full-time basis. While
the (hourly) minimum wage threshold would be effective in improving the position of
persons who have no financial dependents, it would be of little help to part-time workers,
and particularly to single parents. The 1 minimum wage would also be of limited value in
boosting individual parents' incomes to an acceptable standard, for those who are part of a
couple. On the other hand, given the level of couples' combined earnings, the
implementation of an hourly minimum wage of £3.25 would effectively improve their
combined weekly earnings, even if one works part-time.
Summary
There is a fundamental incontruity with the main explanation of low pay provided by the LPU
- that it is a matter pertaining primarily to the economics of industry and not an issue of the
family, and the stated objective to provide each individual wage earner with a socially
acceptable standard of living. This perhaps explains the somewhat contradictory impact of
the suggested minimum wage on single-parent families (15% of the sample), two-parent
single earner families (10% of the sample), and two-parent dual-earner families, can be
explained. In considering the nature and extent of low pay, and assessing the likely impact
earnings. Using the typology developed by Pahl (1985), it is probably the case that the majority of
respondents with partners in this study operated a 'whole wage' or 'pooling' system of allocating
resources. Typically, the whole wage system prevails in situations where the income level of the
household is low, and where one partner takes responsibility for managing all the household finances.
The pooling system occurs where both partners have access to all the household money and where
both are responsible for managing expenditure; this system is also more likely to occur when income
is low, and as income rises, and where the wife is in employment. In Pahl's study, 93% of the couples
who used the whole wage system had incomes below £9,000 per annum; 63% of couples who used
the pooling system had incomes below the same amount. Altogether, 55% of couples used the
pooling system and 14% used the whole wage system.
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of the proposed minimum wage, it is evident that the relations of domestic to employment
experiences are socially patterned. At its current level, the minimum wage is not adequate
for those who need it most - those who require an independent or 'full-wage'. But it is more
likely to provide an adequate 'component-wage' for each partner in dual-earner families. As
Siltanen (1986) argues, the distinction between full- and component-wages is not entirely
related to the actual level of the wage, but is also formed on the basis of differences in
relations to household maintenance. Thus a full-wage (job) enables the incumbent to take
sole responsibility for maintaining an independent household, which may include financial
dependents; a component-wage (job) is not sufficient to enable the incumbent to be wholly
responsible for financially maintaining a household.
The distribution of low earnings among respondents, and their partners where applicable,
suggests that while the distribution of low earnings is sex-skewed, a substantial proportion
of male partners also earn component-wages. Further, more male partners earn
component-wages than do single respondents. It is, however, single parents and single-
income families who are poorly served by the minimum wage because with a combined
income, most couples jointly provide a full-wage for the household, the vast majority above
140% of their SB requirements. The pattern of low earnings observed for the sample of
domestic ancillary workers illustrates that pay does not reflect the quantity and quality of
labour supplied; that is, 'individual worker characteristics' defined in terms of the 'market'.
Rather, employment experiences are structured in relation to the social circumstances and
domestic responsibilities of respondents.
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Conclusion
The growth in public sector employment during the post-war period has been significiant
and, importantly, associated with the marked increase in the employment of women.
Women's increased labour force participation is closely linked to the expansion of social
welfare services, that is, health, education and social services; given the growing size and
importance of the public service sector as a source of women's expanding employment
opportunities, women in particular are susceptible to the consequences of cuts in public
spending and attempts to reduce the scope and content of social welfare services. The
government's privatisation policies are, therefore, a major cause for concern in regard to
women's employment.
The privatisation programme, which incorporates policies to contract-out public services,
denationalise public industries, and 'liberalise' legislative controls, is closely allied to
assumptions of orthodox economic theory and is designed to 're-establish' the primacy of
'market' principles in the distribution of resources. The expansion of the welfare state and of
social wages (income and services provided by the state) is argued to interfere with the
proper functioning of the market and, consequently, is said to be the cause of wage inflation,
unemployment and poor productivity growth. Thus, the privatisation agenda has been
engineered to reduce the size and cost of the public sector, primarily by effecting a
downward pressure on public sector wages, on the grounds these have been artificially
raised by exogenous social and political interventions into what is ostensibly the province of
economic market operations. The unfettered operation of the labour market, then, is argued
to bring about the most 'efficient' allocation of resources (wages, jobs, goods and services).
Privatisation policies have been marshalled, however, in relation to those circumstances
where market distinctions are most problematic. As I have suggested in Chapters 2 and 3,
market-based explanations fail to coherently account for public service sector employment
and the growth of 'social wages'; they are also unable to adequately explain gender
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differences in earnings and the general pattern of low pay. In each instance, the market
assumption that there is a single price for the same quantity and quality of labour is
contradicted. In seeking to impose a market determination of resource allocation (through
privatisation policies), the assumption is that the failed market prediction is an aberrant and
ephemeral product of social and political interference in 'economic' processes. Thus, social
categories are residually employed in an attempt to explain away the observed
countervailing tendencies.
The form of discourse favoured by economists has been pervasive among sociologists as
well as social policy analysts. Social theory perpetuates the categorisation of social
processes as 'exogenous' and peripheral to processes of resource distribution. Within the
sociology of stratification, the 'market' has had a central place in explanations of the
structuring of inequality. Attempts to explain patterns of low pay and gender differentials in
earnings have focused on the efficacy of labour market explanations. This has led to the
development of labour market segmentation analyses. Labour market segmetation theory
has evolved out of the recognition that 'market' criteria are limited. Although they are unable
to demonstrate the explanatory power of 'market' processes, however, segmentation
analyses typically remain entrenched within a normative economic frame of reference and
thus fail to cope with the centrality of social processes. That is, like orthodox economic
explanations, labour market segmentation theory accepts that there is a single price for the
same quantity and quality of labour, but suggests that in the long-term, social/structural
factors impede its actualisation for certain groups of workers.
Arguments developed in the present research suggest, however, that the consequence of
invoking social categories in explanations of the structuring of employment and resource
distribution, fundamentally challenges their perceived residual status. The urge to retain
'market' explanations of the structuring of employment stems from the perceived need for
coherence. But 'market' explanations do not further our understanding; rather, it is suggest
here that the apparent incoherence in patterns of social experience identified by 'labour
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market imperfections' or 'rigidities' is, in fact, generated by the lack of theoretical integrity.
The study of gender and employment, in particular women's employment in the public
service sector, is instructive in challenging the way conventional explanations, within
economic and sociological theory, assume social processes and issues to be peripheral.
The post-war expansion of female part-time service sector employment brings into focus, in
a very powerful way, the fundamental significance of social relations.
Existing patterns of female employment contradict the assumption that rewards are attached
to particular jobs ('economic' processes), independent of the processes allocating people to
these positions ('social' processes). This is further emphasised by the case study material
presented here. The findings presented in Chpater 5 suggest that with the changing
circumstances of domestic ancillary employment, the profile of the domestic ancillary
workforce does not remain static, but also changes. This development underlines the
relations between social circumstances and the structuring of employment. The changing
pattern of recruitment in domestic ancillary work evidenced in this study can be explained in
terms of the changing job-type and household maintenance responsibilities of recruits.
Domestic ancillary employment has essentially always provided 'component-wage jobs'
(which do not enable the incumbent to be independently financially responsible for the
maintainance of a household). But as a result of the cost-cutting exercises, particularly the
increasing use of part-time work, the component-wage jobs now available to new recruits in
domestic employment draw a larger proportion of younger workers with considerably fewer
financial responsibilities, and a smaller proportion of workers with fuller finanacial
responsibilities. While the findings suggest that household maintenance responsibilities
influence who will seek full- and component-wage jobs, it is not assumed that the choices
involved are free from constraint. It is argued, however, that the constraints and outcomes
are socially determined.
The need to move beyond the restrictive parameters set by 'market' understandings of the
problem of wage and gender inequalities, toward an understanding of resource distribution
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in other than 'market' terms is clear. Further, the argument that gendered wage differentials
primarily reflect unequal rewards to equal labour power is rooted in the assumption that
there is a single price for the same quantity and quality of labour, that processes of wage
determination are separate from processes of employment allocation. This assumption
reinforces the artificial separation of economic and social factors in explanations of the
structuring of social resources, and perpetuates the dichotomisation of the spheres of 'paid'
and 'domestic' labour. Understandings and explanations of social practice, of the relations
of domestic circumstances to employment experiences, must be analysed as components of
a single process, where social relations are constitutive of this process. The tendency,
however, has been to assume the analytical independence of 'society' and 'economy', of
family and work. This has circumscribed our understanding of the problem of resource
distribution and processes maintaining inequalities to the extent that if issues of 'need' and
'dependency' (domestic circumstances) are taken into account, they are perceived to be
residual to 'economic' labour market processes.
As Chapter 6 suggests, minimum wage debates underline the problematic nature of the
separation of 'economic' and 'social' factors in explanations of resource distribution and
processes maintaining inequalities. Arguments for a national minimum wage are not only
inspired by the desire to effect some measure of earnings redistribution to improve the
position of the low paid, but are also intended to provide the wage earner (and any
dependents) an income which could provide a 'socially acceptable standard of living'.
There is, then, some recognition of the need to address the issue of 'family responsibilities'.
On the other hand, calls for government legislation to institute a national minimum wage
suggest that government 'intervention' in wage determination processes is warranted on the
grounds that the 'market' has failed (because of structural demand-side rigidities) to equally
reward the same quantity and quality of labour. This explanation of low pay seriously
weakens the argument for a minimum wage: firstly, it subscribes to the market assumption
that political processes are exogenous to and not constitutive of processes structuring the
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distribution of resources; secondly, it suggests that wages are simply rewards for
'economic' performance, which again undermines arguments for more equitable income
distribution to ensure a 'socially acceptable standard of living'.
It is not a coincident that privatisation policies, premised on erroneous market
explanations of income distribution, have the most detrimental impact in
precisely those areas where mistaken understandings converge. Women's
employment in the public sector juxtaposes the artificial division of domestic and paid
labour, and 'public welfare' and 'private market' forms of resource distribution, underlining
the contrived nature of the separation of 'economic' (productive) and 'social' (non¬
productive or reproductive) processes. While conventional 'malestream' analyses
focusing on 'economic man' have been criticised for their general disregard and
inappropriate treatment of women as 'other' and subsidiary, there arc clear
parallels to the manner in which public welfare services and women are
analytically treated: as 'social' categories they arc construed to be peripheral
and are therefore marginalised.
Conservative policies to 'roll back' welfare state activities have been widely criticised as
turning the tide against the 'welfare state'. This 'crisis in welfare' is argued to reflect the
collapse of consensus regarding the 'mixed-economy' of 'market' and 'state' welfare
assumed by pioneers of the welfare state. It is argued in Chapter 2, however, that the
current 'crisis in welfare' is rooted not in the collapse of consensus but in the consensus
rationale that state activities constitute intervention in 'market' operations. Both free-market
theorists and leftists share similar analytical understandings of the relations between politics
and the 'market economy'; both positions assume that improvements in social welfare
through government action constitutes interference with the 'logic of the market'. It is this
pervasive assumption which has hitherto constrained welfare state developments and
which continues to debilitate the left's capacity to successfully counter the privatisation
agenda.
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The application of 'market' principles in public service provision and wage determination
has been unequivocally advocated by the Thatcher government. But, as Chapter 1
indicates, privatisation is simply one instance of government policies concerning wages in
the public sector, instituted throughout the post-war period, that promotes the salience of
'market forces' in the determination of wages. Whether the principle of pay determination for
public sector employees is that of 'fair comparison' with outside work, or linking pay to work
performance (productivity bargaining), the assumption has been that state 'conventions'
should emulate 'real market' determinations.
The pressure to hold down 'social' wages, and cut back welfare state provision generally, is
rooted in the presumption that different logics govern the allocation of 'private' and 'social'
wages. Income from employment is assumed to be primarily determined by market forces.
The reluctance to fully relinquish market understandings of income distribution has far-
reaching implications for public sector developments. That is, because private sector costs
(prices and wages) are said to be determined by the 'market', and the costs of public sector
services, primarily employment, are not, public services have been classified as
'unproductive' and 'non-progressive'. Thus, increases in public expenditure are construed
to be disadvantageous to the 'economy'; this has fuelled arguments for public expenditure
contraction. The escalating 'economic' costs implied by the expansion of the 'unproductive'
public service sector find their counterpart in the increasingly rigid policy measures adopted
to control 'public expenditure'. But the implied increasing 'relative price effect' of public
service sector expansion is not inevitable; rather, the problems created by the expansion of
the public service sector are borne out of the contradictions and explanatory failures of
economic theory.
Through its privatisation policies, the Thatcher government's attempt to curtail social welfare
developments is highly deleterious. However, political and social research critical of the
government's position concerning the privatisation of public services, nevertheless has
perpetuated and ultimately reinforced these policies by failing to fully challenge the
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principles underlying the privatisation agenda. On both the left and the right of the political
spectrum, the state is perceived to interfere in the 'private market' arena. While the
operation of the 'private economy' is seen to be independent or autonomous, the growth of
the welfare state is perceived to have been shaped by politics. In positing a disjunction
between 'private market' and 'public welfare' activities, the welfare state is assumed to have
a peripheral role in processes of resource distribution. Rather than the allocative function
presumed of 'economic market' operations, the function of social policy is restricted to that of
redistribution and the correction of market failure. Social welfare developments are thus
defined residually.
The legitimacy of and increasing emphasis given to 'market' criteria has been cultivated as
a result of the power given to economic, as against social, explanations, rather than
emanating from any intrinsic 'economic' logic. Conventional explanations of the growth of
the public sector are simply a continuation of inadequate explanations and arguments for its
contraction; the main effect of orthodox economic theory has been to justify the status quo
on the basis of deficient understandings. To argue in favour of a form of analysis which
considers the domestic circumstances and needs of individuals is not to provide an analysis
which falls back onto economistic explanations that individualise problems; rather, the
challenge is to provide an analysis which accounts fully for the range of social relations.
Recognition of the centrality of social processes in the structuring of employment and
incomes has far-reaching policy implications. Such recognition challenges, in a
fundamental way, the entrenched assumption that government action constitutes
'interference' in either the 'family' or the 'economy'; it places the power and onus on society
to determine the direction of the social and political process.
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APPENDIX A.
HOSPITAL NILS DOMESTIC ASSISTANT WORKERS - QUESTIONNAIRE
Introduction - reiterating purpose of interview, as indicated in letter requesting their participation
in the study. Reassure respondent of the confidentiality of the interviiew and of their responses.
BEFORE BEGINNING FIRST SECTION - ESTABLISH DATE OF BIRTH.
sev ivnPvL< I ftMALfic.3 .
SECTION I RESPONDENT'S JOB
Let ine just check off a few things about your work....
1) You started working here at the Hospital as a domestic assistant in .... ?
2) You work in ....(ward/theatre/relief etc.) 7
3) You normally work hours per week not including overtime?
A) You work (set days/rota etc) ?
(a) You normally work (specify days) 7
(b) You normally work from ... to ... (specify daily hours)?
5) You normally liave .... days off per week?
6'1 Have you always worked in ..... (area specified above) ?
IF NO
(a) Where did you use to work?
(b) When did you move to your present position?
(c) Why did you move to your present position?
7) Is it possible for you to work overtime?
IF YFS
(a) Is overtime work offered to you very often?
(b) How often do you do overtime;?
(c) How many hours per week (on average) overtime do you do?
(d) Why do you/don't you do overtime? f)0 -{o c^0Ov€
8) Do you ever do any cover work?
IF YES
(a) How often?
(b) Are you paid for this work?
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9) Do you normally work public holidays - one on one off, or do you not work then at all?
10) Have you had time off in the past 12 monthsv(or since started work) apart from paid holidays?
IF YES
(a) Why?
ltov.0 ( Cy-O ?
11) How long does itl take for you to travel to work?
12) How do you normally get to work?
IF FARES
(a) How much does it cost you in fares each day, adding together tire cost of both ways?
(b) So how much is tliat over a week?
13) Have you been given any training at the Hospital in how to do you present job?
IF YES
(a) What sort of training have you liad?
(i) How long did this training last?
14) Wliat are your reasons for working?
(a) Wliat is you main reason for working?
15) Why did you choose this particular job?
(a) What is your main reason?
IF WORKS PART TIME (40 HOURS OR LESS)
16) Wliat are you main reasons for working part-time? (prompt health if no reason ...)
(a) Wliat is your main reason for working part-time?
ALL
17) When you were looking for a job and found this one, did you want to work full-time or part-time?
(a) How many hours a week did you want to work?
(b) At wliat times did you want to work?
18) Thinking of the number of hours you work now, would you prefer a job where worked more or fewer
or different Iwurs per week?
SECTION II RESPONDENTS (JUIER CURRENT JOB(S) AND FUTURE ONES
19) Do you liave any other paid jobs at the moment?
IF YES
(a) How many?
(b) What do you do?
(c) When did you start this job? 230
>0) 4 Have you looked for a second (additional) job in the past 12 months (or since started...)?
IF YES
(a) Why was this?
11) ) Have you looked for an alternative job in the past 12 months (or since started...)?
IF YES
(a) Wliy was this?
22 ) Are you in the process of looking for a job now?
IF YES
(a) Wliat is your main reason for planning/expecting to leave?
23 ) When you got the job a't the had it been difficult for you to find the sort of job you wanted?
IF YES
(a) What made it difficult?
24 ) If you liad to look for another job, how easy do you think it would be now to find a job you
would be prepared to accept?
IF DIFFICULT
(a) Why would it be difficult?
WOMEN AGED UNDER 40
25) Women's work plans are often affected by whether or not they expect to have any (more) children.
Do you think you will have any (more) children at sane time in the future?
IF YES
(a) Are you planning to return to wrk after you liave the baby?
OR Do you think you would want to continue working, apart from a period of maternity leave?
OR Would you give up work altogether?
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.25) (b) (Whether or not you intend returning to your present job after you have a baby) how soon
after the baby's birth do you think you would start work again?
(c) Do you tliink you would work full-time or part-time at first?
ALL
26) Thinking forward over the next 3 or 4 years, do you expect to be working here at the 7
(a) Wliat sort of work lo you think you will be doing?
AGED OVER 40
27) Do you expect to go oil working until you reach retirement age?
IF NO OR PART-TIME
(a) Why do you think you may stop work/go part-time before you reach retirement age?
SECTION III RESPONDENT'S WORK HISTORY AND EDUCATION
Later on in this section, I want to ask you some questions about your education, but first I would like
to fill in some details about the previous jobs you have had.
28> What was your first job after leaving school?
(a) When was tliat?
(b) Was this job full-time or part-time?
(i) Approximately how many hours a week did you work?
(c) How long were you in this job?
(d) What were your reasons for leaving your first job?
(i) What was your main reason for leaving?
IF SINGLE NO DEPENDENI'S GOTO Q /yj fflO
Repeat Q. 28 (a) - (d) in relation to PENULTIMATE JOB
IF MARRIED/HAS CHILDREN
Having established reason for leaving first job, if NOT for pregnancy/childcare then establish
30) 1) Wliat the FIRS! EXTr JOB was (ie.exits for pregnancy not including maternity leave)
Repeat Q 20 (a; - Id;
31) 2) Wliat the FIRST RE-ENIRY JOB (CASUAL/TENPl was. Repeat Q 28 (a) - (d)
<! '
32) 3) What the FIRST PERMANENf RE-ENIRY JOB was. Repeat Q 28 (a) - (d)
33) Wliat the PENULTIMATE JOB was. Repeat Q 28 (a) - (d)
34) Approximately how many paid jobs have you had since your first Job?
(a) How many of these were full-time and how many part-time?
.35) How many spells out of employment have you had?
(a) Wlvat were the reasons for these spells out of eriployment?
(b) How long did each of these spells last?
• 36) What type of school did you last attend?
(a) Did it cliange while you were there?
IF YES
(i) What type was it when you first went?
37) How old were you when you left this school?
38) At school did you get any formal qualifications or pass part of a qualification?
IF YES
(a) What did you get?
39) Wliat was your father's job at the time you left school (or last job held)?
6?) LCVva-f -h taoo Loft Tc Ko>ol Lor [cr^
AO) Have you had any full-time education or training s<jnce leaving school?
IF YES
(a) Did it lead bo qualifications of any sort?
IF YES
(i) What was the Mghest qualification you obtained?
41) Have you had any part-time further education?
IF YES
(a) Wliat was the highest qualification?
(b) Are you currently studying for any qualfication?
92) Did you serve an apprenticeship?
IF YES
(a) In wtiat occupation? 233
SECTION IV CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENT'S JOB
I should now like to ask you sane more questions about your job here at the
43) Would you say tliat your work Is fairly typical of hospital cleaning here in the or do you
do any particular tilings tliat others don't normally do? (probe - patient related activities)
44) How much choice do you liave about the way you do you job - tliat is the tasks you lvave to do and the
order in which you do these tasks? Would you say it is
(a) Mainly laid down with not much clioice
(b) or only partly laid down, and mostly up to you
45) Thinking of your supervisor/assistant manager/manager - which of you lias the most control over
what you actually do on the job?
(a) How closely does she supervise you?
(b) When you supervisor/assistant manager/manager wants you tt do something, does she usually
(i) just ask you to do it ?
(ii) or does she discuss it with you at all?
46) I am going to read out a list of some of the tilings that affect how people feel about their jobs and
I want you to tell me how satisfied you feel with each in your present job. Can you choose your
answers from this card.
How satisfied are you with....
(a) The people you work with
(b) The ease of your journey to work
(c) Your prospects
(d) Your liours of work
(e) The sort of work you do
(f) Your rate of pay
(g) The opportunity to use your abilities
(h) How secure your job is
(i) The pace of work and the standards required in your job
(j) Overall, how do you feel about your job
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SECTION V COMPARISON : BEFORE AND AFTER THE BONUS - WORKERS UIFO WORKED BEFORE BONUS IN1RODUCED
I would now like to talk about your work before the bonus was introduced last and liow it
compares with your present work under the bonus scheme.
47). Has there been much of a change in the work you do?
48) Wliat difference, if any, lias the introduction of the bonus made to your work?
49) Did you expect there to be much change after the bonus was introduced?
(a) Why/why not?
50) Did you clean the same area as you do now before the bonus was introduced?
IF NO
(a) Where did you clean before?
ALL (i) Did you work the same number of hours per week as you do now?
>
IF NO
(ii) How many hours did you normally work per week before?
> (b) Wliat was your shift before?
51) Was it possible to do overtime and therefore to earn extra money before the bonus was introduced?
IF YES
(a) Are you able to do more or less overtime now?
5?) Did you do cover work before?
IF YES
(a) How often?
(b) Were you paid for doing this?
(c) Do you do more or less cover work now than before?
53) Was your actual cleaning routine and method the same before as it is now?
(a) Regarding the completion of all the work you are required to do - would you say that
(i) you managed more easily before the bonus was introduced
(ii) or you manage more easily now tliat the bonus lias been introduced.
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54) How much choice did you have about the way you did your job - that is the tasks and the order in
which they had to be done, before the bonus was introduced compared to now? Would you say tliat you liad
(a) more choice before the bonus was introduced
(b) or loss choice before
(c) or the same amount of choice
55) Thinking of your supervisor/assistant manager/manager which of you had the most control over wliat you
actually did on the job before the bonus was introduced"- compared to now?
(a) How closely were you supervised before the tonus was introduced compared to now?
(b) When your supervisor wanted you to do something, did she usually 1
(i) just ask you to do it
(ii) or did she discuss it with you at all - before the tonus was introduced?
56) I am going to read out the list of tilings that affect how people feel about their jobs again and I
want you to think back to the period before the bonus was introduced and tell me how satisfied you felt
with each in your job. Can you choose your answers from this card again.
How satisfied were you before the tonus was introduced with...
(a) The people you worked with
(b) The ease of your journey to work
(c) 'Your prospects
(d) Your hours of work
•(e) The sort of work you did
(f) your rate of pay
(g) The opportunity to use your abilities
00 How secure your job was
(i) The pace of work and standards required in your job
OJ) Overall, how did you feel about your job before the bonus was introduced?
57) Are you more or less satisfied with the work that you have to do now compared with your before the
bonus was introduced?
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58) How involved were you in the staffs decision to request the bonus schene?
(a) Were you in favour of the bonus?
(b) Why in your opinion did the staff request the bonus scheme?
(c) Reflecting on how the different payment systems have operated, which do you prefer and why?
59) In your opinion, wliat is the''purpose of incentive bonus payment schemes? Would you say that
their purpose is
(a) to increase individual worker's earnings
(b) or to reorganise 'the method of work to secure overall financial savings for hospital management.
SECTION VI. RESPONDED!'S EARNINGS
60) How much do you presently earn per week from your job at the Hospital?
(a) take-home including bonus
(b) gross including bonus
(c) overtime - take-home including bonus
(d) overtime - gross including bonus
FOR THOSE WHO WORKED BEFORE THE BONUS WAS INTRODUCED
61) How much per week did you normally earn before the bonus was introduced?
(a) take-hcme
(b) gross
(c) overtime (gross/take-home specify)
62) Are there more opportunities to increase your earnings now or were there more before?
(a) Do you actually earn more, less or the same now as you did before?
Specify whether gross or take-home.
FCR THOSE WriH OTHER JOB(s)
63) How much do you earn in your other job(s)?
(a) take-home
(b) gross
(c) overtime (gross/take-home specify)
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SECTION VII RESPONDENT'S HOUSEHOLD
Now I'd like to ask some questions about the people who live with you and what they do and if you have
children, who looks after them when you're at work and so on.
64) Are you niarried/liave a partner, separated, divorced, widowed or single?
FCR MARRIED/WITH PARTNER ONLY (CUllERS GO TO Q 68 )
6J) Does your husband/partner have a job?
IF YES
(a) Wliat does s/he do?
(i) Does s/he work full-time or part-time?
Specify number of liours.
IF NO
(b) Even tliough your partner isn't working, does s/he have a paid job tliat s/he is away from at
present?
IF NO
(c) Why is your partner not working at the moment?
IF HUSBAND/PARTNER IS WORKING
66) Sometimes the sort of job a husband does can affect his wife's employment - I mean whether or
not she works or the job or hours she does.
Does your husband's/partner's job affect the sort of job you can do?
Hj YES
(a) In wliat ways does his job affect your employment?
IF HUSBAND/PARTNER IS NOT WORKING
67) Sometimes whether a husband is working or not can affect Ms wife's employment - I mean whether or
not she works or the job or hours she does.
Does your husband's/partlier's not working affect the sort of job you do?
IF YES
(a) In what ways does Ms not working affect your employment?
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FOR ALL
60) Record details of household in which informant lives.
Wlio lives in your household?
What is their reLationship to you? on/ II -
Wliat do they do? - }.£■ rOM (
How old are tliey? '
THOSE WITH CHILDREN
69) I!ow many of your children are still financially dependent on you?
ALL
70) Do you have any (other) dependents apart from spouse or children?
71) Apart from looking after the family in the usual way, some women have extra responsibilities
for looking after a sick or elderly friend or member of the family. Is there anyone like this who
depends on you to provide some regualr service for them?
IF YES
(a) Who is tliis person?
(b) May I just check, does s/he live with you?
(i) How often do you see Mm/her?
(c) Wliat is it you do for ... (or do you just generally look after him/her)?
(d) About how long do you spend doing this each day/week?
(e) Has wliat work you do or the hours you work been affected in any way by having to look after...?
IF YES
(i) In wliat ways lias it affected your work?
THOSE WITH CHILDREN
72) Do you need to arrange for anyone (else) to look after your child(ren) while you are at work?
»
IF NO GO TO Q 76
IF YES
ARRANGEMENTS FOR IRESCHOOL AGE CHILDREN
73) Wlio looks after you child(ren) wliile you are working?
(a) How much does this cost you each week altogether?
239
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN
74) Blinking of your chiid(ren) who go/es to school, who looks after him/her/them...
(a) In term time
(b) In the school holiday's
(c) How much does this cost you each week?
ALL WITH CHILDREN
75) If your child(ren) is/are ill or need(s) to be taken anywhere by you, can you get time off work
easily?
(a) Would you take time off anyway?
(b) Do you have to take time off...
(i) As part of your holidays
(ii) As part of your own sick leave
(iii) As unpaid leave
(iv) other specify
(c) Are you able to make up for the time you take off?
SECTION VIII HOUSE! iOLD FINANCE
I'd like to ask a few more questions about your financial situation. I am interested in the different
components of household income and the ways in which wages from enployment fit into income gained
from other sources.
IF HUSBAND/PARTNER





77) How much does/do the other adult(s) in your household earn/what is their income?
ALL
78) Are you (or your housband/partner) at present receiving any cf the state benefits or allowances
listed on this card?
(
240
79) Apart from earnings and benefits do you (and your partner/husband) receive any regular income
from any other sources, such as those listed on this card?
80) Could you tell me, how much is your (and your husband's/partner's) net income from ALL the sources
you liave mentioned - I mean your total income after income tax, national insurance and other
statutory deductions? I ol • C Lcv\j> l\(S .
81) Is your (liouseliold's) accotunodation owned or rented?
IF OWNED
(a) Is it owned outright or being bought on a mortgage or loan?
IF RENTED
(b) Is it rented from the Council, a housing association or rented privately?
OTHERS
(c) Wliat sort of arrangement do you have?
ALL
^d) Type of accommodation occupied by household - specify.
IF BOARDER
82) Do you pay for your board and lodging?
YES (a) How much do you pay in total each week?
(b) Wliat does this cover?
IF OWNER/OCCUPIER
83) Can you tell me the average monthly mortgage payments tliat you pay?
(a) Wliat are your rates payments?
(b) Insurance payments
IF RENTS
84) How much rait do you pay?
(a) Do you pay rates separately or is it included in your rent or are you not responsible for
paying rates at all?
(i) How much are your rates?
(b) Does/do the rait (and rates) you pay include any rait (or rates) rebate?
(i) How much of a rebate do you get?
MARRIED/COHABITING PEOPLE
85) If you were not working, would you be able to get by alright on your husband's/partner's money?
Would you say that you
(a) would liave to give up a lot of tilings
(b) or would you not be able to manage at all without the money you earn?
(c) or would It make no real differaice at all?
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SECTION LX TRADE UNION AFFILIATION AND PARTICIPATION
86) Are you a member of a trade union?
IF YES
(a) Which union?
(b) Do you ever attend union meetings?
if no
(i) Is there any particular reason why you don't go to union meetings?
(c) Have you ever held any office in you union - such as shop steward or committee member?
(d) In general, are you liappy with the way the union looks after the pay and other conditions of
employment at your work place?
(e) How would you compare your union to other unions organising domestic assistants/supervisors?
IF NO
(f) Why have you not joined a union? 7
('0 t5v] cT" VOW V~Cp. .
(Hi) Have you ever belonged to a trade union? HFrJOOi) HP Wyo i^oq,y-p. ^Tp/Jvo? C I'vDcl ta-i «-a"To ft
iracclQl ^Ou Cora ItAJLI - \OMlv-«=\ u>o 0
87) Thinking of trade unions generally, are you in favour of them? -J
SECTION X WAGES AND JOBS GENERALLY - RESPONDENTS PERCEPTIONS
I should now like to ask sane questions about jobs - how they differ in various ways, the kinds of
people who do them and so on.
First, I should like to ask sane more about the people you work with and the sort of work you do.
88) Do you think of your work as :
- mainly women's work
- mainly men's work
- or work tliat either men or women do?
(a) Why do you think your job at the City is mainly done by women?
Here Is a list of jobs that I should like to have your views on. (P/P ) M/f- > HlCffiSj ).
89) Let's start by considering the question of general working conditions, tilings like hours worked,
unsocial hours, pleasant surroundings as against noisy or dirty ones. Would you order the jobs from
tliat with the best conditions to that with the worst.
■ (a) Where would you place your own job in terms of the working conditions?
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90) Can we now turn to the incomes that people get from each of the jobs. How much do you think an
average person in each of these jobs earns?
*j.l) Could you now look at these jobs again and tliis time consider....
(a) Which one would be mainly done by a young married man with children?
(b) Which ones would mainly be done by a woman single parent?
(c) Which ones would mainly be done by an older married woman with school age children?
(d) Wliich ones would nvainly be done by an older single man?
92.) At the present time, everyone may agree on the desirability of reducing unemployment, but there
is alot of discussion about the need to expand competitive employment sectors, thus creating
more productive jobs and to cut back on unproductive jobs.
Would you say tliat public sector jobs should be cut back?
(a) Are there any of these types of jobs tliat it is necessary to cut back on?
(b) Are there any of these types of jobs that it is necessary to create more of?
93) I am now going to read out some statements often made in respect of jobs and wages and I want
you to say whether you agree or disagree with then.
(a) There should be a single rate for the job irrespective of job performance, on the understanding
tliat general work performance is adequate.
(b) Laws giving men and women equal pay for equal work ahve been very important and progressive
pieces of legislation.
(c) Die public sector should take a lead rather than follow the private sector, in respect of rates
of pay.
(d) To get a decent wage you have to ruin your social life by working much too long on over-time
or shifts.
(e) There should be a statutory minimum wage which all anployers liave to observe.
(f) There's alot of talk about fair wages, but nobody pays a fair wage for people like me.
(g) Recent moves by the government to increase competition for jobs and services is increasing
Inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth.




Statistical testing and small samples
Chi-square was the main statistic used in testing the significance of association. SPSSX
automatically applies Yates' correction of Chi-square for lack of continuity in all 2X2
contingency tables. Correction for lack of continuity is, however, generally only
recommended when df=1 and any expected frequency is less than 10 (Downie and Heath
1974). Moreover, Yates' correction has been argued to over-correct, leading to an
underestimated approximation of the level of significance. An alternative formula, which
makes a much smaller correction is that proposed by Pirie and Hamden1. (Downie and
Heath 1974:197). Therefore, where df=1 and any expected frequency is less than 10 (but
greater than 2), I have manually calculated the Pirie-Hamden correction of Chi-square. In
2X2 tables where the expected frequencies of each cell is 10 or more, I have calculated the
raw Chi-square.
Where there are fewer than 20 cases in a 2X2 table, SPSSX automatically computes
Fisher's Exact Test. As the name implies, Fisher's Exact method computes the exact
probability of association (whereas Chi-square is an approximation). The Chi-square
approximation is generally used for larger samples and tables because the actual
computation of exact probabilities is very laborious or impossible (Hays 1981:552). In
smaller 2X2 tables and, in particular, where expected frequencies are very small (2 or less),
Fisher's exact method should be used (Downie and Heath 1974:198). Even so, the formula
entailed in Fisher's Exact Test involves 9 factorials which is formidable2. Fortunately,
Finney et al (1963) provide tables for computing exact probabilities for 2X2 tables with
marginals up to 40, which makes the task easier.
1 Pirie and Hamden correction of Chi-square is expressed in the following formula:
x2 = N[(ad-bc) - 0.5]2 + klmn
2 Fisher's Exact Test: p=(a+b)!(c+d)!(a+c)!(b+d)l + Nlalblcld!
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Most of the associations presented in the current study are based on 2X2 tables and consist
of nominal variables. Thus Phi has been selected as the most appropriate measure of
strength of association3. Phi adopts a more restrictive definition of perfect associaton than
Yules Q, requiring all of the data to be concentrated in one diagonal of the table for there to
be a perfect association (Loether and McTavish 1988). The Phi coefficient, for nominal
variables, can vary between 0 and 1. In rxc tables other than 2X2 tables, gamma is used to
measure the strength of association4.
3 Phi = ad-bc/(klmn)Y2
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FROM PUBLIC PROVISION TO PRIVATISATION:
THE CRISIS IN WELFARE REASSESSED
Jane Pulkingham
Abstract Privatisation policies, pursued by a government informed by neoclassical
economic theory and intent on 'rolling back the frontiers of the welfare state', have been
widely criticised as turning the tide against both the 'welfare state' and 'welfare' more
broadly. The policy to privatise public industries and services is, in effect, both an
employment and wage policy: the intention is to govern, not simply the general type of
service provision but also, the method of wage determination itself. The argument in this
paper is that the privatisation strategy is the culmination of, rather than a digression from,
post-war policies in the public sector concerning wage determination. In arguing that
privatisation represents the culmination of public sector wage policies in the post-war
period, it is being suggested that privatisation denotes the most categorical statement and
extension of successive policy developments promoting the salience of so-called 'market'
principles in the determination of wages. It is contended, furthermore, that the legitimacy
of and increasing emphasis given to criteria such as efficiency and productivity in the name
of 'economic necessity', has been cultivated as a result of the power given to economic, as
against social explanations, rather than emanating from any intrinsic 'economic' logic.
Political and social research concerning the privatisation of public services, though often
highly critical of the Government's philosophical and economic beliefs, nevertheless has
perpetuated and ultimately reinforced these beliefs by failing to challenge fully the
principles underlying the privatisation agenda. The privatisation debate is premised upon
the assumption that 'the logic of the market' provides a salient description of the overall
process occurring. I would suggest that this needs to be reconsidered and an alternative
conception established to further our practical and analytical understanding of the
processes observed.
Introduction
The privatisation programme heralded by the present Conservative Government,
is premised explicitly upon neoclassical economic theory, and ascribes paramount
importance to the belief in 'market forces' distributing resources, that is, wages,
jobs, goods and services. It is argued that by introducing 'market competition',
privatisation will make public industries and services more efficient, providing better
'value for money' by removing wasteful employment practices (cf. Kay et al. 1986;
Beesley and Littlechild 1986; Moore, M.P. 1986; Minford 1987; Barry 1987; Ascher
1987). Privatisation is an umbrella term encompassing an array of policies designed,
in the Government's view, to 're-establish' the primacy of so-called 'market'
principles in the provision of public services and these policies are at the heart of
controversies concerning the distribution of resources.
The policy to privatise public industries and services is, in effect, both an
employment and wage policy: the intention is to govern, not simply the general type
of service provision but also, the method of wage determination itself. My argument
in this paper is that the privatisation strategy is the culmination of, rather than a
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digression from, post-war policies in the public sector concerning wage
determination. In arguing that privatisation represents the culmination of public
sector wage policies in the post-war period, I am suggesting that privatisation
denotes the most categorical statement and extension of successive policy
developments promoting the salience of so-called 'market' principles in the
determination of wages. It is my contention, furthermore, that the legitimacy of and
increasing emphasis given to criteria such as efficiency and productivity in the name
of 'economic necessity', has been cultivated as a result of the power given to
economic, as against social explanations, rather than emanating from any intrinsic
'economic' logic.
Political and social research concerning the privatisation of public services,
though often highly critical of the Government's philosophical and economic
beliefs, nevertheless has perpetuated and ultimately reinforced these beliefs by
failing to challenge fully the principles underlying the privatisation agenda. The
privatisation debate is premised upon the assumption that 'the logic of the market'
provides a salient description of the overall process occurring. I would suggest that
this needs to be reconsidered and an alternative conception established to further our
practical and analytical understanding of the processes observed.
I do not doubt that the alterations to employment and service provision witnessed
exacerbate forms of inequality. However, I would suggest that the restructuring
occurring in the wake of privatisation policies, though heralded (by supporters and
critics) as resulting from the introduction of 'disciplines of the market' to public
services, cannot be straightforwardly attributed to the operation of 'market
processes'. Thus, the observed diversification is not one of 'privatisation' in the
underlying sense in which it is widely used and intended, that is, as increasing the
role of 'market forces'.
As Block has argued (1986:177- 181), both free-market theorists and leftists share
similar analytical understandings of the tension between politics and the 'logic of the
market economy'. Both positions assume that improvements in social welfare
through government action constitutes interference with the 'logic of the market' or
the exigencies of accumulation. This in turn rests on the assumption that the 'market
economy' is autonomous, obeying a single logic. Thus government policies represent
superstructures on top of an economic base and are perceived either to ameliorate or
obstruct 'market forces'. When referring to 'market forces' then, I am primarily
using the term in the sense that it is employed as an economic rationale for processes
of resource distribution and exchange in society. That is, as an economic function,
the 'market' is assumed to have an internal logic of its own which governs allocative
processes.
Further, in arguing that the privatisation strategy is coextensive with post-war
public sector wage policies, what I wish to emphasise is the persistent underlying
presumption that a market determination of wages operates in the private sector and
that public sector forms of resource distribution are not simply different, but
essentially aberrant. It is this rationale which has seriously constrained all forms of
public sector resource distribution and which has been a critical factor shaping the
perceived 'crisis in welfare'. This crisis, signalled over the past decade or so by the
collapse of consensus regarding the 'mixed-economy' of 'market' and 'state' welfare
assumed by pioneers of the 'welfare state' (Mishra 1984), could be argued to have
been endemic.1 Accordingly, I would suggest that a better perspective and account of
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the current welfare crisis or 'rolling back of the welfare state', in which valued
services and citizenship rights are being seriously eroded, should be provided. As I
attempt to argue in this paper, the Keynes-Beveridge rationale for state intervention
pandered to the notion of the 'economic logic of the market' and, whether as a force
to be mitigated or elevated, this logic is, I would suggest, entirely misleading.2
Throughout the post-war period, the question of public sector pay has been
central to the growing concern about the increasing size and, more importantly, the
increasing cost of maintaining the public sector. The prevailing presumption is that
public expenditure, affording essentially 'unproductive' services, is a drain on the
national economy, threatening economic growth. Wages are regarded as the largest
element in escalating public expenditure costs. There are, however, problems in
measuring government activity and public expenditure. Measures of public sector
size are relatively arbitrary in two ways — in relation to public sector accounting
practices and in relation to welfare costs specifically. Criticisms of public service
provision in fact mobilise a stereotypical conception of 'the welfare state' which
conveniently disregards the broad range of welfare benefits provided and, the
equally diverse recipients of these benefits.
The nature of the social divisions of welfare (Titmuss 1958; Sinfield 1986) and the
interplay between fiscal, economic and social policies reflect these entrenched, and
in my view, incorrect assumptions about the relation between 'socio-political' and
'economic' processes. The attempted subsumption of social processes under the
centrality of market-commodity production stems from the separation of
'economic' processes from apparently additional 'social' influences. This conceptual
framework has important implications for understandings of the distribution and
allocation of resources.
The future of welfare, a question central to issues of citizenship and the
universality of social rights in contemporary society, is necessarily bound up with
controversies concerning the distribution of income and resources. This debate,
which has focused on the role of the public sector, involves distinctions between
apparently alternative forms of income, that is, income from individual 'civil rights'
(participation in the economy) and income from 'social rights' (Marshall 1964:72).
As Friedland and Sanders argue (1986), the pressure to hold down 'social' wages and
cut back welfare state provision generally, is rooted in the presumption that
different logics govern the allocation of 'private' and 'social' wages. Public sector
employment is doubly implicated in this given that the public sector serves both as a
source of employment and as a form of welfare provision.
Public Sector Wage Policy Developments
Welfare issues then, in particular, those of public as opposed to private sector
service provision, highlight the problematic nature of the division of economic and
social processes which has been a common feature of theories addressing the
distribution of resources. The assumed dichotomy, the separation of economic and
social factors, is a contrived one imposing serious limitations on our understanding
of social processes, and fostering unconvincing explanations of inequality.3 The
separation of economic and social categories has far reaching policy implications
which are reflected in the analysis and design of policies concerning the provision of
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social services, and wage and employment legislation. I wish to delineate the way in
which privatisation, a policy narrowly conceived in terms of economic criteria, is a
product of the assumed fundamental disjunction between social and economic
factors.
The debate about public sector pay has invariably been set in relation to private
sector pay. The controversy centres on the relative rates of growth of average
earnings in the two sectors and the apparent divergence of average pay levels. The
controversy, though arguably heightened since the early 1970s, has always been a
pressing issue. There has been a dual concern underlying the endeavour to clarify the
principles determining pay in the public sector: firstly, to specify the ostensibly
economic relationship between the so-called 'productive' and 'non-productive' or
'market' and 'non-market' areas of employment, in order to aid the formulation of
government employment policy; and secondly, to ensure that public sector
employees are not poorly paid in relation to other workers, apparently a socio¬
political objective, deriving in part from the former problem.
Public expenditure, defined generally as the 'dispensation by the state on non-
market criteria of economic resources which it has acquired from firms and
households' (Heald 1983:10), is used to measure the size of the public sector, usually
by comparison with the national income aggregate, Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
It is not the purpose here to discuss in detail the various public expenditure/national
income ratios which, by all accounts, record an expanding share of national income
involving the state. Nonetheless, it is important to restate the standard cautionary
warnings, typically ignored, that there are problems in measuring government
activity and public expenditure and therefore, measures of public sector size are
relatively arbitrary. In the protracted political debate about the size of the public
sector, such measures have, nevertheless, been extensively employed, and have
themselves contributed to an escalation of concern over what appears to be the
steady encroachment of the public sector on the rest of the economy.
Government policies regarding public sector wages have taken various forms over
the post-war period. Essentially, there have been five institutional approaches:
incomes policies, fiscal policies, arbitration and enquiry, cash limits on public
expenditure, and privatisation. Successive enquiries concerning the pay and
conditions of employment for public service workers in the civil service, local
government and the NHS, beginning with the Tomlin Commission in 1929 and
ending with the Clegg Commission in 1980, have accorded priority to the principle
of pay comparability. This principle, that 'fair market rates' should be paid to
public service workers, stemmed from two rather conflicting concerns. One major
concern was the need to recruit and retain sufficient staff in the public sector.
Another concern, from the point of view of the Treasury, was that a broad
comparison of wages provided by the generality of outside employers established, as
near as could be, a surrogate commercial 'market' basis for wage determination in
the public sector. A 'market price' was argued to be necessary in order to provide
some defence against criticisms (from both employees and 'taxpayers') about public
sector wage levels and public expenditure costs in general.
I would argue that the development of incomes policies, cash limits and
privatisation has demonstrated a progression towards tighter controls designed to
constrain public expenditure with particular pressure on wages. Incomes policies,
policies designed to control the rate of growth in wages, are the most obvious and
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familiar form of government wage intervention and were widely used in the years
1948- 1979. The operation of pay comparability exercises as the basis of
remunerating public service workers was often modified or deferred on the grounds
of national incomes policies. From the mid-1970's, incomes policies were
accompanied by the use of cash limits on public expenditure which, since 1981, have
been employed more extensively and stringently. Cash limits, intended to restrict the
cash requirements for the public sector as a whole, do so to a large extent by limiting
wage costs. The assumptions underlying cash limits include provisions for projected
pay movements and thus reflect an implicit government policy on pay. Privatisation
of the 1980's, which incorporates policies to contract-out public services,
denationalise public industries and 'liberalise' legislative controls, is both a wage and
employment policy, intended to introduce to the public sector a 'market allocation'
of wages and services thereby restricting wages.
The common rationale for incomes policies, cash limits and privatisation alike, is
the prevailing presumption that public expenditure, affording essentially
'unproductive' services, is a drain on the national economy, threatening economic
growth. It is the nature of public services in particular which is argued to create the
problem of allocating resources (which includes wages, jobs and services) because
demands are not restrained by a 'market price'. This has been most explicitly
addressed and politicised by the current government but has informed and
constrained government employment and wage policies throughout the post-war
period.
The following series of extracts taken from government documents over the post¬
war period is intended to provide a sense of this uninterrupted logic.
The nation's economic welfare depends largely upon our ability to make and sell the
exports necessary to buy the imports we need to feed our people and keep our industry
going. Our costs of production are of vital importance and they depend to a considerable
extent on the amount which industry has to pay in profits, salaries and wages (1948:para 1;
emphasis added).
Thus began the first incomes policy of the post-war period. Warning of the ever
present dangers of inflation, the policy declared that there should be no further
general increase in levels of individual money incomes without a corresponding
increase in the volume of production. A year previously, the Interim Report of the
Cost of Living Advisory Committee (1947) suspended the existing cost-of-living
index, proposing in its stead a retail price index. The adoption of an interim index
and the subsequent retail price index, in part stemmed from the out-dated basis of
the official cost-of-living index figure. However, as the Interim Report itself
indicates, the desired revision was not simply due to the fact that the index was out
of date but that the whole conception of a 'cost-of-living' index had come to be
perceived as inappropriate and misleading. The adoption of the index based on retail
prices rather than costs or standards of living facilitated the desired distancing of the
index from an explicit wage index; a policy clearly in line with the anti-wage inflation
concerns of the government at that time.
In the 1956 White Paper The Economic Implications of Full Employment, the
government underlines the 'obvious social evil' of continually rising prices, the most
important factor being productivity concerns — wages and productivity levels.
The 'social unfairness' of the 'spiral of rising incomes and prices' is ardently
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criticised. The objective, to achieve full employment without inflation is,
nonetheless, bound by the view that levels of income depend on the balance of
supply and demand.
The Government of this country does not attempt to tell the people what income each one
of them ought to be receiving at any given moment. Wages are fixed by free
negotiation.... But the satisfactory operation of this whole system depends upon everyone
involved being fully aware of the issues at stake, and upon their acceptance of the full
duties of citizenship which this realisation places upon them (1956:para 31).
The ordained solution was self-restraint together with increasing productivity.
The Economic Survey of 1962 indicates that one of the main factors contributing
to poor national productivity performance at that time was the
.. .growth in employment during the past two years.. .of workers (for example
immigrants, school workers and women, including many working part-time) who have
gone largely into the service industries, where output is difficult to measure, or whose
contribution to production is for various reasons bound to be limited (1962:para 43).
The Incomes Policy of 1969 notes that '[Slince the war, governments have needed to
find a new approach, breaking the hitherto link between expansion and inflation'
(1969:para 1). The statement suggests that the special problems with pay in the
public sector, that is, the difficulty in measuring output and making a direct link
between efficiency and pay, is because a 'market price' cannot normally be assigned
to the value of labour's output, 'thus removing one of the major factors which bear
on pay in other sectors of the economy' (1969:para 93). By the mid-1970's,
containing the growth of public expenditure (and wage increases) was pursued
through the use of, not only incomes policies, but also cash limits.
In planning total public expenditure, the Government have to ensure that the resources
taken by the public sector are sensibly related to the total resources available in the
economy as a whole (Cash Limits on Public Expenditure 1976:para 1).
Since 1981, the Public Expenditure Surveys (which form the basis for government
decisions about public expenditure finance) have been conducted in terms of cash
expenditures rather than in terms of 'volume' expenditure. This cash planning is a
further extension of the general principle of cash limits as a means of controlling
cash spending. The purpose is 'to decide first what can and should be afforded, then
to set expenditure plans for individual programmes consistently with that decision'
(1984:para 25).
Again it is argued, but more forcefully, that it is the nature of public services
which creates the problem of allocating resources because demands are not
restrained by the 'price mechanism'. Public pay and pensions, said to account for
about one third of public expenditure, or 13% of GDP, are criticised further
for having a far heavier effect on public services such as law and order (73%),
education (62%), health and personal social services (56%) and defence (37%)
(1984:para 43).
Wherever it is possible and sensible to do so, the government is seeking to transfer the
provision of services into the market sector. In other areas it may be possible to use charges
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as a more direct way of testing demand, even within the public sector. There may, too, be a
case for hypothecating revenues to individual expenditure programmes, particularly in the
social field, in order to bring home the costs (1984:para 26).
The implied 'oversupply' of public services in this statement should be noted.
To think of workers as part of a market is not to devalue them; it is to recognise that the
realities of economic life are not waived just because the factors are people, not things.
Skill and effort are traded between workers as sellers and employers as customers; and here
as in all other markets, the customer cannot be expected to buy unless he is getting what he
needs at a price he can afford (1985:para 5.3).
Until the early 1980's, the principle of pay comparability has existed alongside
incomes policies which, at best, have been intended to permit wage increases in line
with improvements in the 'efficiency of production'. Though the incoming Thatcher
Government did partially honour the recommendations of the Clegg Commission on
pay comparability in the NHS, the Commission was disbanded in 1980. In 1981, the
Government suspended the pay research procedures in the civil service and withdrew
from the existing civil service pay agreement. Following the report of the Megaw
Inquiry into civil service pay in 1982, the Civil Service Pay Review Unit which had
developed the pay comparability system operating over the post-war period in the
civil service, was also dismantled. The Government, recognising that pay
comparison was not an alternative to a 'market approach', but was a part of that
approach (Megaw 1982:para: 110) nonetheless criticised the assumption that 'fair
comparison' would adequately reflect 'market' rates of pay. Essentially the
Government believed that the range of comparator employers was too selective
raising pay levels in the civil service above their 'true market value' and that civil
servants were further privileged by underrated benefits such as job security. Thus
privatisation, in particular policies to tender public sector services to private
contractors (contracting-out), has become another, though more direct, form of
comparability exercise in which 'fair market rates' represent the lowest wages
provided by the generality of outside employers.
As this brief summary illustrates, the obsession with public expenditure over the
post-war period has become progressively intensified through time, reflected in the
increasing severity of measures adopted to curtail public expenditure growth. Wage
recusance is the primary factor implicated in the undesired cost increase. I would
suggest that this ultimate concern, to prevent wage inflation, rests on inadequate
assumptions about wage determination and erroneous notions of public sector
accounting.
'Economic' Rationales for Wage and Price Inflation
The fundamental theoretical ideas behind concerns to prevent wage and price
inflation are specific analyses of the relationship between employment and wages.
The most widely accepted theory allegedly explaining the behaviour of employment
and wages (as for example, indicated in the quotation above) is that the price of
labour (as any other type of 'commodity') is determined by the interactions of
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supply and demand in a market environment with equilibrium representing that
price at which the quantity demanded equals the quantity offered (an equality of
exchange).
Over the post-war period, economists' views about the determination of wages
have vacillated in relation to the 'Simple Phillips Curve', the 'Expectations Phillips
Curve' and 'Keynesian' and 'Institutionalise views of money wage determination
(Artis 1981; Davies 1983; Bleaney 1985). The neoclassical foundations of the Phillips
curve model and its successor, the Expectations Phillips curve, seem clear. An
alternative wage determination proposition is that put forward by the Keynesian/
Institutionalist theories of inflation. The Keynesian view is reflected in a number of
different perspectives. This in part stems from the fact that the General Theory does
not itself provide a model of money wage determination but implies that wages are
determined orthogonally to the economy, that is, outwith the economy. The
emphasis generally given by both Keynesian and Institutional theories of wage
determination is to social and political forces rather than economic forces. In
particular, trade unions and issues of 'comparability' are seen as being the primary
cause of increasing wages and costs. In this perspective, it is argued that the
maintenance of full employment over the post-war period enabled trade unions to
successfully push for higher wages, hence increasing inflation, a phenomenon
independent of (economic) market forces (Artis 1981; Davies 1983; Flemming 1978).
The oscillation of wage determination rationales, characteristic of the post-war
period, may be set out as a question of the location of this process in relation to the
economy, that is, whether the determination of wages is endogenous or exogenous to
the economy. The Phillips curve model, through its various stages of 'refinement', is
predicated on the assumption that the determination of wages is endogenous to the
economy. So-called socio-political explanations do not generally enter this debate
which uncritically accepts the neoclassical presumption that laws of supply and
demand in a market economy determine the price of all commodities, including
labour. Yet the failure of these models to explain the behaviour of wages, in
particular in relation to issues of gender, generation and ethnicity, which are not
adequately accommodated, has led to the search for explanations external to 'the
economy'. This search focuses on social and political processes as independent
forces either impinging on the essentially autarchic economic processes determining
wages or else operating entirely separately from the economy.
It is important to recognise that all these perspectives can be aligned in relation to
the position taken regarding conceptions of 'social' and 'economic' processes: where
the economic and social are not set up as mutually exclusive categories which have
no bearing upon one another they are, nonetheless, accorded intrinsic autonomy as
systems which have independent status but may operate interactively. Thus, for
example, wages are argued to be paid to positions on 'economic' grounds; but who
gets into the positions is argued to be a different matter and is generally explained in
terms of 'social' factors. It is this assumption of the relative independence and
coherence of 'economic' versus 'social' categories, informing theories of wage
determination and government policies, which I wish to criticise.4 The separation of
economic and social issues, though difficult to relinquish, entails a form of analysis
which inevitably contains contradictions (Stewart et al. 1980; Holmwood and
Stewart 1983; Prandy 1986). I wish to underline the explanatory failure and
contradictions inherent in analyses which assume that social and economic factors
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act upon wages as different and mutually exclusive orientations, by briefly
considering the Keynesian response to neoclassical economics and the issue of public
sector wage determination.
'Keynesian Economies': A Revolutionary Post-War Orthodoxy?
The main point to be developed in this section is that explanatory contradictions,
arising from the mobilisation of residual categories such as 'short-run empirical'
versus 'long-run theoretical' and distinct exogenous-social/endogenous-economic
components in explanations of wage inflation and wage determination, suggest that
the analyses concerned are no longer tenable. Given that economic theories of wage
determination and resource allocation play such a critical role in interpreting and
influencing public service sector developments, it is important for sociologists to
consider the adequacy of these explanatory models.
The idea that Keynes' General Theory produced a new revolutionary economics,
challenging the neoclassical tradition in a very fundamental way, has been effectively
dispelled (Bleaney 1985). As Bleaney argues, Keynes unquestioningly accepted the
bulk of orthodox economic assumptions as a basis for further development.
Nonetheless, the problem of so-called 'short-run' disequilibrium characteristic of
the 'real market world', which neoclassical economists have systematically avoided,
is addressed by Keynes' analysis. Thus, the remedial concept 'effective demand'
resurrected by Keynes (1985:2—17), attempts to explain why actual 'market
transactions' fail to operate consistently in terms of the primary (neoclassical)
theory. The notion of 'long-run' equilibrium as the benchmark remains
unchallenged however. Therefore I disagree with Bleaney's suggestion that Keynes
analysis adequately overcomes the gulf between favoured explanations and social
circumstances which has been the great weakness of neoclassical theory. On the
contrary, the remedial concept, 'effective demand' is a development which does not
eliminate explanatory contradictions, it simply shifts them to the contradiction
between short-term (social) and long-run (economic) processes. As Holmwood and
Stewart argue (1983) in relation to a parallel problem confronting stratification
theory - the contradiction between class (economic) and status (social) categories,
Further attempts to deal with these emerging explanatory failures may have the appearance
of the elaboration of theory but... [tlhey take their problems entirely from the preexisting
theory and are determined by its explanatory deficiencies... [as] they themselves are the
embodiment of these problems (1983:238).
The issue of the conceptual limitations of analytical systems is also addressed by
Goldthorpe (1978) in his consideration of the problem of inflation. As he cogently
illustrates, economist's analyses of inflation resort to the use of 'residual categories'
(which are typically negatively defined), to try and explain why modes of social
action fail to conform to the behaviour prescribed by the particular economic
analyses concerned. The difficulty, however, with using such residual categories is,
as highlighted above and as Goldthorpe suggests, that their application both
undermines and radically departs from the central tenets of the analysis (1978:212).
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Thus, following Parson's analysis in The Structure of Social Action (1937),
Goldthorpe argues that:
.. .the limits of an analytical system are best indicated by the occurrence of 'residual
categories': that is, categories which are introduced to deal with phenomena recognised as
relevant to the enquiry in hand... but categories which are at the same time distinguished
by their lack of theoretical fit with those that are central to the analytical system in use and
'positively defined' within it (1978:186).
Returning to the consideration of the Keynesian analysis then, the problem of
'short-run' dynamics, the 'empirical reality' of disequilibrium which is set against
the 'long-run' theoretical principles of equilibrium, is indeed exposed by Keynesian
analysis but is not resolved by it. Instead of leading to the development of a new
basis which is theoretically integrated, failure has prompted the ad hoc separation of
explanatory principles, in an attempt to explain away the countervailing tendencies
observed. The absence of the assumed equilibrating economic laws of supply and
demand of market-commodity production, is presented as simply a short-run
empirical question and not subject to theoretical determination. That is to say,
counteracting influences appear to be produced by a process external to the
analytical theory as though they are given, rather than acknowledged as an intrinsic
explanatory failure generated by the theory itself.
Similarly, separating social and economic categories is presented as necessary,
though the intention is to elaborate an integrated theory. This mobilisation of
distinct exogenous-social/endogenous-economic components is intended to provide
explanations of experience which cannot be accounted for by the other component
but nonetheless, the separate explanations contradict each other, giving rise to
incoherent principles of income determination. Social categories and explanations
are presumed merely to impinge upon established economic accounts. However, if
closer attention is paid, the consequence of invoking 'social' categories and
explanations is more powerful than simply exerting an influence which modifies, as
their utilisation negates 'economic' accounts (Stewart et al. 1985). As such, the use
of these distinctions should signal the occasion to produce an alternative
understanding in which explanations of processes, previously identified as primarily
'economic' and residually, 'social', are accomplished with categories which
encompass the full range of social circumstances. This should facilitate greater
theoretical integrity. Instead, the respecification of traditional wage relationships is
contingent, and generally specified counterfactually, as what-is-not-but-should-be,
rather than what actually is.
Given that unintegrable 'short' versus 'long-run' dynamics and 'economic' versus
'social' processes are mobilised in these analyses, how is change over time accounted
for? Goldthorpe suggests that it is recognition of processes of structural change
which sociological investigation permits. Thus, in relation to theories of inflation he
argues that:
...the ambition of any sociological enquiry must be...to investigate how inflation,
understood as the monetary expression of distributional conflict, is ultimately grounded
not in error, ignorance or unreason on the part of actors involved, in the way that
economic analyses are constrained to suggest, but rather in on-going changes in social
structures and processes (1978:195).
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That is to say, the use of residual categories in theoretical explanations indicates that
structural changes have occurred, undermining and rendering untenable the
analytical system which employs such residual categories. Furthermore, Goldthorpe
suggests that approaches to explanations of inflation by sociologists and economists
are necessarily competitive rather than complementary because of their different
evaluations of the capitalist market economy. Indeed, I would emphasise that they
are competitive because social theory attempts to develop the 'residual categories' in
a way that challenges their residual status. Whereas economists are said to perceive
the market economy to be inherently stable (or capable of being stabilised),
sociologists are said to view it as inherently unstable. In Goldthorpe's words, the
sociological view of the market economy is that it exerts a
constant destabilizing effect on the society within which it operates, so that it can itself
continue to function satisfactorily only to the extent that this effect is offset by exogenous
factors: most importantly, by the integrative influence of some basic value consensus in the
society, deriving from sources unrelated to the economy.. .(1978:194).
While I agree that evaluations of the market economy are indeed of central concern
and that both economic and sociological analyses tend to conceptualise the market
economy in the manner described by Goldthorpe, I consider this to be highly
problematic. More specifically, I do not share Goldthorpe's approval of this
particular, albeit predominant, Parsonian form of sociological theory. It appears to
me that Goldthorpe fails to appraise critically social theory as rigorously as he does
economic theory.
Contrary to Goldthorpe's suggestion, social theory has simply displaced, not
resolved, the problems highlighted by the use of residual categories in economic
theory and, moreover, has reinforced a restriction of the relevance of social theory
to a limited set of circumstances. Goldthorpe is critical of the position adopted by
economists, that in the 'long-run' the market economy is stable, as day-to-day social
circumstances and 'modes of social action' fail to conform to the behaviour
prescribed by economic theory. Economic theory, then, can only try and explain
social circumstances through the use of residual categories. Social theory, however,
adopts a similar strategy. In portraying the market economy as unstable in the 'long-
run' only, because factors exogenous to the economy are said to permit its continued
satisfactory functioning in the 'short-run', sociological analyses also fail to take
account of processes of change. Moreover, this form of analysis which maintains the
notion that social factors are 'exogenous', restricts the relevant field of study for
social theory to a limited set of circumstances perpetuating their perceived residual
status.
Understandings of social change and transition are crucial. As Abrams argues
(1972:18), one of the most important things about the sociological emphasis is that it
searches for 'tendentious explanations', that is, it attempts to account for both
structure and action over time. That sociological analysis has not been entirely
successful in this pursuit, which is highlighted above, is significant. More
specifically, sociology has perpetuated the 'objectification' and 'abbreviation' of
history (Abrams 1972:26) through its own use of 'conceptual polarities' (and often
by not challenging their use in related disciplines). As a result, processes of change
are not recognised, indeed, they appear to be impossible to delineate.
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The next section extends the discussion about the role of counterfactual forms of
explanation in engendering the controversies which beset issues of public sector
provision and, in particular, the perceived crisis in welfare.
Issues of Public Sector Provision and Accounting
Concerns about public sector wage determination and productivity issues reflect
problems which are created and sustained by the spurious separation of 'economic'
and 'social' processes, in particular, the reluctance to challenge the assumed
unassailability of the 'economics' of market and commodity production. The public
sector dilemma is two-fold. On the one hand, it is the apparent lack of a price
mechanism allocating resources (including wages) which is problematic. On the
other hand, the lower imputed productivity gains in the public service sector (which
is argued to be an essentially 'unproductive' or 'non-progressive' sector), further
exacerbates the perceived difficulties caused by the absence of a market allocation.
Together, these apparent malfunctions have not only generated the pressure to keep
wage costs down, but moreover, have operated against the expansion of public
service provision and generally restricted its development in an insidious way. This is
not to say that public service provision has not grown as very obviously it has.
However, there has always been a critical tension between the drive to expand and
improve welfare services and escalating concerns regarding the relative costs of
public service provision which, more often than not, focuses on wage costs alone
(mirroring economic models).
The importance of public sector pay movements in public expenditure is evidenced
by structural constraints on public expenditure produced by historical trends in a
phenomenon known as the 'relative price effect' (Price 1979). As Price argues, the
impetus to keep public expenditure costs down, in particular the drive to effect
public expenditure cuts by the Conservative Government which came into office in
1979, stems from the tendency for public expenditure to increase in relative cost over
time. This adverse relative price effect, more contentious in periods of relatively high
inflation than in others, is always present and furthermore, tends to re-emerge as a
more intractable problem because it has not been recognised as a continuous
problem. The root of the problem Price indicates, is the failure to measure public
service output properly. He suggests that:
...whereas pay rises in the 'enterprise' sector (public as well as private) are not fully
translated into price changes because of productivity offsets, in the government sector
productivity growth is assumed to be zero (in effect it is not measured), so that prices
increase as fast as wage and salary rates. This means that the price of the services provided
by government employees rises r per cent per annum faster than the price of goods and
services provided by the rest of the economy, where r is the rate of productivity growth in
the non-government sector (1979:69).
Hence, so long as pay in the public services tends to move in line with pay in other
sectors (and as long as productivity in the economy generally continues to grow) the
share of public spending in GDP will appear to increase, the relative price effect
being positive, representing a productivity disadvantage to the economy as a whole.
The convention which fails to impute productivity gains to government employees,
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argues Price, also circumscribes measurements of growth in government services:
any volume growth in services provided can only occur through increased
employment and therefore cost.
Price's argument is that the cyclical suppression of constraints on public spending
plans has meant that plans for the volume growth of public spending in these periods
have been established on questionable grounds, given that the adverse long-term
relative price effect is not explicitly addressed (1979:70). The remedy Price proposes
- to avoid the recurrent financial crises of control over public spending caused by
this erratic behaviour - is to recognise that:
public servants will not, in the longer run, accept lower growth of real incomes than their
counterparts in the non-government sector purely on the grounds of lower imputed
productivity gains. Attempts should therefore be made to identify actual or notional
productivity gains in the public services and this would at once relieve some of the pressure
to expand through recruitment and would prevent also the unjustified suppression of
relative incomes in the government sector. This succeeds in the short term at the cost of
disruption later (1979:75).
That Price regards this remedy as a viable short term solution only, concluding his
paper with the suggestion that nevertheless, the problem will re-emerge as strongly in
the future, indicates that perhaps he realises that the account provided is not an
entirely adequate statement or understanding of the problem.
Price's account, on the one hand, argues that if only one could ascribe some
productivity gain to public service output, then individuals (governments, taxpayers,
consumers) would no longer demand expanded service provision in the form of
employing more people. Instead, by imputing 'actual' or 'notional' productivity
gains, such persons would realise that the service was improving without any
employment increase. The implication is that (at best) without there being any actual
change in service provision (notional productivity gains merely credited to its
performance), individuals should be placated by the 'fact' that these services are
productive and are thus deemed to be expanding, as though their previous
assessment of the adequacy of service provision was incorrect. Price further argues
that if productivity gains were imputed, then there would also be less pressure to
suppress incomes in the government sector, as wages could increase in line with the
attributed productivity gains in that sector. Wage increases would, therefore, no
longer represent a productivity disadvantage to the economy as a whole.
There is a point to be made that public services are inaccurately classified as
'unproductive' and their contribution to society incorrectly assessed. The remedy is
not, however, one of imputing 'notional or actual productivity gains' to the public
sector. This is because the root of the problem is not as Price would have it, simply
the failure to measure public service output properly.5 On the contrary, the
classification of public services as 'unproductive' reflects entrenched assumptions
about the salience of market-commodity production, in particular, it is a
conventional reaction, consisting of the counterfactual categorisation and
explanation of activities which do not conform. The problem of identifying and
measuring outputs, although common to all products, especially services whether
public or private (Brown and Jackson 1986:106), is perceived as a threat to economic
stability really only when the services involved are not seen to be 'viably' operating
on the 'free market'.
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Price's analysis is, in fact, modelled on Baumol's (1967) formal examination of
the perceived 'problem of unbalanced growth in the economy', that is, the observed
growth of service employment and the persistent cumulative rising costs of
producing personal services in the public sector. Baumol's argument is, quite simply,
that there are two types of economic activities, one 'progressive' and the other 'non¬
progressive' : maintaining the output of the non-progressive sector entails cumulative
rising relative costs and the absorption ofmore of the labour force, and a decreasing
labour force in the progressive sector, slowing 'economic growth'. (Baumol ignores
the fact that 'economic growth' is measured in such a way as to favour the
'progressive' sector.)
.. .the place of any particular activity in the classification is not primarily a fortuitous
matter determined by the particulars of its history, but rather. . .it is a manifestation of the
activity's technological structure, which determines quite definitely whether the
productivity of its labour inputs will grow slowly or rapidly (1967:416).
It is important to unpack this statement. In doing so, one discovers that the critical
'technological structure' referred to in fact consists of labour's perceived role in the
process.6 In the 'progressive' sector, labour is argued to be an instrument merely
required for the achievement of the final product, whereas in the 'non-progressive'
sector, labour is said to be itself the end product (labour services are part, if not all,
of the product being produced). In this formulation, a productivity differential
exists between the 'progressive' and 'non-progressive' sectors, not because labour in
the non-progressive sector is working inefficiently.7 Rather, regardless of the most
'efficient' use of labour and technologies, the price of the non-progressive sector will
'rise cumulatively and without limit'.
It is argued that in the progressive sector, unit costs remain constant because
improvements in labour productivity are accompanied by equivalent wage rate
increases. In the non-progressive sector, alternatively, unit costs rise because wage
increases equivalent to that in the progressive sector take place while productivity
remains constant, if not actually decreasing. Hence the relative price of non¬
progressive sector outputs increase compared to those in the progressive sector.
Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that the non-progressive sector absorbs an
ever increasing proportion of resources (essentially labour) to the detriment of the
progressive sector. The employment expansion in the non-progressive sector and the
contraction in the progressive sector is argued to occur because the progressive
sector experiences cumulative increases in productivity (restricting labour growth)
whereas the non-progressive sector simply absorbs more and more labour to
maintain its output.8
There is a certain pathos about Baumol's argument. Despite the argued dangers to
economic growth represented by the expanding non-progressive sector (largely
identified as public services), Baumol concludes that:
This is a trend for which no man and no group should be blamed, for there is nothing that
can be done to stop it (1967:423).
The argument, however, is tautological and mobilises residual definitions. Baumol's
'proof' consists merely of a restatement of the observed expansion of personal
service employment because of its lack of 'productivity'. As Fraser notes (1987),
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services are essentially defined negatively, that is, as activities not producing material
goods. Once again, we witness the mobilisation of residual categories when
phenomena observed fail to conform to the assumed theoretical model. The pattern
of expanding service employment should represent a serious challenge to
assumptions about labour and market-commodity production, but is not regarded in
this way. Instead, it is set up as an emphemeral or superficial aberration, with the
theoretical model presumed to be unscathed and intact.
Contrary to Baumol's assertion (1967:416), the classification of activities as
'progressive' or 'non-progressive' is, in fact, crucially determined by a historical
tradition of insufficient responses to explanatory crises generating residual
components and contradictions in explanations. Moreover, the deliberate focus on
wage-labour costs alone, ignoring all other costs, and the particular concern about
services which do not operate on the 'free market' (1967:420 — 422) underline the
persistent and unresolved difficulties posed by the public service sector in the face of
obdurate refusals to relinquish the 'economic' market-commodity model of price
determination, whether for labour (wages) or other 'commodities'.
Public sector developments have created significant problems for this general
framework of understanding, taxing both its ability to explain the 'price of labour'
and economic accounting practices. The 'relative price effect', borne out of the
contradictions and explanatory failures of economic theory, is not an inevitability
but has nonetheless, very real and deleterious consequences for welfare
developments, constraining public service provision. Its rationale restricts
conceptions of 'economic' and 'social' systems, circumscribing forms of
organisation. Furthermore, the escalating 'economic' costs implied by the 'relative
price effect' find their counterpart in the increasingly rigid policy measures adopted
to control the 'problem'. In a sense, the post-war development of incomes policies,
cash limits and ultimately, privatisation, demonstrates the desperate resolve to try
and effect a 'market-based' price mechanism.
Rethinking the 'Public Welfare'/'Private Market' Division.
In this paper I have suggested that the crisis in welfare, linked as it is to issues of
wage determination and the distribution of resources more broadly, might be
understood as an issue not simply of scarce resources combined with philosophical
preferences for private enterprise. Rather, the crisis should be perceived to reflect
and to have been exacerbated by, the conceptual framework delineating resource
production and distribution in society. Furthermore, it is my suggestion that
recourse to notions of a 'market distribution', rely upon a contrived separation of
the allocative and distributional process and is a critical factor in the escalating crisis
in welfare.
From the point of view of most economists, the position adopted by many social
theorists, (including factors other than economic ones as part of the explanation), is
iconoclastic. However, it is my contention that most sociological arguments are
inadequate and should be developed much further to challenge the whole notion of
the operation of 'markets'. In summarising attempts to interpret women's
employment participation, especially their concentration in social welfare jobs, Rein
concludes that,
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The problem of interpretation lies in the twin reluctance of economists to move beyond
labour market supply theory and of sociologists to enter this terrain and establish a theory
of the sociology of labour markets (1985:55).
I would go a step further and remark that to the extent that sociologists have erred, it
is in doing precisely what Rein wishes them to do - they have entered this terrain
and attempted to provide market-based sociological explanations. Their reluctance
has been to move beyond market theory, in order to establish an alternative theory. I
would suggest that what is required, is an alternative inclusive explanation of social
welfare and resource distribution. As Stewart et al. argue (1980:106- 107), the
production of multi-dimensional models of stratification in order to try and
accommodate antithetical processes is at odds with both the underlying belief that
the stratification system operates consistently and attempts to provide a theoretically
integrated model. The intellectual appeal of an adequate endogenous account of
theory and practice should be upheld.
The tendency to depict public welfare as 'unproductive' and a drain on the
'private market sector' because public sector developments do not conform to
'economic laws' of 'market-commodity production', are all the more arbitrary in the
light of forms of welfare provision developed over the post-war period. Criticisms of
public service provision mobilise a stereotypical conception of 'the welfare state'
which conveniently disregards the broad range of welfare benefits provided by the
state for those in secure employment.
The latent assumptions which commonly underlie these criticisms [of the public
sector].. .have little relevance while they remain attached to a stereotype of social welfare
which represents only the more visible part of the real world of welfare. The social history
of our times inevitably becomes, in the process, sadly distorted (Titmuss 1958:53).
As Sinfield argues (1986), Titmuss' contribution regarding the 'social division of
welfare' is very relevant today. Titmuss identified three systems of 'social services'
— social welfare, fiscal welfare and occupational welfare. The first, 'social welfare'
refers to the traditional area of social policy and administration generally
understood as 'welfare state' services. Sinfield prefers to call this 'public welfare' to
emphasise the visible nature of the welfare provision. The second, tax or fiscal
welfare includes tax reliefs and allowances from the government, though these are
not included in the public expenditure accounts despite the fact that they provide
'similar benefits and express similar purpose in the recognition of dependent needs
and social welfare' (Titmuss 1958:44). Occupational welfare covers benefits received
by an employee through or as a result of employment, including industrial and
fringe benefits.
Thus, those who benefit from both fiscal and occupational welfare are those in
secure employment and especially, well paid employment. Fiscal and occupational
welfare are funded by government in the form of 'tax expenditures'. The result is a
reduction in tax revenue which not only limits the amount of resources perceived to
be available for 'public welfare' but also may be reflected in lower wages and salaries
(Sinfield 1986).
Titmuss argues that though the three systems are regarded as distinct, independent
systems perpetuating the stereotypical conception of 'the welfare state', the division
is contrived. He suggests that the three systems
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signify that man can no longer be regarded simply as a 'unit of labour power'; they all
reflect contemporary opinion that man is not wholly responsible for his dependency, and
they all accept obligations for meeting needs of the individual and the family (Titmuss
1958:3).
I would, however, like to develop further the framework delineating the social
divisions of welfare as I believe it is crucial to the debate about 'market' distribution.
The most salient analytical point illustrated by attempts to specify the nature of the
social divisions of welfare is precisely that the division between 'economic
determinants' and 'social influences/outcomes' is impossible to sustain. All forms
of the divisions of social welfare - 'public', 'fiscal' and 'occupational', constitute
public expenditure on welfare, effecting a distribution of resources. The debate
about the social divisions of welfare then, needs to be made absolutely central to the
debate about welfare 'efficiency' and 'market' distribution.
It is therefore important to emphasise that typically, the present Government, and
governments in the past, have maintained the false distinctions between the various
forms of welfare identified by construing both the 'fiscal' and 'occupational' forms
of welfare as essentially 'productive' processes, compatible with the operation of
'market forces'. In contrast, 'public' or 'social' welfare is depicted as 'unproductive'
and incompatible with the operation of the 'market'. Consequently, the contrived
link between productivity and market forces on the one hand, and low productivity
(or unproductiveness) with state service provision on the other, is extended.
This process of separating out and undermining the legitimacy of public welfare
highlights, I believe, the contradictions inherent in approaches assuming market
validity. As Mukherjee cogently points out in respect of state responsibilities:
Statutory intervention.. .has been in the interest of re-establishing freer markets. From
long usage, a seal of respectability is attached to government intervention in making
product and capital markets work in a way approximately resembling text book models
(1974:3).
Sustaining the notion that there is a credible system of 'market distribution', even if
its perceived mode of operation falls short of the model described in text books, is, I
would suggest, part of the process which increasingly undermines the legitimacy, not
only of 'public' welfare, but also of social welfare in its broadest sense, as it
concerns understandings of the production and distribution of resources.
Conclusion
In proposing that there has been a public sector wage and employment policy
continuum bound largely by 'economic' rationales, I have suggested that social
theory is centrally implicated in the current crisis in welfare. Controversies
concerning welfare reflect problems of understanding regarding processes of
resource distribution and allocation. The area of 'labour market' research is an
important area of stratification research but has glossed over important theoretical
questions. Specifying the mechanisms by which outcomes are produced is an issue of
theoretical capacity. The problems of theories of wage determination, in particular
in relation to the public service sector, constitute an explanatory crisis and consist in
404 FROM PUBLIC PROVISION TO PRIVATISATION
the attempted subsumption of social processes under the centrality of market-
commodity production. The contradiction inherent in this separation of 'economic'
processes from additional 'social' influences prevents an endogenous and
theoretically powerful account of social practice.
Notes
1. I wish briefly to elaborate this proposition as it is important to distinguish it
from the (predominantly functionalist-marxist) arguments that welfare is
functional for capitalism or similarly, that state welfare developments have and
can merely serve to compensate partially individuals against the full impact of
market/capitalist forces (c/. O'Connor 1973; George and Wilding 1976; Gough
1979; Taylor-Gooby and Dale 1981). These arguments deny processes of social
change and transformation of any real solidity and thus can only present an
impoverished strategy for progress. In contrast to such arguments, the point I
wish to stress is that, to a large degree, problems of welfare are borne out of the
restrictive conceptual parameters determining this debate. Problems of
understanding and explaining social processes are, then, an integral part of
'material' experiences/events. A more promising line of argument is that
welfare 'increases the need for more sharply focused social criticism' (Wilensky
1975:110).
2. Despite his pioneering work conceptualising citizenship and the right to welfare
as consisting of legal through to social and even moral rights, Marshall too
perceives the role of welfare to be that ofmodifying the operations of 'economic
market processes' (1981:107).
3. The economic/social divide apparently underlined by welfare developments is
rooted in the convention which maintains an axiomatic separation of
conceptions of 'natural' and 'social' phenomena. As Stewart et al. argue (1980),
the dissolution of this distinction is necessary to facilitate a more adequate
understanding of human activity. Such distinctions are, however, both diverse
and deep-seated. This is an area which I hope to develop in later work.
4. Neoclassical advocates of the market as a 'social institution' notwithstanding
(Barry 1987), the 'welfare judgement' implied by a 'market' allocation of
resources consisting of an equilibriating system of exchange, is that individual
private actions in the market economy bring about the most beneficial
allocation of resources. Thus the institution of the 'market' could only (and at
best) be argued to have 'social' outcomes but not entail social processes.
5. Ironically perhaps, Price's suggestions are being applied in the public service
sector presently. For example, in the health service, the stricter application of
cash limits expressed in terms of cash expenditures rather than volume
expenditures (introduced in 1981) has certainly constrained specific expenditure
programmes and continues to do so. Also, the 'competitive' tendering
programme, euphemistically presented as the opportunity for ancillary services
in the NHS to prove 'just how productive and efficient they really are' has
brought about the widespread introduction of productivity bargaining in a
relatively short period of time as in-house teams attempt to retain the services.
The proliferation of 'efficiency exercises' and incentive bonus payment
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schemes, explicitly linking pay rewards to 'productivity gains', is precisely the
'remedy' prescribed by Price - 'productivity measures' are imputed to services
classified as 'unproductive' in order to persuade the public that the services are
improving despite expenditure and labour force reductions.
6. To this end, all non-wage costs are ignored in the analysis — an 'incidental
premise' simplifying the mathematical model.
7. The model assumes that there is no 'x-inefficiency' in the system, that is, it is
assumed that the services are being produced at minimum cost, with no over-
staffing — the most efficient technologies being employed.
8. Fuchs (1968), provides an empirical confirmation of Baumol's thesis.
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